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Abstract
This thesis presents three empirical analyses on different aspects of the provision of long term care
(LTC), in the paid and unpaid settings, to older adults in Scotland. It contributes to the academic
literature by deepening our understanding in three interrelated areas.
Firstly, it explores variation in the provision of Free Personal Care (FPC) across Scottish local
authorities, in order to establish whether or not FPC provision matches the need of the population.
The analysis suggests that there are significant differences in FPC provision, even after accounting
for personal care need. This raises equity concerns, suggesting that older Scots might be more or
less likely to receive FPC, depending on which local authority they reside.
Secondly, it investigates the interaction between paid care and unpaid care, to understand how
unpaid carers influence older people’s use of FPC. In particular, it aims to establish whether or not
unpaid carers substitute or complement FPC. The paper finds that individuals who have an unpaid
carer receive around one hour and a quarter more FPC each week. This raises concerns for the
pressure unpaid carers might have on FPC resources and for individuals without unpaid carers,
who might not be getting the formal help that they need.
Lastly, it focuses on unpaid carers themselves and explores whether or not providing care has
an impact on their Standard of Living (SoL). Specifically, it estimates the monetary amount an
unpaid carer would need to be compensated by in order to reach the same SoL as a non-carer. In
doing so, it offers evidence for the extent to which the current Carers Allowance is sufficient in
compensating them for the material impact of their care giving duties. The results suggest that
unpaid carers have a significantly lower SoL compared to non-carers and demonstrate that the
Carers Allowance falls considerably short of compensating unpaid carers for the loss in SoL they
experience due to caring.
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1 | Introduction
The European Commission’s report on ageing in 2018 showed that average life expectancy in
the European Union is expected to increase by seven years between 2016 and 2070 (European
Commission 2018). Often, older age is associated with poorer health (Walter et al. 2016, Cam-
polina et al. 2014, Beltrán-Sánchez et al. 2016). There is a growing concern among policy makers
and governments throughout the world, about the effect such demographic shifts will have on the
provision and use of Long Term Care (LTC) services.
LTC services help older adults who have become limited in their ability to perform daily
activities, to live at home as independently and safely as possible. LTC provision often involves
help with Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs).
ADLs are fundamental self-care tasks such as washing, dressing and eating. Care for ADLs
is often referred to as personal care. IADLs refer to activities that require more thinking and
organisational skills such as shopping, housework, taking medication and paying bills. Help with
IADLs is often referred to as home care.
LTC services are provided through paid and unpaid channels. Unpaid care is care that is
provided by family members, partners or friends to those who require help because they are ill,
frail or have a disability (Howard 2002).Paid care services, or formal care services, consist of both
residential and community services, and are provided by governments, voluntary organisations and
private firms, or a mixture of the three. In Scotland, the legal framework for formal care provision
is set by the Scottish Parliament. Formal care is provided by each of the thirty-two local authorities
and encompasses a variety of services including residential care, social support, housing support,
telecare services, meals services, home care, personal care and self-directed support.
This thesis presents three standalone research papers on several of the fundamental emerging
issues surrounding LTC provision to older adults, via both the paid and unpaid channels. Its
overall contribution is to deepen our understanding of these issues using a mixture of data sources.
Scotland provides an interesting context in which to carry out this exploration, partly due to a
number of changes that LTC organisation and policy has undergone in the last two decades.
In particular, in 1999, the Royal Commission on LTC published its report on the funding of
LTC for older people in the UK. One of its main recommendations (recommendation 6.4) was that
"personal care should be available for those individuals who need it, after an assessment" (Royal
Commission on Long Term Care 1999, Chapter 6). Specifically, the report proposed that personal
care should be available to those in need, without a cost (Royal Commission on Long Term Care
1999). Personal care, is defined in the Regulation of Care (Scotland) Act 2001 as:
"care which relates to the day to day physical tasks and needs of the person cared for (as for
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example, but without prejudice to that generality, to eating and washing) and to mental processes
related to those tasks and needs (as for example, but without prejudice to that generality, to
remembering to eat and wash)" (Scottish Executive 2001a, p.6).
Scotland was, and remains, the only one of the four United Kingdom (UK) nations to take
the Royal Commission’s recommendation on board and soon after the report was published,
the Scottish Executive pledged its commitment to introduce Free Personal and Nursing Care
(FPNC). They also established the Care Development Group (CDG) to report on the introduction
of FPNC. The recommendations from the CDG’s final report (CDG 2001) were fully endorsed
by the Scottish Executive and incorporated into the Community Care and Health (Scotland) Act
2002, which provided the legislative backdrop for the implementation of FPNC from 1 July 2002
(Scottish Executive 2002). The FPNC policy can be split into two categories: care in care homes
(which covers personal and nursing care) and care at home (which covers personal care only).
This thesis is concerned with the latter. This part of the policy states that personal care should be
free to anyone assessed as needing it who is aged 65 or over, with no means test for the service.
On the other hand, nursing or personal care need for residents living in care homes is assessed and
a flat rate payment is made on behalf of the local authority to the care provider.
FPNC became the Scottish Parliaments flagship policy and it is the clearest example of Scot-
land taking a radically different approach to Westminster on an important policy issue. In England,
despite several reviews and debates into the funding and organisation of social care, there have
been very few reforms to social care policy and this stalemate has been described as "one of
the greatest unresolved policy issues of our time" (Marsh,S 2017). Meanwhile in Scotland, the
Scottish Government has committed to extend the policy to cover those under 65 by April 2019
(Scottish Government 2019).
At the same time as the implementation of FPNC in Scotland, the Scottish Government en-
couraged local authorities to "shift the balance of care" towards providing care in the community.
This shift is part of their 2020 Vision and sits within the Health and Social Care Delivery Plan
(Scottish Government 2016a). Specifically, the movement into the community aims to ensure that
older Scots spend less time in care homes or hospital. Instead the emphasis is on aiding frail older
people to stay in their own homes or a homely setting, for as long as possible. As a result, there
has been more of a shift towards delivering LTC services in a person’s own home in order to help
individuals maintain their independence and enable them to live in their own homes for as long as
possible. This has included a shift away from residential care homes - there were 4% fewer older
adults in Scottish care homes in 2017 compared to 2007, despite increases in the numbers of older
people requiring care (Information Services Division 2018).
In addition, the Scottish Government has attempted to increase personalisation in LTC by
introducing the Social Care (Self-Directed Support (SDS)) (Scotland) Act 2013 (Scottish Parlia-
ment 2013). The Act aims to give clients more choice and control over their care packages and sits
alongside the Government’s wider NHS Quality Strategy which puts patients and their values at the
centre of care (Scottish Government 2010). There are four SDS options available to eligible social
care clients and local authorities have a legal duty to offer clients these options. The first option
is a direct payment. The direct payment option allows individuals to purchase and commission
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their own social care services. The second option is to direct the available resource. Under this
option the client chooses the services he/she would like to receive with the sum of money they
have been assessed as requiring, and the local authority arranges those services for the client. The
third option is for local authority arranged services and is the traditional way of arranging services.
Lastly, the fourth option allows clients to choose any combination of the first three options. There
is significant variation in the implementation rate of SDS across local authorities, some of which
is reflected in recording practices but is also due to differences in population need (Health and
Social Care Analysis Division 2018).
Moreover, in order to improve the continuity of care provided to people in Scotland and
to make more efficient use of limited resources, the Public Bodies (Joint Working) (Scotland)
Act 2014 set out the legislative framework for the integration of health and social care services
(Scottish Parliament 2016). In 2016, 31 Integration Authorities (one for each of the 32 local
authorities in Scotland with the exception of Highland) were established with a view to better
coordinate communication and working between NHS boards and local authorities. The Integra-
tion Authorities are responsible for the governance, planning and resourcing of adult social care
services, adult primary care and community health services and some hospital services (Scottish
Parliament 2016). Integration of health and care services is also a key component of the Health and
Social Care Delivery Plan and again its aim to shift care out of hospitals and into the community
(Scottish Government 2016a).
The Scottish Government also acknowledges the significant contribution that unpaid carers
make towards LTC provision in Scotland. Unpaid carers not only provide physical help with ADLs
and IADLs, they also supervise and monitor the cared for, and anticipate their future care needs
(Farina et al. 2017). Without their contribution, the social care system would most likely collapse.
It is therefore vital that they are properly supported. To ensure this, the Scottish Government
introduced the Carers (Scotland) Act 2016, which provides key legislation designed to support
adult and young carers in Scotland (Scottish Government 2017a). In particular, the Act aims
to support carer’s health and well-being, as well as making caring more sustainable. The first
measures of the Act came into effect on the 1st April 2018. These included a requirement on
local authorities to provide information and advice to carers; to provide adult carer support plans
to set out the carer’s personal outcomes and identified needs; and to give support to carers, based
on their needs, according to local eligibility criteria. The Act contributes towards the Scottish
Government’s wider vision of a healthier and fairer Scotland.
Finally, Scotland has been devolved several powers from Westminster under the Scotland Act
2016 (Scottish Executive 2016). These powers include social security benefits which affect older
people such as disability and carer’s benefits. To manage and deliver those benefits to the people
of Scotland, the Scottish Government has set up an Executive Agency - Social Security Scotland
(SSS). SSS have committed to placing dignity, fairness and respect at the heart of their practice.
This commitment is certainly a change from the current approach taken by the Department for
Work and Pensions (DWP) and could have implications for the future provision of the benefits.
It is therefore increasingly important that we fully understand the aspects of LTC provision in
Scotland, which might influence the demand for such benefits, in order to anticipate the impact
that both demographic and policy changes will have.
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A further feature of the Scottish system which provides a unique opportunity to study LTC
provision to older adults, is its collection of administrative data. Since the 1980s, the Scottish
Executive has collected information on all clients in Scotland receiving care services. This in-
formation is collected by individual local authorities. In 2013, the previous Home Care and
SDS surveys were brought together to form the Social Care Survey (SCS). The SCS contains
information on care packages delivered to all care clients in Scotland and on any SDS packages.
The data collected usually covers the final week in March each year. The clients in the SCS are
therefore those whose care needs are being met. That is, it does not include those who might be on
a waiting list for care or those who are having their needs met privately either from unpaid carers
or from paid private carers.
The SCS is a unique survey: as far as I am aware, no other country collects detailed information
from its entire social care population on a regular basis. To access data from the SCS, an applica-
tion must be made to the Scottish Government detailing the purpose of the research and what data
are required to answer the research question.1. Ethical approval to access this data was granted by
the Scottish Government in January 2017 (project number SG000-000850). Specifically, access
was granted to the entire SCS from 2014-2016, for all social care clients in Scotland aged 50 and
over. This data were made newly available as part of this project and as such a significant amount
of time was spent pre-processing them, before using them in the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3.
In summary, the changing policy landscape in Scotland surrounding LTC provision highlights
the Scottish Governments commitment and interest in improving care that is delivered to older
people, their health, their access to services, as well as ensuring that unpaid carers are supported
in their roles. At a time when Scotland is faced with an increasingly older population who are often
living with multiple chronic conditions, it is becoming increasingly important that we understand
the provision of LTC services to those individuals.
This thesis presents three standalone research papers on several of the fundamental emerging
issues surrounding LTC provision to older adults in Scotland. Chapters 2 and 3 are solely my own
work, whilst Chapter 4 is co-authored with my primary supervisor Professor David Bell2. In what
follows is a brief description of each of the three chapters, including their aims, contributions,
methods and results.
Chapter 2: Variations in Domiciliary Free Personal Care Across Scottish Local Authorities
The first paper is focused on the provision of formal care services. In particular, domiciliary FPC
services in Scotland. The responsibility for the provision of these services is held by individual
local authorities, which can mean that despite central government’s pledge to the universal cover-
age of services, disparities at the local level can still arise. In fact, the starting point for the paper
originates from the existence of stark differences in the provision of FPC to the over 65s between
local authorities. These differences were previously noted by two independent reviews of FPC that
were carried out in 2008 by Audit Scotland and Lord Sutherland (Sutherland 2008, Audit Sotland
2008). The paper aims to examine whether or not these differences can be explained by measured
1Further details on accessing the data can be found here.
2David’s input into this chapter was in the early stages of the research via discussions surrounding the application of the SoL
framework to unpaid carers, after which the work in this chapter is entirely my own.
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need. In turn, this investigation permits us to determine the existence of geographic inequity in
FPC provision and the factors which might drive such inequity.
The paper contributes to the existing research on equity in care provision in several ways.
Firstly, the majority of the literature focuses on equity with respect to health care services, whilst
this paper focuses on equity within the long term care market. Secondly, it explores geographic
inequity, which has also largely been ignored by the existing literature. Moreover, the Scottish
context offers a unique opportunity to investigate geographic variation in LTC provision due to
its commitment to the universal coverage of such services. Lastly, the paper makes use of an
unexampled administrative dataset which allows an investigation of FPC provision to be carried
out at lower levels of geography.
The investigation into geographic inequity begins with a descriptive analysis into the potential
influences on the provision of FPC within a local authority, followed by the development of basic
econometric models to look at those influences in one framework at both the local authority and
lower data zone level geographies. We use a mixture of publicly available and administrative data
sources over the period 2013-2016.
In summary, the paper concludes that there is evidence of geographic inequity in the provision
of FPC in Scotland. In particular, the analysis suggests that the differences between the FPC rate
and the rate of disability are not consistent across local authorities, suggesting that a needy indi-
vidual might be more or less likely to receive care depending on where they live. One explanation
for this is that local authorities differ in terms of their practices for managing the demand for FPC.
In any case, the results suggest that there is potentially unmet need for FPC. Whilst unmet need is
difficult to measure, its existence will inevitably lead to an increased reliance on unpaid carers to
step in and fill the gap. At a time when resources for LTC are being squeezed, governments might
even try to encourage unpaid carers to step in, to reduce pressure on government-provided care
such as FPC. It is therefore crucial to understand the role that unpaid carers play in the provision
of LTC and how they might influence older peoples’ use of formal care services. Chapter 3 aims
to add to this understanding.
Chapter 3: Utilisation of Personal Care Services in Scotland: the Influence of Unpaid Carers
The availability of unpaid care is recognised as a potential influence on the demand for paid
care services since one might substitute or complement the other. The current restructuring of
policy surrounding unpaid carers in Scotland, in particular the Carers Act (Scottish Government
2017a), is aimed at supporting unpaid carers in their role and might encourage unpaid carers to
undertake care-giving roles. At the same time, population ageing and the increased likelihood of
older individuals living with multiple chronic health conditions is also contributing to an increased
demand for unpaid carers.
If unpaid care substitutes paid care, then such policy and demographic shifts could lead to a
decreased demand for formal care services provided by the government. On the other hand, if
unpaid care complements formal care, then there could be an increased demand for those services
and as a result an increased strain on the public purse. Therefore, in order to anticipate the effect
of such changes on the overall distribution of LTC provision, it is essential to understand the
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relationship between the two care channels.
Chapter 3 seeks to do this by looking at the interaction between paid and unpaid care, and
determining whether or not unpaid care and paid care are substitutes or complements – a matter
which is fiercely debated in the existing literature.
Specifically, the aim of the paper is to explore how unpaid carers influence FPC use by Scots
aged 65 and over. Once again, the Scottish context provides an interesting context in which to
investigate this relationship since personal care is provided for free, with no means test, to all
individuals aged 65 and over. This policy might alter the incentives faced by unpaid carers and as
a result lead to different conclusions about how unpaid care affects FPC use, when compared to
other jurisdictions.
The paper contributes to the existing literature by investigating the relationship between unpaid
and paid care, using Scotland’s unique administrative Social Care Survey (SCS) data for the years
2014- 2016. We compare Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Generalised Linear Models (GLM) and
Two-Part Models (2PM), and conduct a variety of sensitivity analysis to deal with endogeneity
concerns.
The findings from the models suggest that unpaid care and personal care services are com-
plements. In particular, the presence of an unpaid carer increases weekly personal care hours by
about 1 hour and 14 minutes per week, on average, ceteris paribus. This relationship might be
due to unpaid carers advocating on behalf of the cared for, and demanding services from the local
authority for them. They might do this because they require more support to enable them to remain
in the labour force. It might also be the case that the type of care unpaid carers provide is different
to that provided by formal carers.
The implications of this result are concerning for two reasons. Firstly, it might imply that
encouraging unpaid care, as might be the case due to the new Carers Act and proposed increase
in the Carers Allowance in particular, could lead to increased costs to the government as unpaid
carers put pressure on local authorities to increase the care provided to their family members.
Secondly, the finding highlights a potential concern surrounding the well-being and outcomes of
older adults who do not have an unpaid carer present to help them access the care that they might
need. Unmet need has also been identified in formal care recipients who have an unpaid carer
helping them (Brimblecombe et al. 2018). The existence of such unmet need once again puts
pressure on unpaid carers to support older people and there are most likely to be costs associated
with that. Some of those potential costs are explored in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4: The Cost of Unpaid Care: a Standard of Living Approach
Once again, the finding of a complementary relationship between paid and unpaid care could
mean that a consequence of an increase in the provision of unpaid care is pressure on the public
purse due to a heightened demand for formal care services. Of course, this is only one side of the
coin and with an increased provision of unpaid care comes an increased need to understand the
consequences of unpaid caring from the caregiver’s perspective.
Whilst it is widely acknowledged that unpaid carers experience costs due to care giving –
carers are given a Carers Allowance in the form of a cash benefit to help them cover such additional
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costs - they are seldom recognised in economic evaluations. Ignoring the costs of unpaid care in
this way could lead to an inefficient allocation of resources.
This paper seeks to add to the literature on the consequences of unpaid care by estimating
the monetary cost associated with the provision of unpaid care provision. In particular, we use
data from Scottish households in the 2013/14 – 2016/17 UK Family Resources Survey (FRS) to
estimate the cost of unpaid care in terms of any change in Standard of Living (SoL) an unpaid carer
experiences, due to their care giving role. In doing so, we aim to provide evidence for the extent to
which the current Carers Allowance appropriately compensates unpaid carers for the service they
provide.
We contribute to the literature by focusing on the material impact of unpaid care provision
rather than on time spent caring, which is the common approach in the existing literature. More-
over, we offer the first evidence on the ability of the Carers Allowance to compensate carers for
the additional material costs they face due to care giving.
The findings from the paper suggest that unpaid caring is associated with a significant re-
duction in SoL, especially for those who live with the person they are caring for. Specifically,
depending on which functional form of income the model supposes, we find that unpaid carers
who are living with the person being cared for would need to be compensated by around £229
per week in order to reach the same SoL as their non-caring counterparts. We conclude that the
existing Carers Allowance falls considerably short of compensating unpaid carers for the reduction
in SoL they experience due to care giving. In particular, it would need to increase to a level that is
at least 3 times higher.
The remainder of this document will present the three papers as standalone research outputs,
each with their own review of the existing literature, methods, results and discussion. Once again,
the three papers are thematically bound together by the overarching concept of LTC provision to
older adults in Scotland. In a final step, Chapter 5 offers a summary of the findings and suggests
the potential implications of this body of work for future research in the area.
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2 | Variations in Domiciliary Free Personal Care Across Scottish
Local Authorities
Elizabeth Lemmon
Abstract
Equity, or equal access for equal need, is frequently an objective of social care systems. However,
responsibility for social care provision often lies with local government. This can mean that, de-
spite central government commitment to universal coverage, geographic variation in the provision
of services may occur. In this paper an investigation into the variation in free personal care (FPC)
in Scotland, a service provided to those aged 65 and over who need help with personal care tasks
such as washing and dressing etc, is conducted. To do this, a mixture of publicly available and
administrative data sources over the period 2013-2016 are used. Both descriptive and econometric
methods are employed to investigate the existence of geographic inequity in FPC provision. The
results suggest that the variation in FPC provision is not fully explained by variation in measured
need, implying that inequity exists between local authorities, suggesting that receipt of FPC might
be more or less likely depending on which local authority a person lives.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The notion of universal coverage is generally understood to imply equal provision for equal need,
irrespective of other factors such as geography, income, ethnicity etc. This concept of equity
implies that there are no differences in access or use of services where needs are equal (Mangalore
& Knapp 2006). Equity is recognised by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as a desirable
goal for all health systems (WHO 2000). In 2017, the Commonwealth Fund ranked the NHS in
the UK as first in terms of equity of provision, in a comparison with ten developed health systems
(Schneider 2017). However, despite best efforts of most European countries, barriers to equal
access to care still persist (Doorslaer et al. 2004, Terraneo 2015).
This paper aims to determine whether or not variation in Free Personal Care (FPC) provision
across Scotland is matched by similar differences in personal care need in the population. In
doing so, it aims to offer evidence on the existence of geographic inequity in FPC provision is,
alongside evidence of what factors could be driving this inequity. Understanding the existence and
extent of inequity within health and care systems has attracted much attention in the literature. In
terms of health care, inequity has been identified with respect to income (d’Uva & Jones 2009,
Doorslaer et al. 2004) and various indicators of socio-economic status such as education, ethnicity
and employment status (Terraneo 2015, Regidor et al. 2008, d’Uva & Jones 2009).
The existing literature on inequity with respect to healthcare provision can be grouped in two
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ways. The first focuses on horizontal equity, as described above, which is defined as the equal
treatment of individuals with equal need. These studies generally aim to measure the extent of
horizontal inequity, typically by using some version of a Concentration Index whereby the actual
distribution of health care utilisation (ranked by some socio-economic indicator) is compared to
a needs adjusted distribution of utilisation (d’Uva et al. 2009, Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer 2000,
Van Doorslaer et al. 2000, Doorslaer et al. 2004, García-Gómez et al. 2015, Van de Poel et al.
2012).
The second approach focusses on explaining variation in health care utilisation and attempts
to identify the factors which drive this. These studies use regression analysis to explicitly model
utilisation as a function of both needs and non-needs factors (Trydegård & Thorslund 2001,
Propper et al. 2005, Regidor et al. 2008, Cookson et al. 2012, Fernandez & Forder 2015, Otto
et al. 2018, Yardim & Uner 2018, Terraneo 2015, Morris et al. 2005, d’Uva & Jones 2009). In such
models, the significance of non-needs variables are interpreted as evidence of inequity in provision
(d’Uva & Jones 2009). Unlike the first approach, which is limited in its focus on horizontal equity,
the second approach also incorporates the principle of vertical equity (Abasolo et al. 2001). That
is, individuals with greater need should receive more treatment.
In this paper the focus is shifted from equity in the provision of healthcare to equity in the
provision of long term care (LTC). In Scotland, LTC services are organised and delivered by each
of the 32 local authorities. The starting point for the focus on LTC stems from the existence of stark
disparities in the provision of free personal care (FPC) between local authorities in Scotland. To
be specific, based on our definition of care provision, the rate of provision in some local authorities
is up to double that of another.
As discussed in Chapter 1, Free Personal and Nursing Care (FPNC) was introduced in Scot-
land in 2002, on the back of the Royal Commission’s main recommendation (recommendation
6.4)(Royal Commission on Long Term Care 1999, Chapter 6). The basis for their recommendation
stemmed primarily from a desire for equity in relation to the costs faced by, for example, a cancer
patient and a dementia patient, who would face similar costs yet only a cancer patient would
receive treatment free of charge. For this reason, the report proposed that personal care should
be available to those in need, without a cost (Royal Commission on Long Term Care 1999). The
FPNC policy can be split into two categories: care in care homes (which covers personal and
nursing care) and care at home (which covers personal care only). This paper is concerned with
the latter and will here on be referred to as FPC. This part of the policy states that personal care
should be free to any adult over the age of 65 who requires it, subject to a needs assessment.
As with any universal coverage of health or social care, the FPC policy is intended to promote
geographic equity in personal care (CDG 2001). Eligibility for FPC is subject to a needs assess-
ment, carried out by the local authority. The Scottish Executive’s guidance for local authorities
on FPNC set out information on the needs assessment of individuals. Specifically, older persons’
needs are assessed according to the Single Shared Assessment of Community Care Needs (Scottish
Executive 2001b). This process involves a set of minimum standard check-lists to be used by local
authorities when assessing the care needs of older people within their area. The assessment of care
needs then determines a Resource Use Measure (RUM) to indicate what resources are required to
meet the individual’s needs. RUM was developed especially to promote equity in care provision
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between local authorities as it was noted at the time that often people with the same needs would
get differing levels of service depending on where they live (Scottish Executive 2001b).
In 2008, Audit Scotland and Lord Sutherland reviewed FPNC in Scotland (Sutherland 2008,
Audit Scotland 2008). Both reports highlighted equity concerns surrounding the variability in
provision of care between local authorities. The Audit Sotland (2008) report also identified that
ambiguities in the FPNC guidance and legislation led to distinct local authority interpretations,
and thus differences across Scotland, in how FPNC was implemented. Furthermore, the reports
noted that local authorities were using eligibility criteria and waiting lists as a means to manage
demand for FPC. This resulted in older people receiving different levels of service depending on
where they lived. As a result of recommendations from the reviews, the Scottish Government
and the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) developed a set of national standard
eligibility criteria and waiting times for FPNC under the National Eligibility Criteria framework
(Scottish Government 2009). The aim of such a framework was to achieve greater consistency
across local authorities and transparency with respect to access to services for older people.
However, whilst the framework provides guidance on how to prioritise personal care clients
according to their need, it remains the responsibility of individual local authorities to assess the
needs of each person, via the single shared assessment, and ultimately decide whether or not
their needs warrant care provision at home. Therefore, it is still possible that local variation in
FPC provision persists. Since the National Eligibility Criteria were established, there has been no
formal review of geographic variation in FPC provision across Scotland.
Furthermore, Scotland’s LTC system has been subject to significant legislative change in
recent years. Differences in the interpretation of these changes may have led to differences in
the implementation of care provision across local authorities, as might legacy effects of their own
previous care policies. At the same time, the decentralisation of health and care funding means
that local authorities can make their own decisions about care provision, and even in a system with
legislated universal coverage, significant variation between local authorities is possible.
This paper aims to examine whether the disparities in FPC provision are matched by local lev-
els of need. Aggregated data at different geographical levels are used. In particular, local authority
and lower "data zone"1 levels. This permits us to firstly check whether equity is achieved at a local
authority level, and secondly, to identify those factors associated with inequity in provision. We
also estimate spatially autoregressive models to investigate whether there are FPC provision spill
over effects to neighbouring areas.
The paper contributes to the equity literature in four unique ways. Firstly, it focusses on
equity with respect to social care or LTC, which has received little attention in the literature
(García-Gómez et al. 2015, Fernandez & Forder 2015). Secondly, it investigates geographical
equity, which has also been largely neglected in the literature. Thirdly, the Scottish context for
LTC services provides a unique backdrop to study equity, since unlike many social care systems,
LTC services in Scotland have a universal coverage element. In addition to this, Scotland is
soon to be devolved powers over disability benefits from Westminster, increasing the importance
of understanding the demand for such benefits, which are likely correlated with LTC services.
Finally, it exploits a unique administrative dataset.
1A data zone is a small-area statistical geography in Scotland containing populations of between 500 and 1,000 residents.
19
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes the data and key
variables. Section 2.3 outlines the descriptive and multivariate analysis. Section 2.4 presents the
results. Finally, Section 2.5 discusses the results and concludes.
2.2 KEY VARIABLES & DATA
This section outlines the key variables, alongside their data sources, which will form the model
of FPC provision in Scotland, formally outlined in Section 2.3. The data used for the analysis
come from a combination of publicly available sources and administrative data held by the Scot-
tish Government, namely the Social Care Survey (SCS)2. A description of each variable and its
corresponding data source can be found in Table 2.3 in the Appendix.
Key Variables
Free Personal Care Rate (FPCR)
The FPCR within a local authority is the proportion of those aged 65+ receiving FPC. In a
traditional market setting, the FPCR would be determined by the interaction of demand and supply
influences. However, in the market for FPC in Scotland, since the price of FPC is zero, demand
for the service would be infinite and as a result the supply of FPC becomes a binding constraint.
Thus, we observe only those clients who actually receive FPC - the so called ’met need’ for FPC.
As discussed, the FPC legislation requires that care should be provided on the basis of individual
need.
Need
We have chosen to use disability benefits data to measure local authority need for personal care.
The two main disability benefits available to older people in Scotland are Attendance Allowance
(AA) and Personal Independent Payments (PIP). Formerly, PIP was called Disability Living Al-
lowance (DLA). An individual can only receive one of these benefits and both are administered
at a UK level by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). Receipt of either benefits has no
implications for receipt of FPC at home and like FPC, neither benefit is means tested. We argue
that since the assessment for disability benefits is uniformly administered across Scotland by DWP,
receipt of the benefits should not be affected by geography and it will therefore accurately represent
personal care needs across the whole of Scotland. Furthermore, as far as we are aware, there is no
existing evidence to suggest that take up rates for disability benefits differ across Scotland.
AA is a disability benefit that is exclusively available to older people (aged 65+) who have a
disability severe enough that they require someone to help look after them. This help is specifically
help with personal care such as washing, dressing, eating, using the toilet etc. Thus, the AA
provides a good indicator of the level of personal care need of the population aged 65+. AA
is paid at two different weekly rates which depend on the level of disability a person has, and
therefore the level of help they require. The lower rate is paid if the person requires "frequent
help or constant supervision during the day, or supervision at night" (GOV.UK 2018a). The higher
2Ethical approval to access this data was granted by the Scottish Government in January 2017. Project number:SG000-000850.
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rate is paid for those who require "help or supervision throughout both day and night" or for the
terminally ill (GOV.UK 2018a).
PIP is a disability benefit available to those aged 16-64 to help with extra costs that are caused
by a long term ill-health or disability. To be eligible for PIP this health condition or disability
must cause the individual difficulties with daily living or getting around (or both). Furthermore,
an individual must have been experiencing these difficulties for 3 months and expect them to
continue to affect them for at least 9 months (GOV.UK 2018b). An individual who received PIP
before the age of 65 will continue to receive it beyond 65 and will not be eligible for AA. PIP is
comprised of two parts: a daily living part and a mobility part. An individual can receive one or
both of the PIP components, depending on how severely their disability affects them. As with AA,
each part has a lower and higher weekly rate.
In order to claim AA or PIP, an individual must complete a detailed form, which describes their
level of disability or illness and its effects. Both benefits cover detailed questions about personal
care needs. The DWP use this information to determine eligibility and at what rate. In some
circumstances DWP might contact the applicant’s GP for confirmation of medical information or
arrange for a health professional to visit the applicant to carry out a face-to-face consultation or
medical examination.
The data on these benefits is used to calculate the Disability Rate (DR) for each local authority
in Scotland, which is the proportion of the population aged 65+ receiving AA or DLA/PIP. Since
the assessment for disability benefits should be uniformly administered across Scotland by DWP,
such data should not be affected by geography. Furthermore, the spread of disability within a local
authority could indicate how needs are distributed and as a result play a role in determining the
FPCR. Specifically, if disability is more spread out, then there are likely to be individuals from
both ends of the needs distribution within the population. As a result, local authorities with needs
that are more spread out might benefit from an economies of scale type effect compared to those
with a narrow spread. To capture this, we calculate the standard deviation of the DR from the data
zone level DRs.
Other individual characteristics which have been shown to predict need for LTC and which
include age and gender (Keene & Li 2005). We therefore also include the number of people aged
80+ and the number of females aged 65+ as a proportion of the population aged 65+, as possible
indicators of the FPCR by local authority. In addition, we include life expectancy at age 65 since
this could also provide an indication of the need for FPC. These data come from the National
Records of Scotland (NRS).
It is argued that the DR, as calculated using the disability benefits described above, will provide
a strong measure of the personal care need of the population because the assessment for those
benefits is specifically based on the need for personal care. Compared to previous literature, which
uses indirect measures of need such as age, gender and life expectancy, this approach provides a
direct measure of personal care need.
Funding and Spending
Although local authorities have a legal obligation to provide FPC to those who need it, they
are limited in the resources they have to do so. Their funding comes largely from the Scottish
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Government, though they also raise revenues through council tax, fees and charges. The Scottish
Government allocates revenue funding to each of Scotland’s 32 local authorities through the Grant
Aided Expenditure (GAE). The total GAE is split into 89 individual local authority sub-services
and each sub-service has its own allocation methodology (The Scottish Government 2017-18). The
methodology behind GAE aims to take into account the needs of the local authority populations,
and allocates funds accordingly. Those allocations are largely proportional to the size of the
relevant population in each local authority. Adjustments are made to take into account of differing
levels of demand and costs of service provision within these populations. Primary and secondary
indicators, i.e. those factors which significantly influence the expenditure for a particular service,
are used to make these adjustments 3.
One of the social work sub-services is ’Personal and Nursing Care for Older People’. This
is the GAE line which distributes resources for FPC at home and Free Nursing Care payments
to self-funders in care homes. The primary indicator used for allocation comes from the Scottish
Government Health Directorate Distribution 4. This distribution uses a composite index made up
of five other indicators: Limiting Long Term Illness, Single Owner Occupiers, Council Tax Bands,
Pensioners Living Alone, and Standard Mortality Rate. This composite index is then multiplied
by the number of people in the age group and further by an historic case load age band weight.
The sum of these age groups gives the final GAE allocation for each local authority.
We use GAE data on local authority allocations for the social work sub-service on personal
care described above, to calculate each local authority’s FPC income per FPC person. This mea-
sure indicates the relative size of each local authority’s allocation for FPC. Whilst local authorities
must meet their statutory duties, one of which is to provide personal care for free to those aged
65+, GAE is simply an allocation methodology. The allocations are not budgets or spending
targets and they are not intended to be used by local authorities to allocate resources. Therefore,
the decision about spending on specific services like FPC is left entirely up to individual local
authorities. As long as they meet their statutory duties, they have latitude to reallocate funding
either into or out of FPC support for older people. For this reason, we also use local authority
expenditure data and local financial statistics data to calculate expenditure on FPC per FPC client.
The amount a local authority spends on FPC may also provide some indication of the needs dis-
tribution of clients within the local authority, since we would expect higher expenditure per person
to be associated with higher needs, and thus a lower FPCR. This is demonstrated in Fig. 2.1. Three
local authorities are shown in the figure, each with a different distribution of personal care need
within their respective populations. For example, the first local authority, LA1, has needs which
are slightly more skewed to the left compared to the two other local authorities. The care provision
boundary, or the minimum provision requirement of local authorities, is shown by the vertical line
on the right hand side of the figure. In practice, this represents the minimum requirement on local
authorities to provide FPC to those assessed as having ’critical’ or ’substantial’ risk, according
to the National Eligibility Framework (Scottish Government 2009). Clearly, LA3 has a higher
proportion of its population who fall above this cut off compared to LA2 and LA1. Thus, LA3,
might expend all of its resources in order to meet its statutory duty, whilst LA1 could actually
3For a full description of how indicators are identified please see The Scottish Office (1992)
4The methodology was agreed in 2006 by the Scottish Government’s Residential Care Funding Distribution Working Group.
This group was set up by the Settlement and Distribution Group (SDG). The methodology papers were not published.
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Figure 2.1: Local Authority Distributions of Need
increase provision to individuals who fall below the cut off. It is therefore possible that a local
authority incurs higher expenditure per FPC person while having a lower FPCR overall.
In summary, the fact that local authorities have the final say over spending on FPC, it might
mean that despite a statutory duty to provide care to those in need of personal care, there could
still be differences in rates of provision between local authorities, even after accounting for need.
Other Influences
There are also other factors to consider which might influence the FPCR within a local authority
and lead to differences in rates of provision.
Awareness
The level of awareness within the local authority population might be a further factor which could
influence the FPCR. The Scottish Executive explicitly puts the onus on individuals to apply for
help with their care (Scottish Executive 2003). As a result, a lack of information about FPC
and how to access it could be a barrier to receiving care (Brimblecombe et al. 2018). Further,
if awareness of the FPC policy differs between local authority populations, this could lead to
variations in the FPCR. The level of awareness could differ between local authorities due to the
quality and accessibility of the information they provide (Dickinson et al. 2007). One factor that
might be associated with awareness is education. It is likely that individuals with higher levels
of education, are better able to be informed about care services and are therefore more able to
access them (Terraneo 2015). To calculate this, we take the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation
(SIMD)5 education rank to calculate the local authority shares of the top 20% most education-
deprived data zones.
5The SIMD is a tool developed by the Scottish Government which measures deprivation and poverty in Scotland. The tool
is based on a number of deprivation indicators which are used to create different domains, e.g.income, education and employment.
Scotland’s data zones are then ranked according to those domains, going from the most deprived to the least deprived. (Scottish
Government 2016c)
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Income
Although receipt of FPC is not means tested, the income of the local authority population may
still influence the provision of FPC services. For example, when local authorities are assessing
the FPC needs of individuals they might implicitly discriminate based on their impression of the
resources available to the person they are assessing. This might result in local authorities with a
higher income population having a lower FPCR, since assessors assume that those individuals can
afford to get care elsewhere. At the same time, a higher income means that an individual will have
more choice about where to receive care, and thus might be more likely to substitute towards other
providers of personal care, for example, private providers. This would result in a lower FPCR in
higher income local authorities. Further, those with higher incomes might be less willing to claim
such benefits because of the stigma that is often associated with benefit dependency. On the other
hand, income is likely to be correlated with education, so we might expect that higher income
local authorities would have a higher FPCR due to the increased awareness of their population.
To measure income we once again utilise data from the SIMD dataset, this time to calculate the
proportion of the local authority population that are classed as being income deprived due to their
living in a low-income data zone.
Transaction Costs
A further factor which might influence the FPCR is the cost associated with accessing personal
care. First, an individual might have to search for information on FPC before applying. This
could involve time searching online, speaking to their GP, phoning the local authority etc. Second,
the individual has to complete the application process i.e. fill in the relevant form, send it away,
wait for an assessment and have the assessment carried out. This process can be time consuming,
complex and bureaucratic, and the higher are such transaction costs, the lower will be the FPCR,
because we would expect that some individuals are not able or willing to see this process through to
the end. Research carried out in England found that transaction costs like these were a key barrier
to accessing social care services (Brimblecombe et al. 2018). This effect may be moderated if the
affected individual has access to support from paid or unpaid carers or from health or social care
professionals.
We propose that rurality could be a factor which affects access. We might imagine areas
with a higher level of rurality to have a lower FPCR because the transaction costs associated with
accessing care services are likely to be higher for example due to long travel times and slower
internet connections.
We therefore use the Scottish Government’s Urban Rural Classification to determine the pro-
portion of the local authority geography which is classed as being rural as a potential correlate of
the FPCR rate. Specifically, we use the 8-fold classification to calculate the share of local authority
data zones which are classified as being either remote and rural or very remote and rural (Scottish
Government 2016b).
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Political Preferences
The political preferences within a local authority might influence the FPCR. In their paper, Fernan-
dez & Forder (2015) hypothesise that areas with more Conservative political preferences, which
typically favour smaller government, will provide less services compared to other parties. This is
a result of their larger dis-utility from increased taxation and smaller marginal utility for service
provision. Indeed, their results show that areas with Conservative party control spend less on
LTC provision compared to Labour-controlled areas (Fernandez & Forder 2015). To capture this
effect, we decided to use data on the share of Conservative first preference votes within Scottish
local authority elections. One caveat is that older people are more likely to vote conservative and
possibly then ensure support for provision of services for older people. We decided to let the data
determine whether conservative first preference votes are associated with a higher provision of
FPC.
Availability of other forms of care
Another factor which might influence the FPCR in a local authority is the availability of other
sources of personal care. Given that someone is able to choose where to receive personal care
services from, a greater supply of other sources of care increases the personal care choice set
available to older people, and this will decrease the likelihood of them choosing local authority
FPC. The availability of other personal care sources might differ between local authorities.
The most common alternative source of personal care services comes from unpaid carers,
usually family members, friends or neighbours. The relationship between FPC and unpaid care is
ambiguous. If unpaid care and formal care are substitutes we might expect a higher rate of unpaid
care to be associated with a lower FPCR, since unpaid carers provide personal care services instead
of the local authority. On the other hand, it might be that unpaid carers complement formal care
provision by advocating on behalf of the person they are caring for and increase the demand
for local authority FPC. We use information from the 2011 census to calculate the proportion of
unpaid carers within the area. Furthermore, since household composition is highly correlated with
unpaid care we also calculate the proportion of married couples within a local authority from the
2011 census data (Comas-Herrera et al. 2007, Pickard et al. 2000).
In addition to unpaid care, the availability of care home places could also impact the FPCR,
again because individuals requiring personal care have more choice about where to receive their
care. Care homes may be operated by local authorities, private companies and voluntary organi-
sations. We use Scottish Government Care Home Census data on the number of registered care
home places available for older people.
The next section outlines the formal model of FPC provision.
2.3 ANALYSIS
Thus far we have discussed a range of factors which might influence the FPCR within a local
authority. As a result, we are interested in a relationship of the form:
yit = f (nit,mit, ait, git, pit) (2.1)
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Where:
i geography (local authority; data zone)
t time period in years
yit the free personal care rate
nit needs-related characteristics
mit availability of other forms of care
ait access to care indicators
git expenditure on FPC
pit political preferences
In Eq. 2.1, we postulate that the FPCR is a function of the factors discussed in Section 2.2. In the
first stage of analysis, a descriptive exploration of FPC provision across the 32 local authorities
in Scotland is conducted, in order to establish whether variation in service provision exists. We
look at the relationships between the FPCR and the factors discussed, to determine which factors
might be contributing to this variation. This involves both graphical representations of the data
and bivariate Pearson correlations, the results of which are presented in Section 2.4.
In a second stage, we conduct a more thorough econometric analysis to identify the factors
that are associated with the FPCR. This analysis also allows us to determine if there is inequity
with respect to factors not directly related to need, in particular, geography.
In the first instance, the empirical model to be estimated is as follows:
yit = α + Xitβ + uit (2.2)
Where i once again indicates geography which is either local authority or data zone, and t
indicates the year. The vector Xit includes all factors affecting the FPCR as discussed above, and
β captures their corresponding effects. uit is a random error term with mean zero and constant
variance.
At both the local authority and data zone levels, Eq. 2.2 is estimated in its pooled form and via
fixed and random effects. In the latter cases, the error term uit can be decomposed into two parts
so that uit = vit + ci. In this case, ci is a time invariant effect for each local authority or data zone
i. Compared to the fixed effects specification, random effects is more efficient because it makes
use of both within group and between group variation (Hsiao 2007). However, it requires the
additional assumption that there is no correlation between the time invariant group specific effect
and the included regressors i.e. corr(ci, Xit) = 0. We use a test proposed by Hausman (1978) to
check this assumption and choose between fixed or random effects. The time series models are
estimated in Stata 15 using the xtreg command. In the data zone level specification of Eq. 2.2,
due to data restrictions 6, the model is estimated using 2013 and 2014 data only.
One of the concerns with the model as presented in Eq. 2.1 is that the error term might not
be independently identically distributed due to the omission of spatial or spillover effects. That is,
local policy decisions create externalities outside of the local authority area (Fernandez & Forder
6Specifically, the benefits data used to calculate the DR have 2001 data zones, the SCS data used to calculate the FPCR are
available for 2013-2016 and use 2011 data zones in 2016, lastly the NRS data on population estimates using 2001 data zones are only
available for 2013 and 2014.
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2015, Moscone et al. 2007, Moscone & Knapp 2005). In their paper investigating variation in
LTC expenditures in England, Fernandez & Forder (2015) provide several potential explanations
for the existence of spatial effects. This occurs firstly because local authorities with a high rate of
care provision might attract clients from outside their local authority area and as a result local
policy makers incorporate the care provision decisions of their neighbouring local authorities
when setting their own agenda. Secondly, information spill overs regarding care provision and
policies are likely between neighbouring authorities. This might result in similar levels of care
provision and policies between neighbouring constituencies since local officials are more able to
exchange information with neighbouring officials. Furthermore, they might be expected by their
constituents to maintain levels of provision that are similar to surrounding areas. (Fernandez &
Forder 2015). Other explanations for spatial effects include contextual factors which might affect
provision over a wider geographical area such as long term unemployment and mimicking effects
whereby contiguous areas mimic one another based on their good (or bad) performance (Moscone
& Knapp 2005).
Thus, in a second step, we follow Fernandez & Forder (2015) and explicitly test for possible
policy spill overs by estimating a spatial autocorrelation model. This involves adding both a spatial
autoregressive FPC term (y−i) and a spatial autoregressive error term. The empirical model to be
estimated becomes:
yit = α + ρWy−it + Xitβ + uit (2.3)
In Eq. 2.3, ρ is the autoregressive spatial coefficient of the FPCR and it will indicate the extent to
which there are FPC policy spillovers between nearby areas, as defined by the NxN non-negative
spatial weighting matrix W. The W matrix in this model assumes that there are potential spillover
effects between areas which share a border or a vertex. That is Wi j = 1∀i , j if area i and j share
a common border or vertex and 0 otherwise. Now, uit = eit + λWit, where λ is the coefficient
on the spatial error lag it and eit is an independently identically distributed error term. λ will
indicate the extent to which there are spill overs in both shocks to the FPCR and unobserved
spatial heterogeneity between nearby areas. The spatial models are estimated separately for each
year at both the local authority and data zone levels using Stata’s spregress command. The
spatial time series models are estimated using the spxtregress command.
The following section outlines the results from the descriptive and econometric analysis.
2.4 RESULTS
In this section we will present the results from the local authority level descriptive analysis. As
a starting point we look at how the FPCR differs between local authorities and check if those
differences coincide with differences in the DRs. We also present the results from a bivariate
exploration into the relationships between the key variables identified, and the FPCR.
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Figure 2.2: 2013-2016 Free Personal Care Rate by Local Authority
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Figure 2.3: 2016 Free Personal Care Rate and Disability Rate
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Descriptive Analysis
Fig. 2.2 charts the average FPCR between 2013 and 2016 for each local authority in Scotland.
On average, 5% of the over 65s receive FPC, but this ranges from just 3% to 7% in some local
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authorities. We might expect that this variation would be due to differing levels of need in the local
authority populations. Furthermore, if the DR, as calculated using disability benefits, reflects the
personal care need of the local authority population, and since personal care provision is based on
need, we might expect the FPCR and DR would be similar.
However, the maps in Fig. 2.3 suggest that neither of these expectations looks plausible. The
maps plot the 2016 FPCR and DR for each of the 32 Scottish local authorities. The distributions
of each rate are divided into eight quantiles or octiles, meaning that four local authorities fall into
each.
With respect to the latter expectation - that the DR and FPCR should be similar - the map
legends show that the DR is consistently higher than the FCPR for all local authorities. If it is the
case that the DR accurately reflects the personal care need of the population, this finding might
suggest that there is some unmet need for personal care. Having said that, social care resources are
scarce and thus it might seem acceptable that the FPCR is lower than the DR (Allin et al. 2010).
At the same time, it is not necessarily the case that those who receive disability benefits, also need
or want FPC.
Despite this disparity, our first expectation would lead us to predict that the relative differences
between local authority FPCRs could be explained by the differences in their respective DRs.
If this were the case, the patterns in the two maps would be identical. In other words, we
would expect those local authorities in the top DR octile to also be in the top octile of the FPCR
distribution and so on. It is immediately clear that more often than not, this does not hold. This
variation might indicate that, for one reason or another, there is inequity in FPC provision between
local authorities. That is, for a given level of disability, the provision of FPC is different depending
on which local authority a person lives.
Fig. 2.3 points to the need for further investigation into the local authority variation in the
FPCR. That is, there must be other factors besides the DR, which are affecting the FPCR.
Correlations
Fig. 2.4 shows scatter plots of those variables which had a statistically significant, at the 5% level,
bivariate correlation with the FPCR 7. The first scatter shows the relationship between the FPCR
and the DR. As expected the Pearson correlation coefficient is positive. However, surprisingly the
correlation is relatively low, suggesting that there must be other factors driving the FPCR.
Figure 2.4.2 shows that the proportion of the population aged 65+ who are female is positively
associated with the FPCR. This positive relationship is consistent with research which shows that
older women often have poorer health compared to men and thus might have a greater need for
personal care (Yong et al. 2011, Josefsson et al. 2016).
Next, Figure 2.4.3 plots the correlation between the FPCR with the proportion of local au-
thority population who are income deprived. In accordance with our initial expectations, local
authorities with a high share of income deprivation, tend to have a high FPCR.
Figure 2.4.4 plots the FPCR against average life expectancy at age 65. The scatter shows
that there is a negative relationship between the two. This might reflect the fact that a higher
7Please see Table 2.4 in the Appendix for the full set of correlations
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Figure 2.4: Correlations
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life expectancy is often associated with better health in older ages, and thus a lower dependency
for FPC. This could be explained by the fact that the gap between life expectancy and healthy
life expectancy - that is the number of years a person can expect to live in good health - is much
larger in areas with high deprivation, and at the same time, average life expectancy is lower overall
(Wood et al. 2006). This would imply that a higher life expectancy is generally associated with
better health and thus a reduced need for FPC.
Figures 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 show that FPC expenditure and income, per FPC client, are negatively
correlated with the FPCR. This negative relationship is consistent with the idea presented in
Fig. 2.1. In particular, that local authorities in which the needs distribution is more negatively
skewed i.e. a higher proportion of the population are in the highest needs categories, have to devote
more resources to those in the highest need and therefore have a lower FPCR. As expected, figure
2.4.7 also suggests that the spread of disability within the local authority is positively related to
the FPCR. This is consistent with the idea that local authorities in which disability is more spread
out, benefit from an economies of scale type effect and as a result the FPCR is higher.
The following three plots demonstrate the relationship between the FPCR and other forms of
available care. As expected, the living alone rate and FPCR are positively correlated, whilst the
married rate is negatively correlated with the FPCR. These variables both indicate the availability
of unpaid care, which is often provided by a partner or someone who is living with the person in
need. Thus, a higher proportion of single person households, and fewer married couples, means the
potential supply of other sources of personal care is lower, and as a result reliance on government
30
care is higher. Interestingly though, the proportion of the population providing unpaid care is
positively associated with the FPCR. This association would support the view that unpaid care and
formal care are complements.
Lastly, Figure 2.4.11 plots the FPCR against the share of the Conservative vote in the 2012
local council elections. As expected, the higher the share of the conservative vote, the lower the
provision of FPC.
To summarise, the bivariate correlations are mostly consistent with our initial expectations
and they have identified several factors which could contribute to the varying FPCRs across
Scotland. However, the bivariate analyses has failed to isolate one or more variables that are
strongly correlated with the FPCR. Specifically, we have shown that although the DR and FPCR
are positively related, the local authority differences in the FPCRs do not seem to be matched by
differences in the DR. Overall, the correlations were relatively low i.e. none > 0.63 and point to the
need for further exploration into the variation in FPC provision across Scotland. The remainder
of this section will outline the results from the multivariate analysis, which attempts to provide
more robust evidence on the key drivers contributing to the disparities in the FPCR between local
authorities in Scotland.
Econometric Analysis
Table 2.1 displays the output from the local authority estimations of Eq. 2.2 and Eq. 2.3. All
models are estimated with robust standard errors. The independent variables included in the mod-
els correspond to those found to have significant Pearson correlation coefficients as presented in
Fig. 2.4, with a few exceptions. Firstly, although the bivariate correlation between the proportion
of the population aged 85+ and the FPCR was not significant, we include it to be consistent with
the existing literature. Secondly, to avoid introducing unnecessary multicollinearity into the model
we only include the rate of marriages in the population as an indication of the availability of other
forms of care. Finally, in the local authority level models we include expenditure on FPC per
FPC client instead of the GAE on FPC because as discussed, GAE is not ring fenced and local
authorities can choose for themselves what to spend on FPC. Thus, expenditure on FPC at home,
per FPC client will provide a more realistic estimate of actual spending on FPC.
The first column of Table 2.1 shows the output from the pooled Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimator. As expected, the coefficient on the DR is positive and significant. In particular,
the model suggests that if the DR were to increase by 1%, the FPCR would increase by 0.06%.
In other words, if the number of people receiving disability benefits was to increase by 1000,
the number of people receiving FPC would increase by around 60. Although this seems like
a relatively small effect, it does indicate the financial risk to the government of an increasing
DR, because of the significant positive effect it has on the FPCR. As expected, the greater the
proportion of the oldest old (85+) in the local authority population, the higher is the FPCR. This
result is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Moreover, the model predicts that an increase in the proportion of married couples in the
local authority will decrease the FPCR. This is consistent with our a priori expectations that the
availability of unpaid care could reduce met need for FPC. This result is significant at the 10%
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Table 2.1: Local Authority Level Results
Pooled FE RE Spatial RE
Disability Rate 0.0564** 0.291 0.0791* 0.0957*
(0.022) (0.193) (0.043) (0.050)
Expenditure on FPC -0.000622* -0.00136*** -0.00118*** -0.00119***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender -0.082 0.306 0.026 0.001
(0.102) (0.327) (0.161) (0.176)
Age 0.251*** 0.0488*** 0.0510*** 0.052
(0.062) (0.017) (0.014) (0.058)
Life Expectancy -0.00317** - -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) - (0.002) (0.003)
Married -0.0560* - -0.056 -0.048
(0.030) - (0.057) (0.057)
Income Deprivation 0.011 0.404 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.371) (0.011) (0.016)
Standard Deviation DR -0.054 0.000 -0.151 -0.118
(0.068) - (0.106) (0.110)
Political Preferences 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
(0.000) - (0.000) (0.000)
2014 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
2015 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
2016 -0.004 0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 0.177*** -0.235 0.105 0.111
(0.061) (0.232) (0.114) (0.113)
ρ - - - -0.094
- - - (0.089)
λ - - - 0.023
- - - (0.232)
Moran Test for Spatial
Dependence (prob >chi2) N/A N/A N/A -
Wald Test of Spatial
Terms (prob >chi2) N/A N/A N/A 0.555
R-Squared 0.47 0.34 0.43 0.452
Observations 128 128 128 128
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
level. In addition to this, total expenditure on FPC per person receiving FPC has a significantly
negative impact on the FPCR. This negative relationship is consistent with the idea presented
in Fig. 2.1, that local authorities who have a high FPC spend per person, are likely to have a
higher needs population, and due to their limited resources with which to meet those needs, cannot
increase FPC provision overall. Life expectancy at age 65 is also associated with a reduction in
the FPCR. This is consistent with the correlation in Figure 2.4.5 and might indicate that once we
account for age in the model, a higher life expectancy is in fact associated with better health and
less need for care.
The remaining covariates in the model are found to have no effect on the FPCR. A joint F-test
to check the significance of all covariates excluding the DR suggests that controlling for these
observed factors explains a significant amount of variation in the FPCR between local authorities.
Specifically, the whole model accounts for 47% of the total variation in the FPCR.
The second and third columns in Table 2.1 present the results from the fixed and random
effects specifications respectively. The key advantage of such panel regressions is that they can
account for unobserved heterogeneity which is ignored in the pooled specification (Hsiao 2007).
The signs of the estimated parameters in both the fixed and random effects specifications are
consistent with the pooled results although the life expectancy and marriage variables become
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insignificant in the random effects specification. Furthermore, the DR is no longer significant in
the fixed effects specification. The model R-squared under fixed effects is 0.34 compared to 0.43
under random effects. The lower R-squared in the fixed effects specification is to be expected since
the effect of any time constant variables on the dependent variable is removed.
As mentioned, random effects will produce more efficient estimates compared to fixed effects,
and will be consistent as long as the correlation between the local authority specific effects and
the regressors is zero. In order to test this and to choose between the two specifications, we
use the Hausman test (Hausman 1978). The statistic suggests that random effects is preferred:
χ2(5) = 7.30, p − value = 0.20.
The final column in Table 2.1 displays the results from the random effects model which
incorporates the spatial lag of the FPCR and the spatial error correlation as outlined by Eq. 2.3.
Once again, the signs of the estimated parameters are consistent with the previous models. The
coefficient on the DR variable is significant at the 10% level and suggests that a 1% increase in the
DR is associated with a 0.10% increase in the FPCR. In other words, an increase in the number
of people receiving disability benefits by 1000, is associated with an increase in the number of
people receiving FPC by around 100.
Neither of the spatial elements, ρ or λ, are found to be significant. This suggests that there isn’t
evidence of interdependencies in the FPC policy between contiguous local authorities for example
through information spillovers or mimicking behaviour (Moscone & Knapp 2005, Fernandez &
Forder 2015). Moreover, that shocks to the FPCR do not spill over between areas. A Wald test for
the joint significance of both spatial terms also concludes that they are insignificant. Further, the
direct effect of the DR on the FPCR is very similar to the classical random effects specification.
Table 2.5 in the Section 2.6 also shows the local authority level spatial models estimated separately
for each year. Although these results are less informative due to their small sample size, they
provide Moran tests for the spatial independence of the error terms which also suggest that the
errors are not spatially dependent in any year with the exception of 2015 (Moran 1950). Overall,
incorporating spatial effects into the model does not improve it and the traditional random effects
specification is preferred.
The finding of no spatial effects might not be surprising in the Scottish context given that
FPC is a national policy and local authorities don’t differ substantially in terms of their political
orientation. At the same time, the geography of Scotland might mean that spillover effects are less
likely e.g. between the islands and the mainland.
In summary, the local authority level results suggest that even after accounting for a number
of factors including personal care need, there is still considerable heterogeneity in FPC provision
across Scotland. This finding confirms the results from the descriptive analysis which suggested
that differences in FPC provision between local authorities are not fully accounted for by differ-
ences in need as we would expect with a policy like FPC, which was specifically designed to
eliminate geographical differences in provision.
Table 2.2 presents the results from the data zone level regressions. The data zone level models
allow us to check whether or not the inconsistencies we observe at the local authority level, in terms
of the variation in FPC provision between local authorities, also persist within local authorities.
As with the local authority level model, the first column presents the pooled OLS results and the
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Table 2.2: Data Zone Level Results
Pooled FE RE Spatial Spatial Spatial RE Spatial Spatial Spatial RE
Edin 2013 Edin 2014 Edin Glas 2013 Glas 2014 Glas
Disability Rate 0.151*** 0.0502*** 0.119*** 0.111*** 0.182*** 0.114*** 0.138*** 0.118*** 0.0992***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
Gender 0.0448*** -0.008 0.0404*** 0.0499** 0.0639*** 0.0353** 0.031 0.028 0.0295*
(0.009) (0.015) (0.007) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017)
Age 0.106*** 0.0950*** 0.106*** 0.0627*** 0.020 0.0593*** 0.127*** 0.107*** 0.107***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017)
Married -0.0175*** - -0.0227*** 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.015 -0.012
(0.005) - (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Income Deprivation -0.0212*** -0.009 0.001 0.018 -0.0535*** 0.008 -0.013 -0.0250* -0.001
(0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010)
Standard Deviation DR 0.202 0.223 0.215 - - - - - -
(0.160) (0.158) (0.158) - - - - - -
2014 0.001 0.000 0.000 - - 0.002 - - -0.00315***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - - (0.001) - - (0.001)
Constant -0.0523** 0.008 -0.0418* -0.018 -0.0224* -0.007 -0.0207* -0.011 -0.002
(0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
ρ - - - 0.092 0.069 0.0976* 0.052 0.144** 0.050
- - - (0.073) (0.074) (0.053) (0.056) (0.056) (0.044)
λ - - - -0.030 0.135 0.129 0.106 -0.156* 0.056
- - - (0.112) (0.105) (0.095) (0.083) (0.092) (0.087)
Moran Test for Spatial
Dependence (prob >chi2) N/A N/A N/A 0.46 0.01*** - 0.05** 0.99 -
Wald Test of Spatial
Terms (prob >chi2) N/A N/A N/A 0.36 0.03** 0.00*** 0.05** 0.04** 0.19
Local Authority Dummies Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
R-Squared 0.41 0.03 0.41 0.27 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.25
Observations 12,996 12,996 12,996 548 548 1,096 688 688 1,376
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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second and third columns show the fixed and random effects estimations respectively. Each
estimation includes local authority level dummies, with Glasgow excluded for comparison. As
discussed, the data zone level data are only available for the years 2013 and 2014. They also
exclude the FPC expenditure, life expectancy and political preferences variables as they are only
available at the local authority level. Once again, the models are estimated with robust standard
errors and these are clustered at the local authority level for the first three estimations.
In the pooled OLS estimation, once again the DR has a positive and significant impact on the
FPCR. Specifically, a 1% increase in the DR is associated with a 0.15% increase in the FPCR.
Compared to the local authority level models, gender is also found to have a significantly positive
impact on the FPCR. This is likely due to the increase in precision of the estimates from the larger
sample size. The results also demonstrate that a higher proportion of the oldest old (those aged
85+) is also associated with a higher FPCR. In addition to this, the results show that a higher rate
of income deprivation is associated with a lower FPCR. This result was not apparent in the local
authority level estimations and supports the hypothesis that people in lower income areas are less
likely to access services (d’Uva et al. 2009).
Finally, the results suggest that compared to Glasgow, the FPCR is higher in all local au-
thorities with the exceptions of Dundee City and Clackmannanshire where it is lower. All local
authority dummies are statistically significant apart from Highland, North Lanarkshire, Renfrew-
shire and Perth and Kinross. The significance of the local authority dummies suggests that holding
the level of disability fixed, the local authority in which a person resides influences the likelihood
of receiving FPC. This finding confirms the existence of geographic inequity between local au-
thorities. The model R-squared shows that 41% of the total variation in the FPCR is explained by
the included regressors.
The fixed and random effects specifications are shown in the next two columns of Table 2.2.
The signs of the covariates are once again consistent with the pooled regression. However, under
both the fixed and random effects, income deprivation is no longer significant, and neither is gender
in the fixed effects specification. The local authority dummies in the random effects specification
show the same signs and significance as in the pooled OLS estimation, confirming the finding that
geography matters.
The R-squared in the fixed effects specification is just 0.03 compared to 0.44 for the random
effects. As discussed above, the fixed effects estimator uses only within group variation, whilst
random effects uses both within and between. Therefore, it is not unexpected that the fixed effects
R-squared would be lower. The Hausman test for choosing between fixed or random effects
suggests that the time invariant data zone effects are correlated with the included regressors, and as
a result favours fixed effects. However, it is evident that there is very little variation in the included
variables over the two years and thus pooled OLS might be preferred.
The final columns of Table 2.2 show the results from the spatial data zone models. Un-
fortunately Stata cannot generate the spatial contiguity weighting matrix W for the whole of
Scotland due to its memory constraints. Thus, the data zone level models are estimated for the
two largest local authorities only (Edinburgh and Glasgow City8). Whilst the spatial elements in
the local authority level models capture FPC policy interdependence between neighbouring areas,
8Other local authorities available on request
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Figure 2.5: 2014 Edinburgh and Glasgow Data zone Level FPCRs
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for example the setting of eligibility criteria, the spatial elements in the data zone level models
are more likely to pick up spatial correlations at an individual level. For example, information
spillovers between residents in certain areas. The spatial models are estimated for the two chosen
local authorities, separately for 2013 and 2014, and together via random effects 9.
Fig. 2.5 provides a data zone level map of the 2014 FPCR in Edinburgh and Glasgow. If the
FPCR is spatially dependent between data zones, we would expect to see data zones with high
FPCR to be clustered together. From a first glance at the maps, it looks like this could be the
case. However, the evidence of spatial dependence is somewhat mixed. In particular, the spatial
error and spatial dependent variable coefficients, λ and ρ respectively, are only found to both be
individually significant in the 2014 specification for Glasgow. ρ is also found to be significant
in the random effects specification for Edinburgh. The Moran test of the spatial error is found
to be significant only in 2014 for Edinburgh and 2013 for Glasgow. In Edinburgh, the Wald
test of the joint significance of the spatial parameters finds significant spatial effects in the 2014
specification and the random effects specification. In Glasgow, the the Wald test shows that both
spatial elements are significant in the 2013 and 2014 estimations but not in the random effects
specification. Overall, there seems to be some evidence of spatial spillovers between data zones.
In summary, the data zone level models in Table 2.2 consistently find that increases in
the DR are associated with increases in the FPCR. The results also show that there remains
considerable unexplained variation in the FPCR, even after accounting for need and other factors.
9Note that we avoid the use of fixed effects because at the data zone level, the regressors show very little variation between the
two years.
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The analysis again suggests that there might be geographic inequity in FPC provision between
local authorities. These findings are in keeping with those presented in the descriptive analysis
and the local authority level regressions in Table 2.1.
2.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The provision of FPC in Scotland is managed at the local authority level. Even in such a system
like Scotland’s, with legislated universal coverage of care, decentralisation to lower level gov-
ernment can lead to differences in provision between those localities. In fact, the rate of FPC
provision differs substantially between Scottish local authorities.
In this paper we use aggregated data at different geographical levels to examine the extent
to which differences in FPC provision in Scotland, are matched by differences in local need. As
a result, we aim to offer evidence on the existence of geographic inequity in FPC provision in
Scotland, as well as evidence of factors which could be driving this inequity.
The results presented in Section 2.4 show clearly that the share of FPC differs substantially
between Scottish local authorities. These differences are visible in Fig. 2.2 and Fig. 2.3. Fur-
thermore, the descriptive analysis suggests that those differences are not matched by similar dif-
ferences in the share of disability within the population. This suggests the existence of geographic
inequity in FPC provision. In particular, for a given level of need, receipt of personal care might
be more or less likely, depending on which local authority a person lives. Given that the intention
of the legislation was that personal care for those aged 65+ should be available on a uniform and
consistent basis, this result is concerning.
The econometric analysis also confirms these geographic disparities between local authorities.
Whilst the results suggest that the DR significantly influences the FPCR, there remains significant
unexplained differences in FPC provision between local authorities, even after accounting for
other influences. Furthermore, the data zone level models show that the inconsistencies which
exist between local authorities, are also present within local authorities, and again confirms the
significance of geography in determining the FPCR. The spatial models also provide evidence of
potential spillovers between contiguous areas at the data zone level but not at the local authority
level.
One potential explanation for the unexplained differences between local authorities could be
their practices at managing demand for FPC. Managing the demand for FPC was identified as
a potential explanation for the variation in FPC provision by Lord Sutherland’s 2008 review.
Specifically, as discussed in Section 2.1 the review found that local authorities were using eli-
gibility criteria and waiting times as a tool to manage demand. Following this review, the Scottish
Government introduced the National Eligibility Criteria (Scottish Government 2009). These were
to be adopted by all local authorities when assessing individuals’ needs for FPC. The intention
is to classify individual need as critical, substantial, moderate and low - with their corresponding
urgency of intervention response times and provides guidance on risk factors associated with each
category. These categories are used to allocate limited resources to the most needy care clients.
As a minimum, local authorities must provide care to those individuals who are categorised as
’critical’ or ’substantial’ risk, and within a six-week time frame. However, it is the responsibility of
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local authorities to determine whether or not those with moderate or low risk require the provision
of services. Since local authority resources are generally under pressure, many local authorities set
thresholds for FPC provision. For example, many local authorities will only provide FPC to those
who have been identified with either critical or substantial needs. At the same time, unlike those
with ’critical’ or ’substantial’ risk, there is no minimum waiting time for those identified with
’moderate’ or ’low’ risk to receive services. As a result, local authorities might use waiting times
for these groups as a means to curtail demand for services, in the hope that some people won’t
be willing to wait so long to access the services, and will subsequently withdraw their application
for support. This has been found to be a barrier to accessing social care services in England
(Brimblecombe et al. 2018).
Thus, depending on how local authorities decide to implement the National Eligibility Criteria,
differences in provision could emerge. Local authority decisions will depend on the needs of the
individuals presenting themselves for FPC services. As a result, the distribution of needs within
the local authority will play a role in determining who gets FPC. As outlined in Section 2.2, if
needs are skewed to the right, that is, if a large proportion of those applying for FPC have critical
needs, a local authority might have to restrict provision to those groups because they cost more
to cater for. At the other extreme, if the needs within a local authority are skewed to the left,
that is, a large proportion of those applying have low risk needs, and few with critical needs, the
local authority might be more able to offer care to all groups. Consistent with this possibility is
the result that the spending per FPC client is significantly negatively associated with the FPCR. In
other words, this suggests that a higher spend on FPC (which is likely to be associated with higher
needs), results in less provision of FPC overall because resources won’t stretch so far. Thus, the
distribution of those who apply for care could make a substantial difference to the provision of
care.
Having said that, it is still the case that the majority of local authorities in Scotland explicitly
state that they will only provide care to those with critical or substantial needs 10. Whether this is to
curb demand due to scare resources or because local authorities differ in their spending priorities,
it is not possible to tell without further investigation.
In relation to this, the way in which local authorities interpret the National Eligibility Criteria
might vary across Scotland and these interpretations are unlikely to be randomly distributed. For
example, local authorities which experience tight funding constraints may be more likely to be
stringent in their interpretation of the criteria compared to a local authority where funding is less
tight. Interpretations might also be correlated with political control in the local authority whereby
a more liberally controlled authority may be lenient in their interpretation of criteria compared to
a more conservative one. Future research would benefit from carrying out a detailed investigation
into individual local authority practices to understand whether and why differences in eligibility
for FPC arise during the assessment process and how these influence subsequent provision of care.
Furthermore, the results presented here have also highlighted the importance of the availability
of other forms of care. Specifically, the results suggest that the availability of unpaid care might
play a role in determining the FPCR. Although the results showed that the number of care home
10We collected information on FPC eligibility from 21 local authorities via their websites or via email. Of those, 11 stated that
they will only provide care to those in the top two risk categories.
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places had no effect on the local authority FPCR, a recent freedom of information request by
Robert Kilgour, chairman of Renaissance Care in Scotland, found that there is significant variation
in the cost of local authority run care homes. Thus, it might be that local authorities ability to
provide FPC to people in their own homes, is also limited by the cost of running their own care
homes (Lang Buisson 2018).
At this point it is important to highlight some of the limitations of this paper and suggest
areas for future research. Firstly, our results from the spatial models might be sensitive to the
specification of the weighting matrix. In this paper we chose to use a basic contiguity matrix
where we defined neighbours as sharing a common vertex or border. There are of course other
specifications of this matrix which define neighbouring areas in different ways. For example,
based on travelling distance between areas.
Secondly, we do not have any information about the distribution of need within local authori-
ties. As discussed above, understanding how needs are distributed would provide a useful insight
into how local authorities make decisions on care provision, and subsequently offer an explanation
for the differences across Scotland. The SCS does contain information on client need by means of
an Indicator of Relative Need (IoRN) score, however, it is very poorly recorded by local authorities
and only a small proportion of social care clients have been given a score.
Related to this, we are limited in that we only observe met need for FPC. We do not observe
those individuals who require FPC but who do not receive it, either because they are put on
a waiting list or they don’t meet the eligibility criteria. In addition, we don’t know anything
about those who do not apply for other reasons. A study carried out in England found that often
information barriers, transaction costs and quality of services were reasons for older people not
accessing services (Brimblecombe et al. 2018). Moreover, perceived budget cuts within the local
authority were also found to be a factor which deterred older people from accessing services
(Brimblecombe et al. 2018).
Future research would certainly benefit from measuring and understanding unmet need in
order to ensure older people in Scotland get the help they require and to improve health and care
outcomes. At the same time, this understanding will be of the utmost importance in Scotland
in the coming years as it takes on powers over disability benefits from the UK Government.
Social Security Scotland (SSS) has been set up to manage and deliver these benefits and they
have made a commitment to putting dignity, fairness and respect at the heart of its practices.
This commitment could have implications for the future provision of the benefits compared to the
current approach taken by DWP. Especially given the significantly positive relationship identified
in this paper between the DR and FPCR, which indicates the financial risk to local authorities
associated with increasing the number of people disability benefits are offered to. At the same
time, as the Scottish Government takes on these new powers it could provide an opportunity
to streamline the assessment processes for disability benefits and FPC, to better identify those
individuals who need care services and consequently reduce unmet need and inequity in provision
between local authorities. It would be beneficial to revisit the analysis presented here in a few
years time to see if the results change after the take over of the new powers, as well as to add
additional data points to improve the precision of the estimates.
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2.6 APPENDIX
Table 2.3: Variables and Data Sources
Variable Geography Description Data Source Year(s)
Free Personal Care Rate (FPCR) Local Authority Proportion of the over 65s in the local authority who are receiving FPC Social Care Survey (Scottish Government) 2013-2016
Data zone Proportion of the over 65s in the data zone who are receiving FPC 2013-2014
Disability Rate (DR) Local Authority Proportion of the over 65s in the local authority who are receiving Attendance Allowance
or Personal Independent Payments/ Disability Living Allowance
Department for Work and Pensions 2013-2016
Data zone Proportion of the over 65s in the data zone who are receiving Attendance Allowance or
Personal Independent Payments/ Disability Living Allowance
2013-2014
Standard Deviation DR Local Authority Local authority standard deviation of the DR over 2013-2014 from data zone level DR Department for Work and Pensions 2013-2014
Data zone Local authority standard deviation of the DR from data zone level DR 2013-2014
Age Local Authority Proportion of the over 65s in the local authority who are over 85 National Records of Scotland 2013-2016
Data zone Proportion of the over 65s in the data zone who are over 85 2013-2014
Gender Local Authority Proportion of the over 65s in the local authority who are female National Records of Scotland 2013-2016
Data zone Proportion of the over 65s in the data zone who are female 2013-2014
Life Expectancy Local Authority Life expectancy in years at age 65 National Records of Scotland 2009-2013 (mean)
Education Local Authority Proportion of data zones in the Local Authority which are in the top 20% most education
deprived data zones
Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation 2012
Income Deprivation Local Authority Average proportion of data zones within the Local Authority which are income deprived Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation 2012
Data zone Proportion of people within the data zone who are income deprived 2012
Rurality Local Authority Proportion of data zones in the Local Authority which are classified as very remote
(UR8FOLD = 8) and rural or remote and rural (UR8FOLD = 7).
Scottish Government 8 fold Urban Rural
Classification
2011
Data zone 1 = Large Urban Areas, 2 = Other Urban Areas, 3 = Accessible small Towns, 4 = Remote
Small Towns, 5 = Very Remote Small Towns, 6 = Accessible Rural, 7 = Remote Rural, 8
= Very Remote Rural
Income for FPC Local Authority Grant Aided Expenditure for Personal and Nursing Care for Older People per FPC client Scottish Government 2013-2016
Expenditure on FPC Local Authority Expenditure on FPC at home per FPC person (excluding overheads) Scottish Government 2013-2016
Political Preferences Local Authority 2012 local elections conservative share of the first preference vote Scottish Government 2012
Availability of other forms of care Local Authority Number of registered care home places per person aged 65+; Proportion of the over 65s
who are married
Scottish Government Care Home Census;
Census
2013-2016; 2011
Data zone Proportion of the over 65s who are married Census 2011
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Table 2.4: Bivariate Correlations
FPCR DR Gender Age Education Income Rurality Life Expenditure Income Standard Unpaid Alone Married Care Home Political
Expectancy pp FPC pp FPC Deviation DR Care Places pp 65+ Preferences
FPCR 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DR 0.5972* 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gender 0.3738* 0.6763* 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Age 0.026 -0.2296* -0.136 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Education 0.160 0.4778* 0.5653* -0.172 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - -
Income 0.1926* 0.3297* 0.4032* -0.052 0.8828* 1.000 - - - - - - - - - -
Rurality 0.004 -0.3948* -0.6201* 0.3788* -0.4018* -0.2486* 1.000 - - - - - - - - -
Life Expectancy -0.5437* -0.8068* -0.4888* 0.3508* -0.2500* -0.101 0.3784* 1.000 - - - - - -
Expenditure pp FPC -0.1927* -0.2777* -0.2829* 0.080 -0.142 -0.2157* 0.5071* 0.143 1.000 - - - - -
Income pp FPC -0.6286* -0.5084* 0.027 0.142 0.001 -0.082 -0.2331* 0.5733* 0.070 1.000 - - - - - -
Standard Deviation DR 0.2807* 0.6923* 0.7635* -0.3516* 0.4674* 0.2680* -0.7439* -0.5772* -0.3041* -0.0286 1 - - - - -
Unpaid Care 0.4226* 0.5387* 0.169 0.129 0.2684* 0.3192* -0.031 -0.1896* -0.2753* -0.3330* 0.2366* 1.000 - - - -
Alone 0.4545* 0.6564* 0.6917* -0.085 0.3183* 0.167 -0.2034* -0.6381* -0.001 -0.2742* 0.5024* 0.005 1.000 - - -
Married -0.5359* -0.7133* -0.6330* 0.038 -0.2517* -0.092 0.068 0.6983* -0.067 0.4044* -0.4347* -0.049 -0.9419* 1.000 - -
Care Home Places pp 65+ 0.043 0.3494* 0.5164* -0.084 0.2443* 0.010 -0.3718* -0.4100* 0.003 0.1949* 0.4292* -0.089 0.4461* -0.4413* 1.000 -
Political Preferences -0.2988* -0.3060* 0.037 0.093 0.2212* 0.167 -0.3762* 0.3928* -0.081 0.7412* 0.077 -0.074 -0.2750* 0.4307* 0.053 1.000
*Asterisk denotes significance at the 5% significance level.
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Table 2.5: Local Authority Level Spatial Results: Individual Years
2016 2015 2014 2013
Disability Rate 0.032 0.035 0.063 0.073
(0.061) (0.048) (0.056) (0.066)
Expenditure on FPC 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender 0.095 -0.258 -0.133 -0.108
(0.211) (0.176) (0.204) (0.239)
Age 0.694 0.217** 0.447 0.238
(0.577) (0.107) (0.545) (0.727)
Life Expectancy -0.00775** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Married -0.005 -0.0983* -0.065 -0.081
(0.063) (0.050) (0.063) (0.069)
Income Deprivation 0.001 0.009 0.011 0.015
(0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019)
Standard Deviation DR -0.030 0.017 -0.055 -0.101
(0.127) (0.098) (0.120) (0.139)
Political Preferences 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.124 0.265** 0.189 0.202
(0.134) (0.108) (0.135) (0.159)
ρ 0.010 0.004 -0.063 -0.127
(0.101) (0.103) (0.091) (0.113)
λ 0.491 0.789*** 0.520 0.668
(0.457) (0.293) (0.518) (0.442)
Moran Test for Spatial
Dependence (prob >chi2) 0.48 0.04** 0.44 0.23
Wald Test of Spatial
Terms (prob >chi2) 0.56 0.03** 0.49 0.18
R-Squared 0.55 0.53 0.46 0.43
Observations 32 32 32 32
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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3 | Utilisation of Personal Care Services in Scotland: the Influence
of Unpaid Carers
Elizabeth Lemmon
Abstract
Unpaid carers may have an influence on the formal care utilisation of the cared for. Whether
this influence is positive or negative will have important implications for the costs of formal
care provision. The existing evidence on the impact of unpaid care on formal care utilisation is
extremely mixed. Scotland provides an interesting context in which to study this relationship.
Unlike many other jurisdictions, personal care in Scotland is provided free to all individuals
aged 65+ who are assessed as needing it. This may affect the incentives faced by unpaid carers,
leading to different conclusions about the relationship between unpaid and paid care, compared to
previous literature. Moreover, the Scottish Government is unique in its collection of administrative
data on all social care clients. This paper investigates how the presence of an unpaid carer
influences personal care use by those aged 65+ in Scotland, using Scotland’s Social Care Survey
(SCS) for the years 2014-2016. Specifically, it compares results from Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS), Generalised Linear Models (GLM), and Two-Part Models (2PMs) and conducts a variety
of sensitivity analysis to deal with endogeneity concerns. The results suggest that unpaid care
complements personal care services. In particular, the presence of an unpaid carer is associated
with an increase in weekly personal care hours by 1 hour and 14 minutes per week, on average,
other things being equal. This result is robust to a variety of sensitivity checks. Complementarity
between unpaid and paid care may imply that incentivising unpaid care could increase personal
care costs, and at the same time it points to the potential for unmet need of those who do not have
an unpaid carer.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Population ageing - the increasing proportion of older people in a population - is a global phe-
nomenon. The United Nations (2017) report on World Population Ageing found that almost every
country in the world will see an increase in the share of their populations aged 60+ between 2017
and 2050. Ageing is primarily driven by reduced fertility rates and increases in life expectancy.
As the population ages, pressure on health and social care services is expected to increase. This
will be further increased if there is an expansion of morbidity, i.e. an increase in the number of
people living with chronic conditions related to age. If ageing is associated with an expansion of
morbidity, as much of the literature suggests (Walter et al. 2016, Campolina et al. 2014, Beltrán-
Sánchez et al. 2016), it is likely it will be associated with an even larger increase in demand for
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formal care services than that warranted by population ageing alone. Having said this, evidence
also exists to suggest a compression of morbidity (Stallard 2016). Pressure on long term care
(LTC) provision is already high in the UK. Age UK (2011) published a report highlighting the
issue of under-funding within the UK care system and the knock-on effects this has on the quantity
and quality of care that is provided. Since funding for social care has not adequately kept up with
an increasing number of older people requiring support, a shrinking social care resource is being
spread over an increasing number of individuals in need. This inevitably leads to unmet need.
Unpaid care might offset pressure on formal care services. Unpaid carers are those who
provide care to family members, partners or neighbours because they are frail, ill or have a
disability (Carers UK 2014). They often step in to provide help to older people when they
experience difficulties with Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) and Instrumental Activities of Daily
Living (IADLs). ADLs are fundamental self-care tasks such as washing, dressing and eating. Care
for ADLs is often referred to as personal care. IADLs refer to activities that require more thinking
and organisational skills such as shopping, housework, taking medication and paying bills. Help
with IADLs is often referred to as home care.
In the absence of unpaid care, it seems likely that the demand for state provision would
increase. The supply of unpaid care is also under threat as a result of other demographic changes
occurring in Scotland.
One mechanism to reduce this demand is for policy intervention to incentivise unpaid care.
For example, through offering financial support, like the UK Carers Allowance, to unpaid carers
(DWP 2017). Furthermore, the Scottish Carers Act 2016, to be implemented in April 2018, has
been "designed to support carers’ health and well-being, and help make caring more sustainable"
(Scottish Government 2017a). Although the Act is not aimed explicitly at incentivising unpaid
care, the benefits set out in the Act could have a motivating effect. However, policies which
incentivise unpaid care will only be effective in terms of reducing pressure on formal LTC services,
if unpaid care substitutes for formal care.
There are currently two competing hypotheses in the literature: the substitution hypothesis and
the complementary hypothesis. The former posits that unpaid care indeed substitutes for formal
care. In other words, as unpaid care increases, the utilisation of formal care by the cared for
decreases. For example, an unpaid carer might perform tasks such as help with getting dressed,
that would otherwise be carried out by a formal carer. The policy implications of this hypothesis
might be to encourage unpaid care giving, in an attempt to reduce reliance on formal LTC services
provided by the government. In contrast, the complementary hypothesis suggests that unpaid and
formal care are positively related. As unpaid care rises, so does the use of formal care services by
the cared for. This might be because unpaid carers demand formal care services on behalf of the
cared for. For example, an unpaid carer might provide help with IADLs, but realise that the person
they are caring for also needs help with ADLs. They may therefore endeavour to increase the level
of support for the cared for by engaging with the formal care sector. At the same time, they might
advocate formal care use in order to reduce their own care responsibility (Bass & Noelker 1987).
Furthermore, unpaid carers might seek help from the formal care sector to enable them to remain
in employment (Pickard et al. 2015, Brimblecombe et al. 2018). If unpaid care complements
formal care in this way, incentivising unpaid care could lead to increased pressure on formal care
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services.
Clearly, the two opposing hypotheses could have significant impacts on the utilisation and
consequent costs of formal LTC services. Thus, in order to design social care policy to respond
optimally to the changing structure of the population, it is crucial that the relationship between
unpaid and formal care is better understood. The existing evidence in the literature is somewhat
mixed in terms of which hypothesis holds true. Since Greene (1983) published evidence on the
substitutability between unpaid and formal care, a significant body of research has supported
the substitution hypothesis (Boaz & Muller 1994, Pezzin et al. 1996, Kehusmaa et al. 2013,
Van Houtven & Norton 2008, 2004, Charles & Sevak 2005, Lo Sasso & Johnson 2002, Coughlin
et al. 1992). More recently, Kehusmaa et al. (2013) investigated the effect that unpaid care has on
public expenditure for older people in Finland. Their findings showed that older people without
an unpaid carer had the highest costs of formal care services, whilst those who lived with the
person caring for them had the lowest costs. Van Houtven & Norton (2008) and Van Houtven &
Norton (2004) both found evidence of substitution when analysing administrative and survey data
for older individuals in the US.
On the other hand, there is evidence in support of the complementary hypothesis (Chappell &
Blandford 1991, Geerts & Van den Bosch 2012, Litwin & Attias-Donfut 2009, Bass & Noelker
1987, Pickard et al. 2015). In particular, Geerts & Van den Bosch (2012) in their analysis of the
effect that needs-based entitlements for LTC has on the dynamics of formal and unpaid care utili-
sation, found that in all countries studied, formal and unpaid care were more often complements.
Furthermore, analysis of European data by Litwin & Attias-Donfut (2009) concluded that unpaid
care was often supplemented with formal care.
Some studies have found a mixture of substitution and complementarity effects, depending on
the needs of the cared for and the type of formal care service used (Bolin et al. 2008, Bonsang
2009, Lo Sasso & Johnson 2002). For example, Bolin et al. (2008) found that whilst unpaid care
tended to substitute for formal social care services such as personal and home care, the relationship
was in fact complementary for health care services like doctor visits and hospital stays. In addition,
Bonsang (2009) finds that the substitution hypothesis holds for services like home care, whilst the
complementary hypothesis holds for personal and nursing care. Other authors have suggested that
the nature of the relationship between unpaid and formal care depends on the relationship between
the unpaid carer and the person being cared for. For example, substitution is more likely for
spouses and family carers, whilst complementarity is more likely for friends or neighbour carers
(Geerlings et al. 2005). Furthermore, some research has found evidence that unpaid care has no
effect at all on formal care service utilisation (Weaver & Weaver 2014, Zhu et al. 2008, Langa,
Chernew, Kabeto & Katz 2001).
The conflicting evidence in the existing literature highlights the complexity of the relationship
between unpaid and formal care. This is further complicated by the ongoing debate of the endo-
geneity of unpaid care in the analysis. Specifically, there is a concern that there could be a reverse
causality occurring between unpaid and formal care. This could be because an unpaid carer could
change their decision to provide unpaid care based on how much formal care is being utilised.
Furthermore, there might be other unobserved characteristics, for example health characteristics,
which could influence both the demand for formal and unpaid care. Both of these sources of
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endogeneity would lead to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates being biased. Some studies
have ignored the issue of endogeneity (Kehusmaa et al. 2013, Geerlings et al. 2005, Coughlin
et al. 1992) whilst others have used Instrumental Variables (IV) techniques to try and account for
it (Bonsang 2009, Bolin et al. 2008, Van Houtven & Norton 2008, 2004, Charles & Sevak 2005).
Overall, there are mixed conclusions on the extent to which endogeneity is an issue. Several
authors have found limited evidence of it (Weaver & Weaver 2014, McMaughan Moudouni et al.
2012, Bolin et al. 2008) and some have found that endogeneity is present and that failing to remedy
it alters results considerably (Van Houtven & Norton 2004, 2008).
In addition to this, other literature has examined how the use of formal care services affects
unpaid care (Christianson 1988, Penning 2002, Johansson et al. 2003, Shelley & Rose 2004, Li
2005, Franca et al. 2008, McNamee 2006, Bell et al. 2007, Arntz & Thomsen 2011, Pickard 2012,
McMaughan Moudouni et al. 2012, Karlsberg Schaffer 2015). Much of this research has found
that there is no relationship between formal care and unpaid care (Penning 2002, Shelley & Rose
2004, Li 2005, McNamee 2006, Bell et al. 2007, McMaughan Moudouni et al. 2012) suggesting
that reverse causation might not be an issue.
The Scottish context provides a unique opportunity to analyse the effect that unpaid carers
have on older peoples’ use of LTC services. Like the rest of the world, Scotland has experienced
significant ageing in its population in recent decades, a trend that will continue until at least 2040
(National Records of Scotland 2016c). The Scottish Government estimates there were 744,000
unpaid carers aged 18+ in Scotland in 2017 (Scottish Government 2017b). That is around 17% of
the adult population (National Records of Scotland 2016a). On 1st July 2002, the Community Care
and Health (Scotland) Act 2002 was implemented and Free Personal and Nursing Care (FPNC)
was introduced to those aged 65 or over, who were assessed as needing it (Scottish Executive
2002).
The existence of FPNC in Scotland makes it unalike other jurisdictions analysed in the existing
literature, where the financial burden of LTC services are often borne by the individual and their
families. The existence of such a policy may mean quite different financial incentives for care
givers, leading to contrasting conclusions surrounding complementarity and substitution. Further-
more, Scotland collects rich administrative data on all social care service recipients, including
FPNC clients who are receiving personal care services at home, in an annual Social Care Survey
(SCS), which provides an opportunity to analyse the whole personal care population. This paper
will provide new evidence on the existence of substitution or complementarity between unpaid
and formal care. Specifically, it adds to the existing literature by utilising the unique Scottish SCS
and demonstrating for the first time how unpaid carers influence personal care use by Scots aged
65 and over.
The remainder of the paper will be structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes the data and
characteristics of the SCS sample. Section 3.3 introduces the theoretical framework and discusses
the empirical specifications of the models to be estimated. Following this, Section 3.4 outlines the
results and provides a discussion. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 DATA
The data used in this paper come from the 2014, 2015 and 2016 Scottish SCS1. This is a com-
prehensive survey set up by the Scottish Government and administered annually by each of the
32 local authorities in Scotland. All individuals who receive at least one of seven possible social
care services are included in the survey. Those services are: home care, personal care, telecare,
meals services, self directed support (SDS), social work and housing support 2. The SCS contains
information on which care packages individuals’ are receiving, as well as additional information
on their basic demographics, needs and unpaid care status.
As discussed in Section 3.1, FPNC was introduced in Scotland in 2002. The FPNC policy can
be split into two categories: care in care homes (which covers personal and nursing care) and care
at home (which covers personal care only). The type of care analysed in this chapter is personal
care at home. This part of the policy makes personal care at home free to all individuals aged
65 and over in Scotland, subject to a needs assessment. Personal care at home can be provided
directly by the local authority or the local authority can purchase personal care from the private
and voluntary sectors. It is intended to help individuals maintain their independence and enable
them to continue to live in their own homes. It comprises help with personal hygiene, continence
management, food and diet, immobility problems, counselling and support, simple treatments and
personal assistance3. The SCS collects information on the weekly number of hours of personal
care an individual received during the final week in March each year.
Sample Selection Criteria
This paper focuses on social care clients’ aged 65 and over. In total, across the three years studied,
there were approximately 335,000 social care clients in Scotland aged 65 and over, who were
receiving social care services due to problems associated with age 4.
The sample is restricted further to include those clients who had unpaid carer information
available. The recording of unpaid carer information is optional for local authorities and as
such a large proportion (around 80%) of these clients have an ’unknown’ unpaid care status.
Unfortunately it is difficult to confirm whether or not the recording of this information is missing
at random and as such the extent to which it could introduce selection bias into the final sample.
As a sensitivity check, a comparison of the main descriptive statistics between the sample before
removing those without unpaid care information and after was carried out. This comparison didn’t
reveal any large differences between the samples, with the exception of the personal care variable
in which only 34% of the pre-unpaid care selection sample were receiving FPC, compared to 44%
in the final sample. This suggests that the final sample is likely to be a higher needs sub-sample of
social care clients. Furthermore, as a further sensitivity check, the main models are estimated for
1Ethical approval to access this data was granted by the Scottish Government in January 2017. Project number:SG000-000850.
2For a detailed description of the information included in the SCS please see Scottish Government (2016d)
3The formal definition for personal care can be found in schedule 1 of the Community Care and Health Act 2002 (Scottish
Executive 2001a).
4The SCS categorises clients into one of eight client groups. Those are: dementia, physical disability, frail older people, mental
health problems, learning disability, learning and physical disability, other and not known. The first three categories are used as criteria
to select individuals most likely to be receiving social care services due to problems associated with older age. These three groups
account for about 78% of all social care clients aged 65+.
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those local authorities who recorded the unpaid carer information for the majority of individuals
5.
Removing the clients with missing unpaid carer information results in a final sample of almost
68,000 6 social care clients across the three years.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 provides a set of basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample, the personal care
clients and the unpaid care clients 7.
The gender distribution is similar in the whole sample and personal care sample, where in both
groups, around 70% are women. This is also similar to the whole population of social care clients
aged 65+ and most likely reflects the higher life expectancy of women. However, a slightly lower
proportion, 66%, of individuals with an unpaid carer are women. The age distribution of clients is
also similar across the three groups, with about 15% aged 65-74, 40% aged 75-84 and 85-94, and
the remaining 5% aged 95 or over.
We observe that around 42% of the sample are from the 2016 census, compared to 36% from
2015 and just 22% from 2014. This is due to increases over time in the number of social care
clients receiving care in each of the selected client groups. The SCS previously variable indicates
where the client received social care in more than one of the three years. This was the case for
approximately 44% of the whole sample, compared to 51% of personal care clients, and over 54%
for clients with an unpaid carer.
In terms of unpaid care status, approximately 34% of the whole sample have an unpaid carer
compared to 39% of the personal care sample. Furthermore, around 45% of the whole sample
receive personal care services, compared to 51% of the unpaid care sample. This might suggest
that individuals with an unpaid carer are more likely to receive personal care services.
Overall, around 11% of the sample have been assigned a dementia status8. This is similar for
personal care clients. This is somewhat lower than the 2017 population estimate of almost 20%,
for those aged 65+ (Alzheimer Scotland 2017, National Records of Scotland 2016a). In contrast,
nearly 19% of clients with an unpaid carer have been assigned the dementia client group. This
might indicate that individuals with dementia are far more likely to have an unpaid carer looking
after them.
The number of other services variable is the total number of social care services an individual
is receiving, excluding home care and personal care. On average, clients receive one other service.
Although, those with an unpaid carer receive closer to an average of two other services.
Table 3.1 also provides information on the distribution of weekly hours of personal care and
the number of staff providing personal care to the individual. The mean number of hours of care
for the whole sample is just over four hours per week. For the personal care sample it is around
nine hours per week and for the unpaid care sample it is around five hours per week. As expected,
the distribution of hours of personal care is clearly positively skewed and thus the median number
5Please see Table 3.8 in the Appendix
6Note that this figure does not reflect the total number of individuals because some clients will appear in more than one year.
7Please see Table 3.5 in the Appendix for a full description of all variables
8The dementia status of an individual is based on a care workers assessment of the individual and thus cannot be considered a
medical diagnosis of dementia.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Whole Sample PC Clients UC Clients
N = 67,695 n = 30,359 n = 23,066
Variable No of Obs % of N No of Obs % of N No of Obs % of N
Gender
Female 46,650 68.91 21,284 70.11 15,229 66.02
Male 21,045 31.09 9,075 29.89 7,837 33.98
Age
65-74 10,281 15.19 4,337 14.29 3,468 15.04
75-84 26,386 38.98 811,949 39.36 8,835 38.30
85-94 27,421 40.51 12,405 40.86 9,339 40.49
95+ 3,607 5.33 1,668 5.49 1,421 6.17
Year
2014 15,099 22.3 8,140 26.81 2,952 12.8
2015 24,455 36.13 10,738 35.37 9,379 40.66
2016 28,141 41.57 11,481 37.82 10,735 46.54
SCS Previously
Yes 29,763 43.97 15,609 51.41 12,527 54.31
No 37,932 56.03 14,750 48.59 10,539 45.69
Dementia
Yes 7,425 10.97 3,454 11.38 4,368 18.94
No 60,270 89.03 26,905 88.62 18,698 81.06
Unpaid Carer
Yes 23,066 34.07 11,811 38.9 23,066 100
No 44,629 65.93 18,548 61.1 - -
Personal Care
Yes 30,359 44.85 30,359 100 11,811 51.21
No 37,336 55.15 - - 11,255 48.79
No. other Services
Mean 1.39 - 1.31 - 1.72 -
Weekly PC Hours
Min 0 - 0.5 - 0 -
Mean 4.07 - 9.09 - 5.07 -
Median 0 - 7 - 1 -
Max 168 - 168 - 168 -
Multistaff - -
Yes - - 3,104 10.22 - -
No - - 27,255 89.78
of hours of care might provide a more accurate description of the average hours of personal care.
This is seven hours per week for the personal care sample, one hour for the unpaid care sub-group,
and zero for the whole sample.
Finally, the multistaff variable indicates whether or not a personal care client requires two
or more members of care staff helping them. This is the case when a client has significant
mobility problems such that they need more than one person to help them move around the house.
Therefore, this variable will provide an indication of need. Around 10% of personal care clients
have been assigned the multistaff indicator.
The following section will outline the model of interest, explore the difficulties encountered
when working with skewed explanatory variables and propose three approaches to estimate the
model which account for skewness.
3.3 METHODS
The relationship of interest is between the presence of an unpaid carer and an individuals’ utilisa-
tion of personal care services. Specifically, personal care services PCi are described as a function
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of unpaid care UCi and other observed and unobserved characteristics:
PCi = f (UCi, Xi, i) (3.1)
Where i indexes individuals for i = 1...n, Xi represents other socio-demographic and health
characteristics of the individual, and i is the unobserved error term.
In the empirical estimations of the relationship as described by Eq. 3.1, the dependent variable
is PCi and is a continuous variable measuring the number of hours of personal care services
individual i received during the census week. The explanatory variable of interest, UCi is a binary
indicator which is equal to 1 if the individual was known to have an unpaid carer and 0 if the
individual was known not to have an unpaid carer.
As can be seen in the left hand panel of Fig. 3.1, weekly personal care hours are highly
positively skewed. In particular, for those who have positive personal care hours, a large propor-
tion have very few hours of care and a small proportion have a very large number of hours of
care. Specifically, the skewness of the distribution is 3.4. Heavily skewed distributions of health
outcomes, such as hours of personal care, is a common problem in the analysis of health care
data and especially with expenditure data, which is highly correlated with hours of care. Heavily
skewed dependent variables in standard regression models such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
can lead to non-normal residuals which will yield inconsistent estimates of marginal and treatment
effects. Economists have developed several ways to deal with this problem, three of which are
explored in this paper.
The remainder of this section will outline the empirical models to be estimated and the calcu-
lations of the incremental effect of the UC variable in each model.
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OLS
One approach to dealing with skewed distributions of dependent variables in regression analysis is
to transform the dependent variable by taking its natural logarithm to ensure that the disturbance
approximates normality. This approach is common in the health economics literature, particularly
in the modelling of utilisation and spending on health resources. (Buntin & Zaslavsky 2004,
Mihaylova et al. 2011). The panel in the right of Fig. 3.1 shows the distribution of the logged
personal care hours for those with non-zero hours of personal care. Clearly, the distribution is
more normal for the logged hours of personal care.
The model is estimated via OLS as:
E[lnPCi|UCi, Xi] = (βucUCi + X′iβ + i) (3.2)
Where lnPCi is the natural log of positive personal care hours, βuc is the parameter to be estimated
on unpaid care (UCi), Xi′ is the vector of explanatory variables which includes a constant, β is the
vector of parameters to be estimated, and lastly i is the random error term.
Interpreting the marginal effects in log-linear models requires transforming the coefficients
such that unit changes in explanatory variables can be interpreted as percent changes in the log
of personal care hours. In order to calculate the incremental effect of unpaid care on the raw
scale of personal care hours rather than the log of hours, one has to re-transform the dependent
variable. This is more complex if the exponentiated error term is not homoskedastic and can lead
to inconsistent estimates of the incremental effect (Manning 1998).
Generalized Linear Model
A second approach to dealing with skewness is to use a Generalized Linear Model (GLM). This
approach has increasingly been applied in health economics research (Deb et al. 2017). The GLM
framework allows the mean of the dependent variable to be a function of the linear index of
covariates, and at the same time allows the variance of the dependent variable to be a function
of its predicted value through the choice of a suitable distribution family (for general overview see
(Deb et al. 2017)).
The model becomes:
E[PCi|UCi, Xi] = g−1(βucUCi + X′iβ + i) (3.3)
Where g−1 represents the inverse of the log-link function and the outcome variable is generated by
the gamma distribution. The decision to use the log-link function and gamma distribution family is
based on Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria, AIC and BIC respectively, and statistical tests
including the Box-Cox and Modified Park tests 9. The log-link and gamma family is a common
choice for GLM models of health care expenditures and costs (Deb et al. 2017, pg.86)
GLM’s are especially useful because they model heteroskedasticity directly and avoid the re-
transformation of the outcome variable back to the raw scale as with log-linear models. This means
9Output from tests available on request.
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that marginal and incremental effects can more easily be calculated. Specifically in the GLM, the
marginal effect of a continuous variable X is:
∂E[PCi|UCi, Xi]
∂X
= βxe
X′
i
β (3.4)
Since the unpaid care variable is a binary indicator, the marginal effect is simply the incremental
effect on weekly hours of personal care:
∆E[PCi|Xi]
∆UC
= e(X
′
i
β|UC=1) − e(X′iβ|UC=0) (3.5)
Of course, the OLS and GLM models are both conditional on an individual having positive
personal care hours. This condition results in a loss of information since those clients who do
not receive any personal care in the first place are ignored. That is, we know that many clients in
fact have zero hours of personal care. The third estimation attempts to account for this.
Two-Part Model
We observe that 55% of the total sample were not receiving personal care and subsequently had
zero personal care hours. Using statistical models that ignore this mass at zero might mean that the
effects of the explanatory variables on the outcome cannot be generalised to the whole population.
Specifically, OLS and GLM only describe the effect of an unpaid carer on personal care hours
for those who receive personal care, however this effect might differ from the effect of an unpaid
carer on whether or not a person receives personal care in the first instance. Thus, it is important
to explicitly model the mass at zero, and subsequently calculate marginal and incremental effects
which account for this.
One model which does this is the two-part model (2PM). It involves firstly estimating the
probability of having a non-zero outcome via probit or logit, and subsequently estimating the mean
of the outcome, conditional on having a non-zero outcome via OLS or GLM. 2PMs have widely
been used and discussed in the health economics literature (Mihaylova et al. 2011, Duan et al.
1984, Mullahy 1998, Buntin & Zaslavsky 2004) and have often been shown to outperform other
models when a large proportion of zeroes exist in the data (Mihaylova et al. 2011). Moreover, the
2PM is frequently employed within the literature on the relationship between unpaid and formal
care (Bonsang 2009, Charles & Sevak 2005, Bolin et al. 2008, Van Houtven & Norton 2004).
Intuitively, there are different decisions occurring in the two parts of the 2PM, which implies that
covariates may have different effects on the dependent variable each step (Deb & Trivedi 2002).
Firstly an individual decides whether or not to demand any personal care services, and secondly
the local authority decides how much care to supply. The 2PM is therefore appealing in this setting
because it takes both decisions into account.
Other approaches to deal with a high proportion of zeroes include Heckman’s 2-step selection
model. Compared to the 2PM, where the zeroes are observed or ’genuine’, the Heckman model
treats the zeroes as unobserved individuals. Thus, it is argued that the 2PM is the most appropriate
model for the analysis in this paper because those with zero hours of personal care are observed in
the sample. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there are unobserved individuals i.e. those in the
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general population who do not receive social care services at all, and as a result are missing from
the dataset. Thus, it is important to bear in mind that the probit model in the first part of the 2PM
is estimated for a population who are perhaps already at an increased risk of requiring personal
care.
Formally, the 2PM can be written as:
Pr[PCi > 0|UCi, Xi] = Φ(αucUCi + X′iα + ξi) (3.6)
E[PCi|PCi > 0,UCi] = g−1(βucUCi + X′iβ + i) (3.7)
The threshold in Eq. 3.6 is modelled as a binary probit model where Φ represents the cumulative
density function of the standard normal distribution. This is known as the 1st part of the 2PM. The
dependent variable PCi and key explanatory variable of interest UCi are as described above. Here,
X′ is a vector of explanatory variables including an intercept. The parameters to be estimated are
in the vector α and ξi is the error term.
Eq. 3.7 is a GLM model for individuals with strictly positive hours of personal care and is
known as the 2nd part of the 2PM. It is identical to Eq. 3.3. Once again, g−1 is the inverse of
the log-link function and the outcome variable, PCi, is generated by the gamma distribution. The
parameters to be estimated are in the vector β and i is the error term. Estimation of the 2PM is
carried out in Stata using the twopm command (Belotti 2015).
Post estimation, the full marginal effects can be calculated:
∂E[PCi|UCi, Xi]
∂UC
= eX
′
i
β
φ(X′iα)αuc + βuce
X′
i
β
Φ(X′iα) (3.8)
Where X′
i
αi are the linear predictions from Eq. 3.6 and αuc is the estimated parameter on the
unpaid care indicator. As before X′
i
βi and βuc are the respective predictions from Eq. 3.7. Finally,
φ represents the standard normal density function.
Eq. 3.8 shows the marginal effect for a continuous variable. The incremental effect of the
presence of an unpaid carer on personal care hours can be calculated simply as:
∆E[PCi|Xi]
∆UC
= Φ(X′iα|UC = 1)e
(X′
i
β|UC=1) − Φ(X′iα|UC = 0)e
(X′
i
β|UC=0) (3.9)
Endogeneity
As mentioned in Section 3.1, there are potential sources of endogeneity that could exist in the
model. Firstly, endogeneity might be present due to omitted variable bias where an omitted
variable is correlated with both unpaid care and the dependent variable. One potential omitted
factor is the need of the social care client. The models account for client need via several variables.
If these do not fully reflect client need, there could be a correlation between unpaid care and
the error term, leading to the estimate of the incremental effect of unpaid care being biased.
Unfortunately, the SCS is limited in its collection of needs indicators. Whilst it does have an
entry for an Indicator of Relative Need (IoRN) score. This is a non-mandatory item in the survey
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and as a result it is very poorly recorded by local authorities. To give an indication of the direction
and extent of any bias due to the omission of need, we also present the results from the 2PM in
which we incrementally add each control for need, to show how the marginal effect of unpaid care
changes as a result. These results are shown in Table 3.5.
Secondly, endogeneity might be present due to the potential reverse relationship that could
exist between unpaid and formal care services. For example, the number of hours of personal care
a person receives might influence the decision of their unpaid carer to provide care. As outlined
in Section 3.1, a number of studies have found that not accounting for this reverse causality can
significantly alter model results (Van Houtven & Norton 2004, 2008). In order to test and account
for this reverse causation, Instrumental Variables (IV) methods can be used. Of the literature which
implements IV techniques, the most commonly used instruments are varying characteristics of the
care givers. Unfortunately, since the SCS data are collected for administrative purposes, they don’t
contain any information on the carer themselves. Having said that, we conduct an IV analysis as
a sensitivity check, by constructing instruments from Census information. As a further check
against reverse causality, the models are re-estimated for those clients who appeared in 2016 only.
The reason being that this is the first time those clients started receiving social care, meaning that
their unpaid care status is unlikely to have been influenced by the number of hours of personal
care they received. These estimates can be compared to the initial model results to see if there is
any evidence of reverse causality confounding the estimates.
The next section presents and discusses the model results from the three estimation approaches
and sensitivity analyses.
3.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 3.2 displays the model results. The OLS and GLM estimations (this includes the 2nd part
of the 2PM), are estimated on the sample of individuals who received personal care, whilst the 1st
part of the 2PM, as shown in the table, is estimated for the whole sample.
Overall, the signs of coefficients in the OLS and GLM estimations are in line with a priori
expectations. In particular, older age is shown to have a positive relationship with weekly hours
of personal care and in general. This is consistent with the idea that ageing is associated with
increased frailty and need for care. Having said that, in the GLM specification, compared to being
aged 65-74, being aged 75-84 is associated with significantly lower hours of personal care. With
respect to gender, there are significant differences in weekly hours of personal care between men
and women. In particular, women have significantly higher personal care hours compared to men.
Moreover, the greater the number of other services a client is receiving, i.e. over and above
home care, the higher are their weekly personal care hours. The number of other services variable
will act as a proxy for level of need and thus the positive relationship is what one would expect.
In addition to this, individuals with two members of staff caring for them also have significantly
higher weekly personal care hours. At the same time, having received any form of social care
service in more than one year is also associated with significantly higher weekly personal care
hours. All effects of the aforementioned needs indicators are significant at the 1% significance
level in both models. The dementia variable is found to be insignificant in both models.
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Table 3.2: Model Results
Variable OLS GLM 2PM (P1)
Aged 75-84 -0.00818 -0.0273* 0.0511***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Aged 85-94 0.0506*** 0.0252 0.0155
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Aged 95+ 0.150*** 0.125*** 0.0326
(0.026) (0.023) (0.027)
Female 0.0250** 0.0262** 0.0313***
(0.011) (-0.0102) (-0.0112)
Has unpaid carer 0.114*** 0.106*** 0.269***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
No. Oth Services 0.125*** 0.100*** -0.185***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Dementia 0.0222 0.0161 0.00458
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018)
Multistaff 0.994*** 0.939*** -
(0.017) (0.015) -
SCS previously 0.0633*** 0.0437*** 0.169***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
2015 -0.156*** -0.120*** -0.663***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.021)
2016 -0.113*** -0.0742*** -0.353***
(-0.0207) (-0.0189) (-0.0214)
Constant 1.521*** 1.886*** 0.511***
(0.120) (0.123) (0.128)
Observations 25,423 25,423 67,682
Marginal Effect 0.80*** 0.90*** 1.23***
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
Local authority dummies are included but are not presented in output.
As for the unpaid carer variable, the coefficients are positive and highly significant in both
estimations, suggesting that weekly personal care hours are higher on average for clients with an
unpaid carer compared to those without, other things being equal. This finding provides support
for the complementary hypothesis.
With respect to the year indicators, both OLS and GLM suggest that weekly care hours are
significantly lower in 2015 and 2016 compared to 2014.
The third column in Table 3.2 shows the results from the 1st part of the 2PM. Thus, the
dependent variable is the probability of receiving personal care, or in other words, the probability
of having positive weekly personal care hours. As with the OLS and GLM estimations, age has a
positive impact on the probability of receiving personal care. However, this effect is smaller and
becomes insignificant into the oldest age groups. Furthermore, the 2PM also predicts that females
and those who received some form of care in more than one year are significantly more likely to
receive personal care. Once again, the dementia indicator is insignificant and clients are less likely
to receive personal care in 2015 and 2016 compared to 2014.
Interestingly, the probit model predicts that the higher the number of other services a client
receives, the less likely they are to receive personal care. This reflects the fact that the other ser-
vices are possibly preventing older people from requiring personal care. For example, meals and
telecare services. Lastly, the model predicts that clients with an unpaid carer are significantly more
likely to receive personal care services. This is in accordance once again with the complementary
hypothesis.
In terms of the incremental effect of an unpaid carer on weekly hours of personal care, the
results are consistent across the three models. With OLS, the coefficient on the carer dummy
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indicates that those with an unpaid carer have higher weekly personal care hours by about 11.4%.
As discussed in Section 3.3, calculating marginal and incremental effects in models with a
log-transformed dependent variable requires re-transformation back to the raw scale. This re-
transformation depends on the estimated errors from the model which can be incorrect if these
errors are heteroskedastic. A Breusch-Pagan test for constant variance of the residuals in the
OLS estimation finds that heteroskedasticity is present in the model. As a result, calculating the
incremental effect of unpaid care is not appropriate. Instead, we can use the coefficient of 0.114
and apply it to the median personal care hours to get an estimate of the effect in terms of the
average number of hours of weekly personal care. This gives a figure of about 50 minutes per
week. That is, those with an unpaid carer receive about 50 minutes more per week of personal
care.
With GLM, the incremental effect of an unpaid carer can be calculated using Eq. 3.5. This
results in a positive incremental effect of 0.90 hours per week. This result is significant at the
1% significance level. In other words, those with an unpaid carer receive, on average, about 54
minutes more personal care per week, all other things being equal.
Moreover, the incremental effect of unpaid care in the 2PM, calculated using Eq. 3.9, which
takes into account the probability of receiving personal care, is 1.23 hours per week. That is,
personal care clients with an unpaid carer receive around 1 hour and 14 minutes more per week
compared to personal care clients without an unpaid carer, ceteris paribus. Once again, this result
is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The small difference in the predicted incremental effect of unpaid care on hours of weekly per-
sonal care between the three estimations is promising, showing that the findings are robust across
different methods of estimation. This has been shown to be the case in previous research which
compares methods for modelling skewed health care data (Buntin & Zaslavsky 2004). In terms
of deciding which estimation is the most appropriate, specification tests, including Pregibon’s link
and Ramsey’s RESET tests, find that the model as estimated with OLS is possibly misspecified,
whilst GLM is correctly specified. As outlined in Section 3.3, the 2PM is generally preferred in
this setting because it takes into account the full incremental effect of unpaid care, incorporating
the two parts of the decision process in determining personal care utilisation. This is also the
approach taken by the vast majority of the literature (Bonsang 2009, Van Houtven & Norton 2004,
2008, Weaver & Weaver 2014).
On the whole, the results outlined in this section show that unpaid care tends to complement
personal care services. That is, in general, the presence of an unpaid carer is associated with an
increase in the number of weekly personal care hours. This finding supports the complementary
hypothesis and might suggest that unpaid carers are demanding personal care services on behalf
of the person they are caring for. These results are also in line with some of the existing literature
which finds that a complementary relationship exists between unpaid and formal care (Geerts &
Van den Bosch 2012, Litwin & Attias-Donfut 2009). However, they are in contrast to much of the
existing literature which finds evidence of a negative relationship between unpaid care and formal
care (Van Houtven & Norton 2004, 2008, Charles & Sevak 2005, Bolin et al. 2008, Lo Sasso &
Johnson 2002).
The finding of a complementary relationship between unpaid and paid care in Scotland might
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Table 3.3: 2PM Results: Accounting for client need
Variable 2PM-1 2PM-2 2PM-3 2PM-4
(P1) (P2) (P1) (P2) (P1) (P2) (P1) (P2)
Aged 75-84 0.0546*** -0.113*** 0.0546*** -0.0257 0.0513*** -0.0268* 0.0511*** -0.0273*
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Aged 85-94 0.0221 -0.0909*** 0.0221 0.0273* 0.0156 0.0254 0.0155 0.0252
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Aged 95+ 0.0433 -0.0215 0.0433 0.127*** 0.0325 0.124*** 0.0326 0.125***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023)
Female 0.0359*** -0.00745 0.0359*** 0.0284*** 0.0313*** 0.0263*** 0.0313*** 0.0262**
(0.011) (0.012) -0.0112 -0.0102 -0.0112 -0.0102 -0.0112 -0.0102
Has unpaid carer 0.298*** 0.196*** 0.298*** 0.114*** 0.269*** 0.107*** 0.269*** 0.106***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
No. Oth Services -0.172*** 0.105*** -0.172*** 0.102*** -0.184*** 0.100*** -0.185*** 0.100***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Demenita - - - - - - 0.00458 0.0161
- - - - - - (0.018) (0.015)
Multistaff - - - 0.939*** - 0.938*** - 0.939***
- - - (0.014) - (0.014) - (0.015)
SCS previously - - - - 0.169*** 0.0438*** 0.169*** 0.0437***
- - - - (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
2015 -0.626*** -0.104*** -0.626*** -0.105*** -0.663*** -0.120*** -0.663*** -0.120***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018)
2016 -0.323*** -0.0633*** -0.323*** -0.0610*** -0.353*** -0.0735*** -0.353*** -0.0742***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
Constant 0.421*** 2.073*** 0.421*** 1.869*** 0.513*** 1.894*** 0.511*** 1.886***
(0.127) (0.120) (0.127) (0.123) (0.127) (0.123) (0.128) (0.123)
Observations 67,682 25,423 67,682 25,423 67,682 25,423 67,682 25,423
Marginal Effect 1.55*** 1.35*** 1.24*** 1.23***
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
Local authority dummies are included but are not presented in output.
be explained by the fact that personal care services are free for the over 65s. Thus, unpaid carers
might not be making the same financial calculations as would be the case in jurisdictions where
personal care bears a financial cost. That is, if the cost of personal care were to fall on the
unpaid carer, there is more likely to be a substitution. Furthermore, complementarity might not
be surprising, given the sample of individuals analysed in this paper are likely to be of a higher
dependency level. Intuitively, a complementary relationship might be expected for those with a
higher level of dependency since it might be that unpaid carers, who are most likely to be partners
or children, are less able to help with personal care tasks such as bathing and toileting. Moreover,
for parents who are getting care from their children, they might be less willing to let their child
help them with such tasks. This finding is consistent with Bonsang (2009) who finds evidence of
complementarity for nursing care.
Sensitivity Checks
As mentioned in Section 3.3, a variety of sensitivity analysis are carried out to check for the
extent of endogeneity. One source of endogeneity is omitted variable bias due to not accounting
fully for individual need. Table 3.3 presents the parameter estimates from both parts of the 2PM
when each control for client need is added. Overall, the results suggest that including additional
controls for need reduces the marginal effect of unpaid care on weekly hours of personal care. This
suggests that any bias resulting from not accounting for need will tend to lead to overestimates of
the marginal effect of unpaid care. However, we find that as additional controls for need are added,
57
the change in the marginal effect gets smaller and smaller. This is promising and indicates that
altering the model specification to include additional controls for need will make little difference
to the estimated marginal effect of unpaid care.
The second source of endogeneity comes from the potential reverse causality between personal
and unpaid care which would result in the unpaid care variable being endogenous and parameter
estimates biased. As discussed, IV can be used to account for reverse causality. IV involves
sourcing exogenous variation in the unpaid care variable UC, that does not directly influence the
dependent variable PC. Such exogenous variation takes the form of an instrument. Of the literature
which implements IV techniques, the most commonly used instruments are varying characteristics
of the care givers. Much of the literature focusses explicitly on children caring for parents, hence
among the most frequently used instruments are, proportion of daughters, distance to nearest child
and age of eldest child (Bonsang 2009, Bolin et al. 2008, Van Houtven & Norton 2008, 2004,
Charles & Sevak 2005). Our focus however, is not restricted to children caring for parents and
individuals in the SCS could be receiving care from a child, partner or someone else.
As discussed, since the SCS data are collected for administrative purposes, there is limited
opportunity for finding suitable instruments. However, we propose using publicly available data
zone10 level information from the 2011 Census to construct two IVs. Those are, the number
of one person households and the number of married individuals, both as proportions of the
data zone populations. In Scotland, around 78% of carers are living with someone in a couple
(Scottish Government 2015). Thus, both of the proposed data zone level rates are thought to be
good predictors of an individuals’ likelihood of having an unpaid carer, i.e. living in an area
with a high marriage rate or low one-person household rate should be highly positively correlated
with a persons unpaid care status, but have no influence on a specific individuals’ personal care
utilisation. We use both IVs to instrument the carer variable. Due to the recording of data zones in
the SCS, which changes between the three years, this approach is only possible for those clients
who were in either all three years, 2016 only, 2016 and 2015, or 2016 and 2014. We also include
an additional income variable in the IV regressions because income might be correlated with
household composition, which in turn could influence hours of FPC. We use data zone level
income deprivation from the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (SIMD) 11. This variable
captures the proportion of the data zone which are determined to be income deprived.
IV models are estimated for the two parts of the 2PM using two data zone level instruments.
Two-stage least squares is used for both parts of the model. Table 3.4 shows the key statistics
from the IV regressions, first using one instrument and then using both. The table shows that in
all cases the instruments are good predictors of unpaid care status. This is indicated by the first-
stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistics, which are all above the ’rule of thumb’ requirement
of 10. When both instruments are included, they also pass the over identification test. Lastly,
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-square statistics for the exogeneity of unpaid care are consistently
insignificant at the required 5% significance level, suggesting that the carer variable can be treated
10A data zone is a small-area statistical geography in Scotland containing populations of between 500 and 1,000 residents.
11The SIMD is a tool developed by the Scottish Government which measures deprivation and poverty in Scotland. The tool
is based on a number of deprivation indicators which are used to create different domains, e.g.income, education and employment.
Scotland’s data zones are then ranked according to those domains, going from the most deprived to the least deprived. (Scottish
Government 2016c)
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Table 3.4: Instrumental Variables Specification Tests
Dependent Vari-
able
Instruments Strength of Instruments Overidentification Test Exogeneity Test
Positive Personal
Care Hours
% one person households
in data zone
F(1, 5757) = 64.49*** Equation exactly identified Chi-sq(1) = 0.08
Personal Care
Hours
% one person households
in data zone
F(1, 4583) = 39.38*** Equation exactly identified Chi-sq(1) = 0.38
Positive Personal
Care Hours
% one person households
in data zone; % of married
people in data zone
F(2, 5757) = 33.54*** Chi-sq(1) = 0.16 Chi-sq(1) = 0.07
Personal Care
Hours
% one person households
in data zone; % married
people in data zone
F(2, 4583) = 19.80*** Chi-sq(1) = 0.67 Chi-sq(1) = 0.35
as exogenous. The parameter estimates from the second-stage regressions are shown in Table 3.6
in the Appendix.
Furthermore, the models are re-estimated for those clients who appeared in 2016 only. Esti-
mating the models for individuals only present in 2016 acts as a check against reverse causality,
assuming that those who were not present in earlier years, were receiving social care for the first
time in 2016 and as a result, the decision of their unpaid carer to provide care is less likely to
be influenced by the number of hours of care the client is receiving. The results are shown in
Table 3.7 in the Appendix and they are consistent with the previous findings.
Overall, the results from the above endogeneity sensitivity checks are consistent with the main
model conclusions and consistently find that unpaid carers complement personal care services for
the over 65s in Scotland.
Finally, to ensure that the results are not sensitive to the recording of unpaid care information
by local authorities, the 2PM (including the full set of need variables) is estimated for the sample
of local authorities in which more than 50% of individuals had unpaid carer information recorded.
The output from this model is shown in Table 3.8 in the Appendix. Once again, the results are
consistent with the previous findings.
3.5 CONCLUSION
The ageing shift occurring in populations across the world has the potential to increase pressures
on LTC provision. As individuals continue to live into older ages they are more likely to require
care for frailty and chronic conditions, especially if ageing is associated with an expansion of
morbidity (Walter et al. 2016, Campolina et al. 2014, Beltrán-Sánchez et al. 2016). This care can
be provided through paid care, also known as formal care, or by unpaid carers. Often, formal care
services are organised and provided by the state. Thus, any increased pressure on those services
inevitably raises concerns regarding the strain of LTC provision on the public purse. If unpaid care
substitutes for formal care, governments might consider policies which incentivise unpaid care, in
order to reduce the demand for formal LTC services.
However, evidence in the existing literature is extremely mixed. Some pieces of research have
found evidence suggesting unpaid care substitutes for formal care, whilst others have found that
it actually complements formal care. The influence that unpaid care has on formal care services
will undoubtedly have considerable implications on the utilisation and subsequent costs of those
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services. It is therefore vital that the relationship between the two is fully investigated, so that
LTC policy can be developed to appropriately respond to an ageing population. Scotland provides
a particularly interesting opportunity to examine this relationship, where personal care services
are free to those aged 65+ receiving care at home, unlike many jurisdictions where the cost of care
is borne by the individual and their family.
This paper is the first to utilise a unique administrative dataset in Scotland to investigate the
influence that unpaid carers have on personal care utilisation by the 65+. Specifically, it uses data
from the SCS, from 2014-2016, and looks at how the presence of an unpaid carer influences the
number of hours of personal care the cared for receives in a week. We estimate OLS, GLM and
2PMs. The 2PM is the most appealing estimation procedure in the literature on paid and unpaid
care as it accounts for the full marginal effect of unpaid care, given that there are a large proportion
of individuals with zero hours of personal care.
The results from the 2PM suggest that unpaid care tends to complement personal care services.
In particular, the incremental effect of an unpaid carer is 1 hour 14 minutes per week. A variety
of sensitivity analysis are also conducted to check for the extent of endogeneity in the model. The
findings from this analysis also finds a complementary relationship between unpaid and personal
care. These findings are consistent with the literature supporting the complementary hypothesis
(Geerts & Van den Bosch 2012, Litwin & Attias-Donfut 2009), as well as with those finding that
complementarity is more likely to exist for those with high levels of need (Bonsang 2009), which
the sample of individuals analysed here have since they are already receiving some form of social
care. Further investigation into different sub-samples might be useful in determining whether or
not a complementary relationship holds for other groups. For example, for social care clients who
are receiving home care only, that is help with IADLs, a substitution effect might be more likely.
The finding of complementarity in Scotland for those aged 65+ may be unsurprising given
that personal care is free for those individuals. To expand, unpaid care is generally provided by a
spouse or an older child. In jurisdictions where personal care bears a financial cost, it might fall
on the unpaid carer to finance this. To do this, they might choose to supply more hours in the
labour market and therefore devote less time to providing unpaid care. In Scotland, where there
is no cost attached to personal care, unpaid carers may be more likely to advocate on behalf of
the cared for to ensure they get the care they require, compared to jurisdictions where there is a
cost associated with formal care. Thus, the complementary relationship might suggest that unpaid
carers are supported by the formal care sector and this is effective in enabling them to remain
in employment (Pickard et al. 2015, Brimblecombe et al. 2018). At the same time, it may also
demonstrate that unpaid carers are providing a different kind of help to the person they are caring
for compared to the formal care sector. For example, unpaid carers might help with the persons
finances or simply by helping them to maintain a sense of self (Farina et al. 2017). However,
further investigation would be needed to verify this.
The existence of a complementary relationship between unpaid and formal care is concerning
in two dimensions. Firstly, it might mean that as the Scottish population ages and family members
take on the role of unpaid carers, the pressure on local authorities providing LTC to older individ-
uals will increase as unpaid carers demand services on behalf of the cared for. If this is the case,
planning for future social care spending will have to take this into account. Secondly, there is a
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concern that there could be unmet need for those individuals who do not have an unpaid carer.
This is especially highlighted in the 1st part of the 2PM, in which it is predicted that those without
unpaid carers are significantly less likely to receive personal care services in the first place.
There are however, some caveats in this paper which warrant comment. Firstly, concerning
the generalisability of the results to the entire population. Specifically, the sub-sample of the
population analysed here is already a higher needs group in that they require some form of social
care service. Thus, the findings of complementarity between unpaid and paid care might not extend
beyond personal care clients. Related to this, the sub-sample of unpaid carers captured in the SCS
might be systematically different from unpaid carers in the general population, for example in
terms of the care they provide, once again threatening the generalisability of the complementary
results reported here.
Secondly, the analysis is somewhat constrained by the sample selection criteria, which in the
case of the unpaid care information, is poorly recorded by local authorities. Specifically, there
are considerable differences in the proportions of local authorities who record the unpaid care
information, which could introduce sample selection bias into the models. As a sensitivity check,
the 2PM is estimated for those local authorities who had recorded the unpaid carer information
for more than 50% of their social care clients12. In addition, a comparison of the main descriptive
statistics between the pre-unpaid care selection sample and the final sample was also carried out.
This comparison did not reveal any large differences between the two groups apart from in terms of
personal care status. Specifically, the pre-unpaid care selection sample had a lower proportion of
individuals receiving personal care by around 10%. This finding once again suggests that the final
sample analysed here is likely to be a higher needs sub-set of the social care population analysed.
Understanding if this selection criteria introduces bias into our sample, is still difficult to tell and
future research would benefit greatly from inquiring with individual local authorities to understand
more about their recording practices and shed light on the probability that this introduces selection
bias.
Thirdly, we acknowledge that the variables which attempt to control for the need/health status
of care clients are only proxies and might not fully capture the care needs of formal care recipients.
As discussed, the SCS does collect more detailed needs information by means of an IoRN score,
but as with the unpaid carer variable, this is optional information and is only available for a very
small proportion of social care clients. If need is not fully captured by the included covariates in the
model, the unpaid carer variable may act as a proxy for need. For example, it could be that unpaid
carers provide care up to the point at which they can no longer meet the needs of the person they
are caring for, and after this point, they seek additional help from the local authority. This could
result in those with unpaid carers having higher personal care needs compared to those without.
Further investigation with more detailed information on individuals need would be necessary to
check this.
Lastly, the analysis is limited by the lack of information available on unpaid carers. For
example, it is unknown if the carer is a child caring for a parent outside the household, or a partner
caring for their other half in their own home. This information would be useful to check if the
results would differ depending on the relationship between the cared for and carer, which some
12Results are shown in Table 3.7 in the Appendix
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evidence suggests is the case (Geerlings et al. 2005, van den Berg & Ferrer-i Carbonell 2007).
Moreover, the SCS doesn’t contain information on the type of care provided or time spent caring
by unpaid carers. Understanding more about the type of care unpaid carers are supplying would
offer a further insight into the relationship between unpaid and formal LTC provision. In addition,
information on the employment status of the unpaid carer would be useful in determining whether
or not the relationship between unpaid and paid care changes with this status. For example, it
might be that substitution is more likely when a carer is retired and has time to take on more
caring duties themselves.
Finally, thus far we have assumed that the relationship between unpaid and paid LTC might
put pressure on formal care services. Specifically, that a complementary relationship could lead
to increased demand and subsequent costs to the government for providing formal LTC. However,
it is possible that the complementarity between the two, suggests that unpaid carers are being
supported in their role as care giver. As a result, they might provide care for longer and prevent
the need for increased use of formal care or other forms of formal care such as residential care, and
subsequently lower costs to the government overall. At the same time, providing unpaid care may
also have negative consequences on carers health, well being and societal productivity (Schulz
& Beach 1999, van den Berg & Ferrer-i Carbonell 2007, Bom et al. 2018, Pickard et al. 2018).
Future research should therefore understand more clearly the costs that arise due to unpaid caring,
to ensure that unpaid carers are properly supported in their role.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this paper has used Scotland’s unique SCS to estimate
the effect that unpaid carers have on older peoples’ use of personal care services. The results
consistently suggest that there is a complementary relationship between unpaid care and personal
care services in Scotland. These findings are robust a variety of sensitivity checks.
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3.6 APPENDIX
Table 3.5: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Gender 0 if male, 1 if female
Age 0 if 65-74; 1 if 75-84; 2 if 85-94; 3 if 95+
Year 2014;2015;2016
SCS Previously 0 if received social care in one year only; 1 if received social care in more than one year
Dementia 0 if client not assigned dementia client group; 1 if client assigned dementia client group
Unpaid Carer 0 if client does not have an unpaid carer; 1 if client has an unpaid carer
No. oth services Continuous variable from 0-5. Sum of services other than home care that a client is receiving.
Those services are: telecare, meals services, self directed support; housing support; social work.
Weekly personal care hours Continuous variable from 0 to 168.
Multistaff 0 if personal care client had one member of staff looking after them; 1 if personal care client had
more than one member of staff caring for them.
Income Deprivation Average proportion of data zones within the local authority which are income deprived.
Table 3.6: Sensitivity Analysis: IV 2SLS Second Stage Results
IV_A (P1) IV_A (P2) IV_B (P1) IV_B (P2)
Has unpaid carer 0.522** -0.203 0.490* -0.21
(0.254) (0.333) (0.255) (0.331)
Aged 75-84 0.0425*** 0.0103 0.0421*** 0.0102
(0.008) (0.022) (0.008) (0.022)
Aged 85-94 0.0382*** 0.0615*** 0.0377*** 0.0614***
(0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.022)
Aged 95+ 0.0449*** 0.132*** 0.0446*** 0.131***
(0.014) (0.038) (0.014) (0.038)
Female 0.0345*** 0.0258 0.0337*** 0.0255
(0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.019)
No. Oth Services -0.00362 0.128*** -0.0029 0.129***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014)
SCS previously -0.0228 0.124*** -0.021 0.124***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022)
Dementia -0.0445 0.0651 -0.04 0.0659
(0.038) (0.047) (0.039) (0.047)
Income Deprivation 0.0828** 0.0701 0.0820** 0.0702
(0.036) (0.073) (0.036) (0.073)
Two or more staff - 0.991*** - 0.992***
- (0.044) - (0.044)
2015 -0.247*** -0.0679 -0.243*** -0.0669
(0.041) (0.055) (0.041) (0.055)
2016 -0.357*** 0.0256 -0.351*** 0.0266
(0.045) (0.059) (0.045) (0.059)
Constant 0.581*** - 0.596*** -
-0.125 - -0.126 -
Observations 42,009 15,751 42,009 15,751
Standard errors are clustered at the data zone level and shown in parentheses: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
Local authority dummies are included but are not presented in output.
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Table 3.7: Sensitivity Analysis: 2016 Only Clients
Variable OLS GLM 2PM (P1)
Aged 75-84 0.0352 0.0225 0.0225
(0.033) (0.028) (0.028)
Aged 85-94 0.0633* 0.0538* 0.0538*
(0.034) (0.028) (0.028)
Aged 95+ 0.101 0.111** 0.111**
(0.066) (0.053) (0.053)
Female -0.02020 -0.0159 -0.0159
(0.025) -0.0206 -0.0206
Has unpaid carer 0.00772 0.0194 0.0194
(0.035) (0.030) (0.030)
No. Oth Services 0.113*** 0.0893*** 0.0893***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
Demenita 0.872*** 0.769*** 0.769***
(0.042) (0.028) (0.028)
Multistaff 0.0497 0.0245 0.0245
(0.036) (0.030) (0.030)
Constant 1.515*** 1.797*** 1.797***
(0.073) (0.060) (0.060)
Observations 4935 4935 14922
Marginal Effect 0.05 0.16 0.46***
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
Local authority dummies are included but are not presented in output.
Table 3.8: Sensitivity Analysis: Local authorities with good unpaid care information
Variable OLS GLM 2PM (P1)
Aged 75-84 0.0345 0.0386* 0.0386*
(0.027) (0.023) (0.023)
Aged 85-94 0.0888*** 0.0887*** 0.0887***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.024)
Aged 95+ 0.215*** 0.224*** 0.224***
(0.048) (0.040) (0.040)
Female -0.00226 0.00332 0.00332
(0.020) -0.0172 -0.0172
Has unpaid carer 0.0557** 0.0758*** 0.0758***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
No. Oth Services 0.157*** 0.122*** 0.122***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Demenita 0.0525 0.0548 0.270***
(0.045) (0.036) (0.041)
Multistaff 0.734*** 0.700*** 0.550***
(0.042) (0.037) (0.032)
SCS previously 0.0489** 0.0164 -0.237***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.050)
Eilean-Siar 0.271*** 0.270*** -0.221***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.052)
Glasgow City 0.604*** 0.550*** 0.700***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.037)
2015 -0.269*** -0.237*** 0.0164
(0.056) (0.050) (0.020)
2016 -0.257*** -0.221*** 0.0548
-0.0578 -0.0517 -0.036
Constant 1.329*** 1.645*** 1.645***
(0.067) (0.064) (0.064)
Observations 8,560 8,560 23,175
Marginal Effect 0.40** 0.63*** 1.62***
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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4 | The Cost of Unpaid Care: a Standard of Living Approach
Elizabeth Lemmon and David Bell
Abstract
The increase in the average age of the Scottish population has increased the demand for care
for older people. Much of this care is provided by unpaid (informal) carers. The provision of
unpaid care affects the living circumstances of these carers. Currently, eligible Scottish carers
are entitled to claim a cash benefit called the Carers Allowance to offset the additional costs they
face due to their care giving role. This paper employs methods used by Morciano et al. (2015),
to better understand the effects of caring on the living circumstances of carers. It uses data from
the 2013/14 - 2016/17 UK Family Resources Survey (FRS), to estimate the monetary cost of
providing unpaid care. This estimate is based on the effect of providing care on a carer’s Standard
of Living (SoL). We use this estimate to provide evidence on the extent to which the Carers
Allowance sufficiently compensates unpaid carers. Our results suggest that caring is associated
with a significant reduction in SoL. This reduction is largest for those who live with the person
being cared for and according to the best fitting model it is predicted that these carers would need to
be compensated by £229 per week in order to reach the same SoL as their non-caring counterparts.
This paper concludes that the current Carers Allowance offered to eligible carers is not sufficient
to compensate them for the loss in SoL they experience due to care giving. Specifically, it would
need to increase to a level that is at least three times higher.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The structure of the Scottish population, like most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries, has changed significantly in recent decades (OECD 2017). Av-
erage life expectancy rose from around 72 years to 79 years between 1981 and 2014 (National
Records of Scotland 2017). There were 20% fewer registered births in 2016 compared to 1975
(National Records of Scotland 2017). As a result, the average age of the Scottish population has
increased. It is expected that by 2041, 14% of the population will be aged 75 and over, compared
to just 8% in 2016 (National Records of Scotland 2016b).
Population ageing has led to an increase in demand for long term care for older people.
Included in this is increased pressure on family members and friends to take on roles as unpaid
or informal carers (Rutherford & Bu 2017). Informal care is defined by Carers UK as unpaid
care provided to "family, partners or friends in need of help because they are ill, frail or have
a disability" (Howard 2002, pp.4). A recent report on long term care demand and expenditures
estimated that over the next 25 years, the number of disabled people receiving unpaid care in
England will rise by more than 75% (Wittenberg et al. 2018).
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Furthermore, as the population has aged, the prevalence of multi-morbidities has increased
(Salisbury et al. 2011). This changes the demands on the types of care unpaid carers need
to deliver, often meaning they have to provide intensive personal care to family members with
complex needs, having had little or no formal training.
The pressure on family members to take up unpaid caring roles is intensified further by cuts in
government expenditure and legislation aimed at promoting care in the community. For example,
new health and social care integration policy in Scotland has a focus on enabling older adults to
stay in their own homes for as long as possible (Scotish Government 2016). This policy shift has
increased pressure on family members to provide unpaid care to older relatives who are living at
home.
Unpaid carers are recognised as the most important source of long term care for disabled
individuals in OECD countries (OECD 2017). For long term care costs of dementia in the US, it is
estimated that 49% of the total costs are made up of unpaid care costs (Hurd et al. 2013), whilst it is
around 36% for the UK (Knapp et al. 2007). The costs of unpaid care can be due to unpaid carers
juggling both employment and caring responsibilities (Pickard et al. 2018, Pickard 2018). This
tension can lead to costs for unpaid carers, their employers and to society, as work absenteeism
increases and unpaid carers cut back on working hours or exit the labour market entirely (Krol
et al. 2015). Furthermore, costs can manifest themselves in negative health and well-being effects
(Hoefman et al. 2013, Schulz & Beach 1999, Bom et al. 2018).
The additional costs faced by unpaid carers are recognised by governments around the world.
In particular, in the UK, some carers are given compensation for their care duties by means of a
Carers Allowance, which is administered by the government under a set of restrictive eligibility
criteria. The benefit is not means tested and is a cash payment paid at the flat rate of £64.60 per
week to eligible carers (2017/18 rate) (DWP 2018).
Having said that, it is often the case that the costs of unpaid care are ignored in economic
evaluations from a societal perspective, which could lead to inefficient levels of resource allocation
and poor policy decisions (Landfeldt et al. 2018, Van Exel et al. 2008, Arora et al. 2018, Krol et al.
2015). In fact, currently in England, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)
doesn’t usually incorporate the costs of unpaid caring into economic evaluations (NICE 2013).
One explanation for the omission of unpaid care costs in such evaluations could be due to the
difficulties associated in valuing unpaid care, around which the literature is extensive (Arora et al.
2018).
Often described as the benchmark method (van den Berg et al. 2006) and employed frequently
in the literature, is the opportunity cost method (Goodrich et al. 2012, Carmichael & Charles 2003,
Chari et al. 2015, Rattinger et al. 2015). This approach values the time spent providing unpaid care
using the hourly wage rate that the unpaid carer would receive if he/she were active in the labour
market. The idea is that the carer forgoes this wage by spending time providing care instead. A
common criticism of this approach is that in many cases, unpaid carers are not active in the labour
market. Therefore, valuing their time spent unpaid caring based on the wage rate they would
obtain if they were working may undervalue their efforts in providing unpaid care.
The proxy goods (or replacement cost) method instead costs an unpaid carers time using the
market rate of an equivalent service, for example, the wage of professional carers. It is widely
66
utilised in the literature (Foster & Fender 2013, Escribano-Sotos & Pardo-García 2015, Langa,
Chernew, Kabeto, Regula Herzog, Beth Ofstedal, Willis, Wallace, Mucha, Straus & Fendrick
2001, Deloitte Access Economics 2015, Dunbar et al. 2018, Arno et al. 1999, Carers UK 2015), but
is often criticised because it assumes that formal care and unpaid care are perfect substitutes, which
may be an unrealistic assumption (van den Berg et al. 2004, Faria et al. 2012, Koopmanschap et al.
2008, McDaid 2001). In particular this implies that there are no differences in the efficiency or
quality of care provided and that both the carer and care recipient are indifferent between unpaid
care and formal care (Koopmanschap et al. 2008). However, in reality, it is likely that these
assumptions do not hold because unpaid carers are usually family members who have known the
care recipient for most of their lives. In many cases, this means that unpaid carers know more
about the needs and preferences of the care recipient as opposed to formal carers. Furthermore,
care recipients might feel more comfortable with a family member caring for them than a formal
carer whom they don’t know (Brimblecombe et al. 2018). On the other hand, unpaid carers often
have no training whilst formal carers do, meaning that certain aspects of the quality of care they
provide is likely to differ.
Another problem that is common to both the proxy goods and opportunity cost methods is that
neither allows for increasing (or decreasing) marginal disutility of hours spent caring, since each
hour of care is valued equally (Koopmanschap et al. 2008). Additionally, both methods ignore
the preferences of the carer and the care recipient (van den Berg, Bleichrodt & Eeckhoudt 2005).
Hence, stated preference techniques such as Contingent Valuation (CV) (van den Berg, Brouwer,
Exel & Koopmanschap 2005, van den Berg, Bleichrodt & Eeckhoudt 2005, Koopmanschap et al.
2008, Faria et al. 2012, van den Berg et al. 2004, Hoefman et al. 2013, Gustavsson et al. 2010),
Conjoint Analysis (CA) (van den Berg, Al, Brouwer, van Exel & Koopmanschap 2005, van den
Berg et al. 2008, Mentzakis et al. 2011) and Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) (Arora et al. 2018)
have been suggested as ways to overcome this problem with the opportunity cost and proxy goods
methods because they incorporate the different circumstances facing carers and more accurately
reflect their preferences. However, there are several biases which these preference methods are
susceptible to e.g. strategic bias, hypothetical bias and anchoring (Koopmanschap et al. 2008, van
Exel et al. 2006, Hoefman et al. 2013, de Meijer et al. 2010). It is generally argued that stated
preference models are preferable to the opportunity costs and proxy goods methods when valuing
unpaid care (van den Berg et al. 2004, Koopmanschap et al. 2008). The well-being method has
also been implemented in the costing unpaid care literature, however it is not superior to the more
traditional costing methods (van den Berg & Ferrer-i Carbonell 2007).
Having said this, a further drawback that these costing methods share, is that they focus
explicitly on time spent caring. This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, they rely on unpaid
carers accurately reporting the number of care hours that they supply. In practice this is very
difficult and subject to significant error. The two key methods of calculating time spent caring that
are used in the literature are the Diary and Recall methods. Both have been studied extensively
and it has been shown that overestimation, and more often underestimation, is likely (van den
Berg & Spauwen 2006). Underestimation occurs when reporting hours of care because carers
don’t account for joint production, that is, doing several tasks simultaneously, and they often find
it difficult to distinguish between caring and non-caring tasks (van den Berg & Spauwen 2006). A
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recent study using survey data from England found that both the wording of survey questions and
to whom the question is asked can lead to significant under-reporting of unpaid care (Rutherford
& Bu 2017). Secondly, this explicit focus on time, results in a narrow view of the trade-offs
associated with caring. For example, an unpaid carer might not be able to go on holiday as a result
of their care commitments, even if those commitments only involve a small amount of their time
each day. That is to say, unpaid caring can be restrictive in other ways, not only on the time a
person has available to them.
In this paper, we propose an approach which, unlike the aforementioned literature, does not
focus on time spent caring and instead focuses on the material impact of unpaid care-giving.
To do this we employ methods used by Morciano et al. (2015) in their paper on the costs of
disability, to estimate the monetary cost of being an unpaid carer in terms of the change in a
carers standard of living (SoL) associated with providing unpaid care. In doing so, we aim to
provide evidence for the extent to which the current Carers Allowance, adequately compensates
Scottish carers for the service they provide. We use data from Scottish households in the UK
Family Resource Survey (FRS). The econometric method employed to form these estimates is a
generalised structural equation model of latent SoL expressed as a function of income, care status
and other characteristics, allowing for measurement error in a set of observed SoL indicators.
We contribute to the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, we do not rely on measurements
of time spent caring and instead focus on the material impact of unpaid care provision, which
has not been done in the previous literature. In this way, the SoL methodology employed in this
paper is an addition to the unpaid care costing tool-kit. Secondly, we are the first to offer evidence
on the ability of the Carers Allowance to compensate unpaid carers for the additional costs they
face due to care giving. We believe that providing this evidence is crucial at a time where several
social security benefits, including the Carers Allowance, are being transferred from Westminster
to Holyrood under the Scotland Act 2016 (Scottish Executive 2016). At present, there is little
evidence to suggest the extent to which the Carers Allowance actually compensates unpaid carers
for the additional costs they face due to care giving and it has been recognised that the current
payment is not high enough (Work and Pensions Committee 2008, Berthoud 2010).
It is recognised that there is evidence of positive effects that result due to unpaid care giving
(Schulz & Sherwood 2008), for example, often family members feel a sense of fulfilment and
happiness from providing care to someone they love, however these effects are not the focus of
this paper.
The structure of this paper is organised as follows: Section 4.2 describes the methodology,
Section 4.3 introduces and describes the data, Section 4.4 outlines the results, and finally, Sec-
tion 4.5 discusses those results and presents the conclusions.
4.2 METHODS
The Standard of Living Method
This paper applies the SoL method used by Morciano et al. (2015) in their paper on the costs of
disability, in the context of the costs associated with unpaid care in Scotland.
SoL is defined as the "degree of wealth and material comfort available to a person or com-
68
Figure 4.1: Standard of Living- Income Profile
munity" (Oxford 2017). The SoL indicators used in this model were designed by the Department
for Work and Pensions (DWP) to specifically capture material deprivation in older adults (McKay
2008). Using such measures of material deprivation is appropriate in the unpaid care costing
context, as they capture reductions in overall SoL faced by unpaid carers as a result of their role as
care givers. Specifically, it is expected that unpaid carers have to divert resources in order to pay
for goods and services for the person they are caring for. Compared to the conventional costing
methods which have focused on attaching a monetary value to the time a carer gives up in order
to provide care, we argue that the SoL approach may capture a wider array of the trade-offs that
are involved in providing unpaid care. For example, are unpaid carers less able to afford to go on
holiday or to take part in a regular leisure activity? If it is the case that unpaid carers have to invest
resources into providing care then they might have less resources to devote to their own needs and
wants, resulting in unpaid carers having a lower SoL compared to non-carers. This is shown in
Fig. 4.1.
It is expected that across all levels of income, a carer (C) will have a lower SoL than a non-carer
(NC). This suggests that for a given level of income, for example Y , the SoL of a non-carer will
be higher than a carer. This implies that there is some amount, θ, by which the carer would need
to be compensated by in order to reach the same SoL as the non-carer. The SoL costing approach
employed in this paper aims to calculate this compensation and thus provide an estimate of the
material costs associated with providing unpaid care. In turn, this estimate can be used as evidence
for the extent to which the current Carers Allowance appropriately compensates caregivers in their
role.
Formally, suppose that SoL is given by an additively separable function of income and care
status as follows:
S oL = f (Y) − g(C) + h(Z, ) (4.1)
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where SoL is standard of living, Y is income, C is unpaid care status, and Z and  comprise all
other observed and unobserved individual characteristics that might influence SoL.
Firstly, consider an initial level of income Y0 where an individual is not providing any unpaid
care. Now, assume a change in situation where the individual moves from providing no care
to providing some care. What would be the minimum compensation (θ) that would be required
to maintain their initial level of SoL? Answering this question involves solving the following
optimisation problem:
min θ s.t f (Y0 + θ) − g(C) ≥ f (Y0) (4.2)
In other words, what is the minimum amount of additional income that a carer would need to have
an equivalent SoL of a non-carer? To find an analytical solution for this problem, the function
f, which gives the relationship between income and SoL must be specified. As in Morciano
et al. (2015), we explore three options comprising (1) linear, (2) log-linear, and (3) log-quadratic
functional forms.
Consider the first option in which SoL is linear in income, f (Y0) = β1Y0, where β1 indicates
the effect that income has on SoL. The solution to the minimisation problem in Eq. 4.2 implies
compensation for care provision would be set at:
θ1 =
g(C)
β1
(4.3)
In addition to calculating the absolute cost of unpaid care giving, it is possible to calculate the
corresponding equivalence scale - a scale often used in the income inequality literature to account
for household size. In general, the equivalence scale (σ), is equal to (Y0 + θ)/Y0. Within the
framework of costing unpaid care, the equivalence scale allows one to adjust household incomes
for those which contain an unpaid carer. Eq. 4.1 implies an equivalence scale of 1 + g(C)f (Y) .
The benefit of specifying a linear functional form for income is that it results in a compensation
which is independent of income. However, the corresponding equivalence scale is dependent
on income. Following from Morciano et al. (2015) f (Y0) is specified as β1ln(Y0). Using this
functional form, the resulting compensation is:
θ2 = Y0
[
e
g(C)
β1 − 1
]
(4.4)
The log-linear specification has the advantage that the corresponding equivalence scale is not
dependent on income: σ = e
g(C)
β1 . This is the standard form that is used in income inequality
analysis to account for differences in the composition of households (Morciano et al. 2015).
The third form used is the more flexible log-quadratic form which is often used in studies
of Engel curves (Banks et al. 1997). Morciano et al. (2015) found that the log-quadratic form
fitted the data best in their analysis of the impact of disability on SoL. Income is specified as
f (Y) = β1lnY0 + α(lnY0)2. The resulting compensation is then:
θ3 = exp
[−β1 + √β21 + 4αc
2α
]
− Y0 (4.5)
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Where c = β1lnY0 +α(lnY0)2 + g(C). Since ln(Y + θ) < 0 is not consistent with theory, the positive
root for the quadratic function is used. Whilst calculating the corresponding equivalence scales
for the various levels of compensation may also be of interest, the results presented in Section 4.4
show the absolute compensation values only 1.
Empirical Model
One of the problems encountered when applying the theoretical model to the data is that SoL
is a concept which is not directly observable: instead, it involves many attributes of life that
individuals combine in different ways. S oL can therefore be represented as a latent variable which
can be approximated by a set of observed indicators, Ik, as follows:
Ik = γkS oL∗ + φk , k = 1....n (4.6)
where γk denotes a kx1 vector of coefficients which are the factor loadings of latent S oL∗ on the
various indicators. A higher factor loading indicates that latent S oL∗ explains a larger share of the
variation in the indicator Ik . In each of the k indicator equations, latent S oL∗ explains part of the
variation in the indicator, while the unique residual appears in the error terms φk. The error terms,
φk, are assumed normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance. It is assumed that
corr(φkφ j) = 0, k , j. That is, the left over residual error is unique to each of the indicators and
the only shared variance between the indicators occurs through the common S oL∗ latent factor.
As in Morciano et al. (2015) the estimation of the empirical model in this paper uses a
Generalised Structural Equation Modelling (GSEM) framework which allows the measurement
of latent S oL∗ to be modelled simultaneously within the structural model. GSEM also accounts
for the binary nature of the indicator variables. This approach involves simultaneously solving the
following equation along with Eq. 4.6:
S oL∗i = β1 f (Yi) − β2g(C) + Z′β3 + i (4.7)
Where i indexes observations (i = 1...N), f (Yi) represents the three specified functional forms for
income and β1 their corresponding effects on S oL. The function g(C) once again represents the
care status of the individual and β2 the associated coefficients. All other observable, individual
characteristics are captured in Z and i captures other unobserved influences on S oL. The key
benefit of SEM over other methods is that it explicitly allows for measurement error in the set of
observed SoL indicators (Morciano et al. 2015).
4.3 DATA
The data used in this paper come from the 2013/14 - 2016/17 waves of the Family Resources Sur-
vey (FRS) (UK Data Service 2013/14-2016/17a). The FRS is a UK-wide cross-sectional survey
that collects annual information on households’ economic, health and lifestyle circumstances. It
also collects detailed information on any unpaid care that is provided by and to household and non-
household members. Specifically, the unpaid care schedule of questions in the FRS relates to help
1Equivalence scales are available on request
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or support received by household members, or provided by household members to people outside
the households because they have long-term physical, mental ill-health, or problems relating to
old age (UK Data Service 2016/17b). In particular, for people living with the person being cared
for, the survey asks "In some households, there are people who receive help or support because
they have long-term physical or mental ill-health or disability, (or problems relating to old age).
Is there anyone in this household who receives any of these kinds of help or looking after?" (UK
Data Service 2016/17b, p.112). In a subsequent question the survey identifies who is providing that
care. For those caring for someone outside the household the survey asks "And how about people
not living with you: do you/ (or does anyone in this household) provide any help or support for
anyone not living with you who has a long-term physical or mental ill-health problem or disability,
or problems relating to old age?"(UK Data Service 2016/17b, p.112). These questions are used to
determine whether or not someone is an unpaid carer, and if they are caring for someone within or
outside their household. We use the sample of Scottish households across the four survey waves.
As in Morciano et al. (2015), we restrict the sample to include only households containing
either a single person or couple. This is due to income being measured at the household level.
As a result, it is assumed that in the case of a couple, each individuals benefits equally from that
income. Further, as we are interested in care provided to older adults as a consequence of ageing,
we restrict the sample to exclude carers who are caring for someone aged below 50 2.
After the sample has been restricted in this way, we are left with a total of 14,706 individuals
over the four years.
Descriptives
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample3. As indicated in the table, 6% of the total
sample are carers, whilst the remaining 94% are non-carers. Of those, about 41% are living with
the person they are caring for and 59% are caring for a parent who lives outside the household.
There are some notable differences between the two groups. Specifically, carers are more
likely to be retired and they are five years older on average compared to non-carers. Carers are
more likely to be married, 74% of carers compared to 50% of non-carers. Furthermore, carers are
slightly less likely to have a university qualification or higher compared to non-carers.
In terms of disability, as defined under the core definition in the Equality Act 2010 (Legisla-
tion.gov.uk 2010), there is little difference between carers and non-carers. In particular, 32% of
carers have a disability compared to 28% of non-carers. At the same time there is little difference
in weekly household income between the two groups. Specifically, median income for carers is
£560 and for non-carers it is £586.
Standard of Living Indicators
As in Morciano et al. (2015), the household-level material deprivation indicators from the FRS
are used to construct individual level-deprivation indicators by assigning the household values to
2For carers who live with the person being cared for we drop those caring for someone aged below 50. For those carers who are
not living with the person being cared for it is not possible to know the age of the person they are caring for. The best we can do is to
exclude those who are caring for someone other than a parent outside the household, and assume that those carers who are aged 34 are
most likely caring for a parent who is aged 50 or over.
3For a full description of each variable see Table 4.9 in Appendix.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics Carers versus Non-carers
Total Sample: N = 14,706
Carers Non-Carers
n = 953 n = 13,753
(6% of N) (94% of N)
Coding No. of Obs % of sample No of Obs % of sample
Retired
Yes 1 657 68.94 7,677 55.82
No 0 296 31.06 6,076 44.18
Married
Yes 1 704 73.87 6,898 50.16
No 0 249 26.13 4,575 33.27
University
Yes 1 161 16.89 3,125 22.72
No 0 792 83.11 10,628 77.28
Disabled
Yes 1 307 32.21 3,849 27.99
No 0 646 67.79 9,904 72.01
Carer
Yes 1 951 100 0 0
No 0 0 0 13,753 100
Live with/parent carer
Live with - 389 40.82 - -
Parent - 564 59.18 - -
Year
2013/14 0 251 26.34 3,615 26.29
2014/15 1 220 23.08 3,421 24.87
2015/16 2 243 25.50 3,273 23.80
2016/17 3 239 25.08 3,444 25.04
Age
Mean Age in Years 58 - 53 -
Income
Min £’s 0 - 0 -
Median £’s 560 - 586 -
Mean £’s 775 - 762 -
Max £’s 10,058 - 10,282 -
individual household members. The responses to the material deprivation questions are grouped
into two categories. The first category indicates that the person reported that they could not
afford the activity/good in question. The second indicates all other possible responses. Each
SoL indicator is therefore a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the individual said they could not
afford the item in question and 0 otherwise.
Prior to the estimation of Eq. 4.7, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted in
order to determine whether or not the material deprivation indicators identify the latent factor
S oL∗. The EFA identified one factor to be retained with an eigenvalue of 4.32 indicating that
approximately 40% of the total variance in all of the observed indicators is explained by the latent
factor S oL∗4. Similar analysis carried out by DWP in their research into the use of these questions
to measure SoL also found that the indicators were identifying the common factor (McKay 2008).
A common rule of thumb is to retain those indicators with factor loadings greater than 0.4 and
0.3 as an absolute minimum (Osborne & Costello 2009). Hence, the twelve strongest indicators,
i.e. those with factor loadings greater than 0.3, were chosen for the estimation of the model. In
fact, all twelve had factor loadings greater than 0.45. Other standard checks were carried out to
assess the suitability of the material deprivation indicators including an alpha reliability test of the
SoL scale. This test produced a test scale alpha of 0.865 for the twelve indicators. This is above
4See Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 in Appendix for results from the EFA.
5See Table 4.7 in Appendix for results from alpha correlation.
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Table 4.2: SoL Measurement Model Descriptive Statistics Carers versus Non-Carers
Total Sample: N = 14,706
Carers Non-Carers
n = 953 n = 13,753
Response (% of n) Response (% of n)
SoL Indicator: Can you afford . . . Yes, 0 No, 1 Yes, 0 No,1
DECOR: ...to keep your home in a decent
state of repair? 91.6 8.4 92.2 7.77
HOLIDAY: ...to go on holiday once a year? 77.5 22.5 78.9 21.13
MONEYSELF: ...to have money to spend each
week on yourself? 84.8 15.2 86.1 13.86
FURNITURE: ...to replace worn out furniture? 84.6 15.4 85.1 14.88
CLOTHES: ...to replace worn out clothes
with new ones? 91.6 8.4 92.4 7.59
ENDSMEET 6: Do you have difficulty making
ends meet? 85.0 15.0 86.0 14.00
LEISURE: ...to regularly take part in a
hobby or leisure activity? 93.2 6.8 93.3 6.71
WARM: ...to keep this property warm? 92.3 7.7 93.4 6.65
SHOES: ...to have two pairs of
all-weather shoes? 95.9 4.1 97.0 2.99
BILL: ...to keep up with regular bills
and repayments? 96.6 3.4 95.1 4.86
MEATFISH: ...to eat meat or fish every
second day? 93.3 6.7 93.9 6.10
COMP: ...a computer? 95.6 4.4 95.7 4.31
the required 0.70 minimum standard (Acock et al. 2013). Adding in other indicators reduced the
test scale alpha. Once again, analysis by DWP also confirmed the indicators had a high reliability
score (McKay 2008).
Table 4.2 displays the descriptive statistics for the twelve SoL indicators that are used in this
analysis. The table indicates that in eleven out of the twelve indicators, a higher proportion of
carers answer that they cannot afford the activity/good in question compared to non-carers. On
average, the difference is about 1%. The biggest discrepancy between carers and non-carers is in
the MONEYSELF indicator. Approximately 15.2% of carers said they could not afford to spend
money on themselves each week, compared to 13.9% of non-carers.
The BILL indicator is the only SoL indicator where carers were less likely to say they cannot
afford to keep up with regular bills. Specifically, 3.4% of carers said they could not afford this
compared to 4.9% of non-carers. In summary, the descriptive statistics in Table 4.2 suggest that
carers might have a slightly lower SoL compared to non-carers.
4.4 RESULTS
This section will outline the results obtained from the GSEM outlined in Section 4.2, hereafter
Model 1. The results from an extended model, hereafter Model 2, will also be presented. This
model extension allows for differences in SoL to occur between those who live with the person
being cared for and those who care for someone outside the household. In this way, the model
aims to capture differences in the amount of time spent caring, since co-resident carers are more
likely to spend substantial amounts of their time providing unpaid care (Geyer et al. 2017, Beesley
6Responses to this question were: with great difficulty, with difficulty, with some difficulty, fairly easily, easily and very easily.
The first two responses have been grouped together to indicate significant difficulty in making ends meet, and the others were grouped
together to indicate little difficulty
74
2006). As has been discussed in Section 4.2, accurately measuring time spent caring is fraught
with difficulties and cost estimates based on the number of hours spent caring are likely to be
subject to significant error. Therefore, without relying on self-reported hours of care provision,
the extended model will reflect intensity of care provision and at the same time it is likely to more
accurately capture those carers who would tend to underestimate the time they spend caring when
reporting the number of hours they care for, i.e. those who live with the person they care for, and
hence better reflect the associated costs.
As discussed in Section 4.3, we are interested in care relationships which have likely resulted
due to ageing. Unfortunately, for those who are caring for someone they are not living with, it
is not possible to determine the age of the cared for. To try and capture those who are caring for
someone older than them, we restrict the sample to include children caring for parents or in-laws
outside the household, and make the assumption that carers who are aged 34 or over will have
a parent who is aged 50 or over. Focussing the analysis on care between those living together,
most likely spouses, and children caring for parents is not too restrictive since these are the most
common unpaid care relationships (Maher & Green 2002).
Thus, in Model 2, carers are split up into those who live with the person being cared for (LWC)
and those who care for a parent outside the household (PC). It is hypothesised that both LWCs and
PCs experience a lower SoL than non-carers. However, LWCs provide more intensive care, most
likely involving a high number of hours of care compared to PCs, meaning that we would expect
LWCs to require a greater compensation than PCs, in order to reach the same SoL as a non-carer.
Both models are estimated in Stata 15 using the gsem command with a logit-link function
specified. This allows the structural model to be estimated simultaneously with the measurement
model that describes the latent, dependent variable S oL∗, whilst taking into account the binary
nature of the observed SoL indicators. Output from the measurement models is not shown here
though all twelve indicators are consistently significant at the 1% significance level across both
models and for each specification of income.
Model 1: Carers versus Non-Carers
Eq. 4.7 is used to estimate Model 1 using the sample from the 13/14-16/17 FRS, where g(C) is
simply defined as a binary variable identifying whether an individual is a carer or a non-carer.
Table 4.3 displays the output from the structural models for the three functional forms of income.
As expected, income has a positive effect on SoL. That is, those individuals with a higher
weekly household income have a higher SoL. In addition, being older, married and retired are also
associated with a higher SoL. SoL is also greater for individuals who have a university qualification
or above. The linear time trend also shows that SoL has been increasing since 2013/14.
Conversely, Table 4.3 shows that SoL is lower for individuals that are disabled. This finding is
consistent with work carried out by Morciano et al. (2015) in their paper on the costs of disability.
Moreover, as hypothesised, SoL is lower for unpaid carers.
All covariates are significant at less than the 1% significance level across each specification,
except for the married variable in specification 3, which is significant at the 10% level.
When using a linear functional form for income, the structural model predicts that carers
would require compensation of around θ1 = £158 per week in order for them to reach the same
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Table 4.3: Model (1) Results Care versus Non-Care
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Income (β1) 0.00228*** - -
(0.000) - -
Carer (β2) -0.361*** -0.435*** -0.366***
(0.102) (0.103) (0.100)
Disabled -1.487*** -1.456*** -1.323***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.069)
Retired 1.652*** 1.498*** 1.695***
(0.103) (0.102) (0.103)
Age 0.0541*** 0.0587*** 0.0579***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
University 0.738*** 0.887*** 0.618***
(0.073) (0.074) (0.071)
Married 0.414*** 0.312*** 0.0911
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Year 0.233*** 0.234*** 0.213***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
ln income(β1) - 1.421*** -2.429***
- (0.055) (0.205)
(ln income)2 (α) - - 0.348***
- - (0.020)
Constant 4.665*** 4.761*** 4.348***
(0.295) (0.299) (0.273)
AIC 68665.3 68320.7 67850
BIC 68908.4 68563.7 68100.6
θ θ1 = £158 θ2 = £200 θ3 = £101
N 14,706 14,679 14,679
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses: * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
SoL as non-carers. Furthermore, assuming a logarithmic functional form for income, the model
predicts that the compensation, θ2 , that carers require in order to achieve the same SoL as their
non-caring counterparts is approximately 35% of their income. At the median level of income
of a carer, £560, this works out at about £200 per week compensation. Finally, allowing a more
flexible relationship between SoL and income using the log quadratic functional form results in a
compensation of θ3 = £101 per week. The calculation for θ3 uses the median values of income,
log-income and log-income squared 7.
According to the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria, AIC and BIC respectively, the
better fitting version of Model 1 is Specification 3, which uses the log-quadratic functional form
of income.
The findings from Model 1 support the initial hypothesis posited in this paper, which antici-
pated that providing unpaid care requires the carer to forgo resources in order to provide care and
as a result would lead to carers having a lower SoL than non-carers. These figures suggest that
the Carers Allowance, currently administered by the UK government, of £64.60 per week, is too
low to compensate carers for the reduction in SoL they face due to care giving (DWP 2018). At
the same time, the Carers Allowance is only available to those who provide over 35 hours of care
per week and Model 1 does not allow for differences in SoL to occur between those who provide
a high number of hours of care and those who provide a low number of hours of care. There are
a number of studies which have found that carers who live with the person being cared for, or
co-resident carers, typically provide a higher number of hours of care compared to those who do
not live with the person being cared for (Geyer et al. 2017, Beesley 2006). Therefore, it might be
7See Table 4.8 in Appendix for these values.
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Table 4.4: Model (2) Results Live with Carers, Parent Carers versus Non-Carers
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Income (β1) 0.00226*** - -
(0.000) - -
Live with carer (β2) -0.882*** -1.033*** -0.857***
(0.154) (0.156) (0.151)
Parent carer (β3) 0.0142 -0.0124 -0.013
(0.133) (0.133) (0.130)
Disabled -1.473*** -1.439*** -1.310***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.068)
Retired 1.680*** 1.532*** 1.721***
(0.104) (0.103) (0.103)
Age 0.0538*** 0.0583*** 0.0575***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Univesity 0.733*** 0.878*** 0.613***
(0.073) (0.074) (0.071)
Married 0.441*** 0.342*** 0.117*
(0.057) (0.057) (0.056)
Year 0.236*** 0.238*** 0.216***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
ln income (β1) - 1.413*** -2.404***
- (0.055) (0.204)
(ln income)2 (α) - - 0.346***
- - (0.020)
Constant 4.652*** 4.741*** 4.335***
(0.294) (0.298) (0.272)
AIC 68647.5 68297.3 67833.6
BIC 68898.1 68547.9 68091.8
θ θ4 = £390 θ6 = £506 θ8 = £229
θ5 = £0 θ7 = £0 θ9 = £0
N 14,706 14,679 14,679
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses: * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
expected that co-resident carers would experience a higher loss in SoL.
Model 2 offers an insight into this intensity of care provision by allowing SoL to differ be-
tween those who live with the person being cared for and children caring for parents outside the
household.
Model 2: Live With Carers, Parent Carers versus Non-Carers
Once again, Eq. 4.7 is used to estimate Model 2 using the sample of individuals from the 13/14-
16/17 FRS, where g(C) ∈ {0, 1, 2}where zero indicates that the person is a non-carer, one indicates
that the carer is living with the person being cared for (LWC) and two indicates that the carer is
caring for a parent outside the household (PC). Table 4.4 displays the output from the regressions
for the three functional forms of income.
As anticipated, the a priori assumptions about the signs of covariates are confirmed again by
Model 2. Income positively influences SoL, as do being older, being retired, being married and
having a university qualification or above.
As in Model 1, disabled individuals have a lower SoL. Moreover, as predicted, being a caring
who is living with the person being cared for is associated with a lower SoL than a non-carer.
Across the three model specifications, these variables are statistically significant at less than the
1% significance level. Contrary to expectations, Model 2 finds that there is no difference in SoL
for those caring for a parent outside the household and non-carers.
If the linear specification for income is assumed, Model 2 predicts that LWCs need a com-
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pensation of approximately θ4 = £390 per week to reach the same SoL as non-carers. This result
provides support for the hypothesis that carers who live with the person they care for, require
compensation for their care giving duties.
If the logarithmic functional form for income is specified, Model 2 again supports this hypoth-
esis in that it suggests LWCs need to be compensated by around 108% of their income in order to
reach the equivalent SoL as non-carers. At the median level of LWCs income, £470, this works
out at around θ6 = £506 per week compensation.
Finally, if the log-quadratic functional form of income is used, the compensation required in
order for a LWC maintain the same SoL as a non-carer, is somewhat lower than the compensation
predicted by the logarithmic model, at θ8 = £229 per week. The calculation for θ8 uses the median
values of income, log-income and log-income squared of a LWC8.
Once again, the AIC and BIC in Model 2 suggest that Specification 3 fits the data best. This
finding is consistent with the results found in Morciano et al. (2015).
Given the assumption that those who live with the person they are caring for provide the
highest number of hours of care, it is probable that the carer within the household is eligible to
receive the Carers Allowance. Evidently, the results from Model 2 imply that the Carers Allowance
offered to carers in the UK falls considerably short of being sufficient to cover the associated cost
of unpaid care in terms of reduced SoL. Specifically, the Carers Allowance would need to increase
to a level that is between three and as much as eight times higher than is currently offered. The
findings from Model 2 support the hypothesis that households in which someone is providing
unpaid care to a person they live with, experience an increase in material deprivation as resources
are reallocated towards care provision.
A variety of sensitivity analysis was performed in order to check the robustness of the results
for both models. These included running standard Structural Equation Models (SEMs) instead of
GSEMs9, estimating the models using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)10 and predicting SoL scores
from a factor analysis11. The results from these analyses were consistent with the results presented
here.
4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The ageing population in Scotland has resulted in an increasing number of people living into older
ages and with multiple chronic conditions. This change has induced an increased pressure on
spouses and family members to provide informal, unpaid care. The Scottish Government has also
implemented policy in recent years to shift care into the community and has advocated that older
members of the population live in their own homes for as long as possible. This policy change has
further heightened the need for family members to step in and provide unpaid care.
The importance of such care and the costs unpaid carers potentially face when balancing
employment and caring are well established (Pickard 2018, Pickard et al. 2018). Despite this, the
value of unpaid care is often ignored in economic evaluations, which could lead to an inefficient
8See Table 4.8 in Appendix for these values.
9See Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 in Appendix for these results.
10See Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 in Appendix for these results.
11See Table 4.14 and Table 4.15 in Appendix for these results.
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allocation of resources. As well to allocate resources efficiently, understanding the costs of unpaid
care are central to ensuring that unpaid carers are appropriately supported in their role.
Several methods for costing unpaid care have been proposed in the literature over the last
two decades. The most popular costing methods have been the opportunity costs, proxy goods,
contingent valuation and conjoint analysis methods. Despite the abundance of studies that have
employed these methods in the unpaid care costing literature, they each share a common criticism
that undermines their ability to appropriately reflect the costs associated with being an unpaid
carer. In particular, the current literature bases its calculations on the cost of unpaid care on the
number of hours a person spends providing care. This approach has two caveats. Firstly, it relies
on unpaid carers accurately reporting on the number of hours they spent caring in some specified
time period, which has been demonstrated to often lead to underestimation by carers (Rutherford
& Bu 2017, van den Berg & Spauwen 2006). Secondly, it assumes a narrow view of the trade-offs
associated with providing unpaid care in that it only focuses on time and ignores other potential
trade-offs.
In this paper we attempt to estimate the monetary costs associated with unpaid carer in terms
of the change in SoL a carer experiences. In this way, we seek to offer evidence on the extent
to which the current Carers Allowance adequately compensates unpaid carers in Scotland. We
contribute to the current literature by moving away from relying on an accurate measure of time
spent caring, and instead focus on the material deprivation associated with caring. We argue that
this approach might capture trade-offs that traditional methods haven’t been able to. Thus, the SoL
approach is suggested as an addition to the costing unpaid care tool-kit. At the same time, we are
the first to offer evidence on the ability of the current Carers Allowance to compensate Scottish
unpaid carers for the service they provide. This evidence comes at a crucial time in Scotland when
the Scotland Act 2016 transfers powers over Carers Allowance from Westminster to Holyrood
(Scottish Executive 2016).
Two GSEMs, each with three specifications for the functional form of income, are estimated.
Model 1 estimates the relationship of interest between SoL and unpaid care provision. Model 2
delves further into the relationship between SoL and unpaid care provision by splitting carers up
into those who live with the person being cared for, and those who care for a parent outside the
household. Due to the difficulties encountered when measuring time spent caring, in particular
the under-reporting of hours spent caring by spouses, measuring the impact of caring on the SoL
of those who live with the person they care for will potentially give a more accurate reflection of
the compensation that is required for those who provide intensive unpaid care, compared to using
self-reported hours of care.
Two critical findings emerge from this paper. Firstly, unpaid carers experience a significant
reduction in their SoL as direct result of providing unpaid care and this reduction is far greater
for those who live with the person being cared for. Those carers who are living with the person
they are caring for require compensation of £229 per week, according to the best fitting model.
Secondly, the current compensation given to eligible carers by the UK government, i.e. the Carers
Allowance, is not sufficient to compensate them for the reduction in SoL they experience as a result
of providing care. In particular, in order to fully compensate carers for the loss in SoL that they
experience, the Carers Allowance would need to be raised by between 3 and 8 times the current
79
level.
The findings highlight the value of the service that family carers provide. If unpaid care were
not being provided by family members, especially those who are living with the person in need
of care, there would likely be an increased pressure on local authorities to assess individuals for
their care needs and step in to provide formal care services. Formal long term care services in
Scotland are under considerable stress at the moment with continuing budget cuts and in some
areas the system has been said to be facing complete collapse (Marsh,S 2017). Thus, it is becoming
increasingly important that unpaid carers are appropriately supported financially in their roles to
ensure that they continue to offer the help that they do.
The Scottish Government is committed to doing this and has pledged to increase the Carers
Allowance in line with job-seekers allowance when it gains control over the benefit under the
Scotland Act 2016 (Scottish Executive 2016). This increase will help to compensate unpaid carers
for more of the loss they experience due to caring. At the same time, the government should
consider the potential additional costs it might face if the increase in the allowance also leads
to an increase in the demand for the benefit. Furthermore, Social Security Scotland (SSS) - the
body which has been set up by the Scottish Government to manage and deliver those benefits -
has committed to putting dignity, fairness and respect at the heart of its practices. This approach
could also have implications for the demand for Carers Allowance once it is handed over from
Westminster. In relation to this, the Scottish Government should also consider the ’visibility’ of
carers when forecasting the impact of increasing the Allowance since their estimates on the amount
of unpaid care being provided are likely to be underestimates (Pickard et al. 2016).
A further implication of this result concerns the marital status of the LWCs who, in this
analysis are almost all married (74%). Given changing trends over the last few decades, namely
the increase in the number of single person households, higher rates of divorce and the decrease
in marriages (Beesley 2006), it is expected that in the future there will be less married couples
living together into older age and as a result less availability of unpaid care from couples living
together. This could additionally lead to increased pressure on the government to provide formal
care services to the elderly population.
Moreover, the Scottish government should consider the potential implications of these findings
for the quality and quantity of care that is being provided by unpaid carers if they are not being
adequately supported. In particular, if a carer is experiencing a significant reduction in their SoL
due to their role as an unpaid carer and is not being sufficiently compensated, this could impact
on the quality of care they provide. If the quality of care provided is negatively affected there
could be knock on effects on health and well-being costs of the carer and cared for. Furthermore,
if the compensation is not sufficient to cover the costs associated with caring in terms of reduced
SoL, some carers might decide not to live with the person who needs care, or they might make a
decision not to provide care to the person they live with (Pezzin et al. 2007). These possibilities
could be detrimental to the older person who requires care, potentially increasing their health care
costs and increasing pressure on formal long term care services.
Nevertheless, some limitations are acknowledged in this paper. Firstly, the SoL costing ap-
proach cannot capture other costs of unpaid care provision, for example, physical and mental
health effects, or other long-term negative effects on SoL. It could be that providing unpaid
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care impacts on the physical and/or mental health of carers and results in them utilising more
health care resources than non-carers (Savage & Bailey 2004, Vlachantoni et al. 2016, Barrow
& Harrison 2005, Maher & Green 2002), which of course could increase the associated costs of
caring. At the same time, we have not distinguished between different needs of the cared for.
It might be that the costs associated with unpaid care are greater depending on the condition of
the person being cared for. For example, evidence from the Netherlands shows that there are
differences in the consequences of caring for someone with depression compared to schizophrenia
(Van Wijngaarden et al. 2009). Therefore, the SoL method might only provide a partial measure
of unpaid care costs.
At the same time, we have ignored any positive effects of care-giving (Schulz & Sherwood
2008). Such positive effects, for example well-being effects, could have been included in the
latent measure of SoL. It might be expected that including such positive effects would reduce
the required compensation for caring compared to a measure which focuses solely on material
deprivation. Such an approach might offer a more holistic measurement of the effects of unpaid
caring.
Secondly, the data cannot capture care networks. A care network refers to the team of individ-
uals who provide unpaid care to a person. For example, several siblings often provide care to their
parent or parents. It is possible that being a carer who belongs to a wider team of carers might
mean that caring responsibilities are shared across the network and this could result in less of a
negative impact on SoL due to caring. Controlling for these types of networks would be beneficial,
as it would separate out those carers who are the sole providers of unpaid care and those who are
in a care network and allow the identification of the effect of caring on their SoL. However, this is
not possible with the data at hand.
Furthermore, a monetary payment has been suggested in this paper as a means to compensate
unpaid carers. However, it could be argued that this is not enough to fully compensate carers. They
might benefit from other types of help such as support groups or respite care. Mentzakis et al.
(2011) found that for younger individuals monetary compensation is a significant determinant of
care provision, however, this was not the case for older individuals, they tended to provide unpaid
care regardless of monetary compensation. This conclusion implies that older unpaid carers, who
in this analysis tended to be those who live with the person they care for, might prefer other forms
of compensation. At the same time, it might be argued that the SoL methodology does not apply
to middle and higher income households who can afford formal care services.
As with much of the literature, this paper also suffers from selection and identification prob-
lems. Specifically, we only observe the care decision of those who have chosen to be unpaid carers
and we do not observe the factors which influence a person’s decision about caring. For example,
it is likely that opportunity costs/outside opportunities and possible future bequests will play a
role. Including such information in the models could change the results. Future research would
benefit from insights into care provision decisions.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the empirical evidence presented here has shed light on
the material costs associated with providing unpaid care in terms of SoL. We find evidence that
unpaid carers must reallocate their resources into providing unpaid care, resulting in a lower SoL.
This reduction in SoL is especially large for those who live with the person being cared for and
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the findings suggest that the current Carers Allowance falls extremely short of appropriately
compensating these carers. As the Scottish population continues to age, and the demand for
unpaid care increases further, it is critical that the government appropriately considers the costs
associated with providing unpaid care, particularly intensive unpaid care, and implements the
necessary policies to support these carers.
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4.6 APPENDIX
Table 4.5: Exploratory Factor Analysis
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor 1 4.31679 4.06181 1.0759 1.0759
Factor 2 0.25498 0.14982 0.0635 1.1394
Factor 3 0.10516 0.00881 0.0262 1.1656
Factor 4 0.09635 0.04766 0.024 1.1896
Factor 5 0.0487 0.03475 0.0121 1.2018
Factor 6 0.01395 0.02315 0.0035 1.2052
Factor 7 -0.0092 0.01127 -0.0023 1.2029
Factor 8 -0.02047 0.0134 -0.0051 1.1978
Factor 9 -0.03387 0.01905 -0.0084 1.1894
Factor 10 -0.05292 0.03359 -0.0132 1.1762
Factor 11 -0.08652 0.00738 -0.0216 1.1546
Factor 12 -0.0939 0.02245 -0.0234 1.1312
Factor 13 -0.11634 0.0059 -0.029 1.1023
Factor 14 -0.12224 0.01238 -0.0305 1.0718
Factor 15 -0.13462 0.01878 -0.0336 1.0382
Factor 16 -0.15341 . -0.0382 1
Table 4.6: Factor Loadings
Indicator Loading onto Factor 1
FURNITURE 0.6838
CLOTHES 0.6823
MONEYSELF 0.667
HOLIDAY 0.6432
DECOR 0.683
LEISURE 0.6202
ENDMEET 0.5816
WARM 0.5502
MEATFISH 0.4905
SHOES 0.5135
BILL 0.5026
COMP 0.4511
WASH 0.1689
PHONE 0.1693
DENTIST 0.1199
MEDICAL -0.0334
Table 4.7: Alpha Correlation
Item Obs Sign Item-TestCorrelation
Item-Rest
Correlation
Average Interitem
Covariance Alpha
FURNITURE 14,706 + 0.7347 0.6424 0.0252 0.8455
CLOTHES 14,706 + 0.7051 0.6339 0.0271 0.8467
MONEYSELF 14,706 + 0.7217 0.6291 0.0255 0.8464
HOLIDAY 14,706 + 0.7187 0.6048 0.0247 0.8510
DECOR 14,706 + 0.725 0.6403 0.0258 0.8453
LEISURE 14,706 + 0.6602 0.5802 0.0275 0.8501
ENDMEET 14,706 + 0.6246 0.5452 0.0281 0.8525
WARM 14,706 + 0.5933 0.5094 0.0284 0.8545
MEATFISH 14,706 + 0.5343 0.447 0.0291 0.8581
SHOES 14,706 + 0.5316 0.4703 0.0300 0.8582
BILL 14,706 + 0.5406 0.4645 0.0294 0.8574
COMP 14,706 + 0.4917 0.4147 0.0299 0.8599
Test scale - - - - 0.0276 0.8630
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Table 4.8: Median Incomes
Carer Live With Carer Parent Carer
Income 560 470 713
ln(income) 6.314 6.134 6.547
ln(income)2 39.86 37.672 42.86
Table 4.9: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
INCOME
Weekly benefit unit income. This is equal to the sum of EARNS (Total income from
earnings), PENINC (Total income from other pensions), OTHBEN (Total income from
other benefits, INV (Total income from investments), RINC (Total income from
remaining sources), SEINC (Total income from self-employment), DISBEN (Total
income from disability benefits) and RPINC (Total income from retirement pensions
plus income support).
CARE A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the individual is a carer and 0 otherwise.
LIVEWITH A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the individual is a carer and is caring forsomeone else in the household and 0 otherwise.
PARENT A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the individual is a carer and is caringfor a parent or in law outside the household and 0 otherwise.
YEAR A dummy variable which is equal to 0 if the year was 2013/14, 1 if it was 2014/15,2 if it was 2015/16 and 3 if it was 2016/17.
RETIRED A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the individual is retired and 0 otherwise.
DISABLED A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the individual is classified asbeing disabled and 0 otherwise.
UNIV. QUAL A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the individual has a university qualification orhigher and 0 otherwise.
MARRIED A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the individual is married and 0 otherwise.
AGE A continuous variable which indicates the average age of the individual. For privacyissues age is censored at 80+.
Table 4.10: Sensitivity Analysis: Structural Equation Model - Model (1)
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Income 0.0000564*** - -
(0.000) - -
Carer -0.0186*** -0.0187*** -0.0174***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Disabled -0.0862*** -0.0768*** -0.0748***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Retired 0.0648*** 0.0678*** 0.0743***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age 0.00240*** 0.00268*** 0.00264***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Univesity 0.0399*** 0.0321*** 0.0253***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Married 0.0423*** 0.0197*** 0.0162***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year 0.00984*** 0.00927*** 0.00884***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log(income) - 0.0753*** -0.0402***
- (0.002) (0.010)
log(income)^2 - - 0.00985***
- - (0.001)
AIC 440925.1 238319.5 292842.4
BIC 441259.3 238653.6 293184.1
θ θ1 = £330 θ2 = £158 θ3 = £116
N 14,706 14,679 14,679
t statistics in parentheses* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 4.11: Sensitivity Analysis: Structural Equation Model - Model (2)
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Income 0.0000559*** - -
(0.000) - -
Livewith Carer -0.0444*** -0.0432*** -0.0392***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Parent Carer -0.00113 -0.00207 -0.00268
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Disabled -0.0856*** -0.0762*** -0.0744***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Retired 0.0662*** 0.0692*** 0.0755***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Age 0.00238*** 0.00266*** 0.00263***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Univesity 0.0396*** 0.0319*** 0.0252***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Married 0.0434*** 0.0208*** 0.0172***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year 0.00995*** 0.00937*** 0.00893***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log(income) - 0.0750*** -0.0392***
- (0.002) (0.010)
log(income)^2 - - 0.00974***
- - (0.001)
421092.4 218559.7 273064.9
421434.2 218901.4 273414.3
θ θ4 = £794 θ6 = £366 θ8 = £250
θ5 = £0 θ7 = £0 θ9 = £0
N 14,706 14,679 14,679
t statistics in parentheses* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Table 4.12: Sensitivity Analysis: Ordinary Least Squares - Model (1)
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Income (β1) 0.000682*** - -
(0.000) - -
Carer (β2) -0.225*** -0.226*** -0.211***
(0.064) (0.062) (0.062)
Disabled -1.034*** -0.920*** -0.897***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Retired 0.773*** 0.810*** 0.889***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.052)
Age 0.0294*** 0.0328*** 0.0324***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Univesity 0.493*** 0.401*** 0.318***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
Married 0.514*** 0.241*** 0.199***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Year 0.120*** 0.113*** 0.108***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
log(income) (β1) 0.910*** -0.490***
- (0.023) (0.115)
log(income)^2 (α) - - 0.120***
- - (0.010)
Constant 8.302*** 3.017*** 7.060***
(0.073) (0.160) (0.363)
θ θ1 = £330 θ2 = £158 θ3 = £116
N 14,706 14,679 14,679
t statistics in parentheses* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 4.13: Sensitivity Analysis: Ordinary Least Squares - Model (2)
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Income (β1) 0.000676*** - -
(0.000) - -
Livewith Carer (β2) -0.540*** -0.526*** -0.477***
(0.098) (0.095) (0.095)
Parent Carer (β3) -0.011 -0.0223 -0.0297
(0.081) (0.079) (0.079)
Disabled -1.027*** -0.914*** -0.892***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Retired 0.790*** 0.827*** 0.903***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.052)
Age 0.0292*** 0.0326*** 0.0323***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Univesity 0.491*** 0.397*** 0.316***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
Married 0.527*** 0.254*** 0.210***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Year 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.109***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
log(income) (β1) - 0.906*** -0.478***
- (0.023) (0.115)
log(income)^2 (α) - - 0.118***
- - (0.010)
Constant 8.30*** 3.038*** 7.032***
-0.073 -0.16 -0.363
θ θ4 = £798 θ6 = £370 θ8 = £252
θ5 = £0 θ7 = £0 θ9 = £0
N 14,706 14,679 14,679
t statistics in parentheses* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Table 4.14: Sensitivity Analysis: Predicted SoL via Factor Analysis - Model (1)
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Income (β1) 0.000292*** -
(0.000) -
Carer (β2) -0.0966*** -0.0972*** -0.0906***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Disabled -0.451*** -0.402*** -0.392***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Retired 0.338*** 0.354*** 0.387***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Age 0.0124*** 0.0138*** 0.0137***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Univesity 0.208*** 0.167*** 0.132***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Married 0.222*** 0.104*** 0.0862***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Year 0.0513*** 0.0483*** 0.0461***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
log(income) (β1) - 0.392*** -0.202***
- (0.010) (0.050)
log(income)^2 (α) - - 0.0506***
- - (0.004)
Constant -1.103*** -3.377*** -1.664***
(0.032) (0.070) (0.158)
θ θ1 = £331 θ2 = £158 θ3 = £116
N 14,706 14,679 14,679
t statistics in parentheses* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 4.15: Sensitivity Analysis: Predicted SoL via Factor Analysis - Model (2)
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Income (β1) 0.000289*** -
(0.000) -
Livewith Carer (β2) -0.230*** -0.223*** -0.203***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.041)
Parent Carer (β3) -0.00623 -0.0112 -0.0144
(0.036) (0.035) (0.034)
Disabled -0.448*** -0.399*** -0.390***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Retired 0.345*** 0.361*** 0.393***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Age 0.0123*** 0.0137*** 0.0136***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Univesity 0.206*** 0.166*** 0.131***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Married 0.228*** 0.110*** 0.0911***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Year 0.0518*** 0.0488*** 0.0466***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
log(income) (β1) - 0.390*** -0.197***
- (0.010) (0.050)
log(income)^2 (α) - - 0.0501***
- - (0.004)
Constant -1.103*** -3.369*** -1.676***
-0.0318 -0.07 -0.158
θ θ4 = £794 θ6 = £364 θ8 = £248
θ5 = £0 θ7 = £0 θ9 = £0
N 14,706 14,679 14,679
t statistics in parentheses* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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5 | Conclusion
In summary, this PhD has utilised a variety of data sources to conduct empirical analyses on
the provision of Long Term Care (LTC) to older adults in Scotland. This research contributes
towards adding to the understanding of the provision of paid and unpaid LTC in Scotland. The
need to add to this understanding is crucial at a time when Scotland is undergoing significant
demographic shifts, austerity measures and policy changes. Specifically, three avenues of LTC
provision are examined in this PhD. In Chapter 2, an investigation into the provision of Free
Personal Care (FPC) in Scotland is carried out. The analysis in this chapter identifies significant
differences in the provision of FPC across Scottish local authorities and finds that those differences
are not matched by differing levels of need. Overall, the exploration suggests that there might be
geographic inequity in FPC provision, namely that an individual in need of FPC might be more or
less likely to receive it depending on where they reside. This finding is concerning since FPC is a
universal benefit that should be provided to any individual in need of such care.
Of course, LTC is not only provided formally but also by unpaid carers. Chapter 3 presents
an analysis of how unpaid care and formal LTC services interact, using Scotland’s administrative
Social Care Survey (SCS). In particular, the analysis offers evidence on how the presence of an
unpaid carer influences an older persons use of FPC services in Scotland. The findings suggest
that unpaid care complements FPC. That is, individuals who have an unpaid carer helping to care
for them at home, tend to receive a higher number of hours of FPC each week. This result perhaps
indicates that unpaid carers might advocate on behalf of the person they are caring for in order to
increase the level of formal care services they receive. This might be due to the fact that unpaid
carers seek additional support from the formal care sector so that they can continue to remain in
the labour force. It is also likely, especially for those caring for someone outside the household,
that the type of care they provide is quite different to the care that paid carers provide, and in this
way the two complement one another.
The finding of a complementary relationship between unpaid and paid care in Scotland is
concerning in the sense that it suggests that there might be an underlying unmet need for personal
care, for those individuals who do not have an unpaid carer. At the same time, complementarity
between unpaid and paid care suggests that any policy or legislative change which encourages
unpaid care, could lead to an unexpected increased demand for paid care services.
Finally, Chapter 4 looks at the other side of the coin of unpaid care provision and specifically
explores how unpaid carers are affected as a result of care provision. The paper uses Family
Resources Survey (FRS) data to model the standard of living (SoL) of adults in Scotland and
looks at the difference in SoL between those who provide unpaid care and those who do not.
The analysis finds that unpaid carers have a significantly lower SoL compared to non-carers. For
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those carers who live with the person they are caring for this result suggests that those individuals
would need to be compensated by £229 per week in order for them to reach the same SoL as a
non-carer. The results suggest that the current carers allowance of £64.60 per week, falls short of
compensating carers for the loss in SoL they experience due to caring. The findings are of direct
interest in England and the rest of the UK where the FRS data tells a similar story.
In summary, one of the key issues highlighted by the research carried out in this PhD is unmet
need for LTC. It is apparent that unmet need is an area which requires further investigation and
inevitably it will be a focus of LTC policy discussions in Scotland and the rest of the UK, in the
coming years. In particular, the findings suggest that there is possibly unmet need for FPC in
Scotland and that this could potentially be more likely for older people who don’t have an unpaid
carer helping to access FPC on their behalf. In any case, if the Scottish Government is to succeed
in ensuring that older people in Scotland can access quality LTC if they need it, it is crucial that
we understand more about how paid and unpaid channels of care operate and interact, and how
unmet need could be reduced as a result.
Unfortunately, unmet need is difficult to measure: as Scotland discovered when it introduced
FPC in 2002 and saw an unprecedented increase in provision by 62% in the first three years of
the policy (Sutherland 2008). A large part of which was thought to be attributed to unmet need
(Lillie Wenzel 2018). As discussed in Chapter 2, we only observe met need for FPC. That is, those
who actually end up receiving the service. We therefore do not know anything about those who
need FPC but do not receive it because they don’t meet the local authorities eligibility criteria or
they are on a waiting list. We also cannot observe those who need FPC but don’t apply, either
due to transaction costs, a lack of information on how to access those services, or in rare cases
where the person is able to meet the costs of care themselves. At the same time, it might be that
those we observe are only having their needs partially met (Brimblecombe et al. 2018). Thus,
future research would benefit from exploring how we can measure unmet need in LTC. In turn this
would allow us to estimate how much unmet need exists and how we might reduce it to improve
health and care outcomes for older people.
The health and care outcomes of care recipients are of course a vital component of LTC
provision that have not been considered in this thesis. As discussed, local authorities have limited
resources to meet the needs of their populations and as a result they have to make decisions about
which individuals to offer services to. In Scotland, this usually means allocating care to the most
needy cases by setting eligibility thresholds. Inevitably, this decision involves a trade off in that
individuals who don’t meet this threshold do not receive care and this could negatively impact their
outcomes . Another approach might be to give care to as many people in need as possible, but this
would likely involve devoting less resources to the most needy cases so their needs aren’t fully
met. In order to know which approach to take when allocating scare resources, it is important to
understand the distribution of need within local authorities, as well as how care provision affects
care recipient outcomes. The Scottish Government collects information on patient outcomes in
its biennial Health and Care Experience Survey, as part of the Scottish Care Experience Survey
Programme. The aim of the survey is to gather information of the quality of health and care
services, specifically from the perspective of the patients, in order to improve their experiences of
using those services (Scottish Government 2018). An exploration of patient outcomes as a result
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of decisions taken by local authorities surrounding the allocation of FPC resources is certainly of
interest for future research, but beyond the scope of this thesis to comment further.
A further issue related to unmet need which is important to consider, is that the Scottish
Government might run into similar difficulties to those experienced with the introduction of FPC
as it takes on new powers from Westminster, specifically over disability and carers benefits, and
as it extends FPC to the under 65s (Scottish Government 2019). Social Security Scotland (SSS) -
the body which has been set up by the Scottish Government to manage and deliver those benefits
- has committed to putting dignity, fairness and respect at the heart of its practices: an approach
which could have implications for the coverage of the benefits once they are handed over from
Westminster. The analysis carried out in this thesis helps by focussing on some of the issues
surrounding LTC which will directly matter, and an increased understanding of unmet need could
help to avoid unexpected increases in demand as in 2002 when FPC was introduced. SSS could
use the assessment for disability benefits to identify those individuals who would also be eligible
to receive FPC and this could help to close the gap between observed disability and need for LTC.
This understanding may also be of interest in England where they too have considered introducing
FPC and where the disability benefits and LTC systems are distinct. In addition, if unmet need
could be accurately measured, we would be better placed to understand how demographic changes
in the future will influence it. This of course could also be used to guide LTC policy in England
and the rest of the UK, where similar changes in the demand for LTC are occurring.
The research in this thesis has also highlighted some of the strengths and limitations of working
with administrative data. In particular, we have exploited the Scottish Government’s SCS. The
primary advantage of the SCS is that it captures population level data on LTC provision with
no sample selection bias, in a way that traditional survey data cannot. A further advantage is
that the data are routinely collected by local authorities as part of the administrative process of
care provision, thus researchers benefit from access without having to endure the costs of data
collection.
Having said that, although it hasn’t been mentioned up until now, an application was also made
to access linked SCS and health records as part of this thesis. The process for accessing this data
was both lengthy and cumbersome. This was due in part, and rightly so, to the privacy issues
surrounding the use of such data, but also due to the infancy of the systems and processes in place
for researchers to access administrative records. Unfortunately, by the time access was granted
and the data were made available, it was too late to produce meaningful output for the purposes of
this research. This process highlighted the real difficulties that PhD students face when applying
to use linked administrative data in their research, when they have a limited time frame in which
to do so.
Moreover, one of the drawbacks of working with the SCS and administrative data more
generally is that they have not been designed with research in mind. This means that they are
often missing key variables which would ordinarily be used in research. For example, details on
individuals living circumstances, financial situation etc. With this in mind, future research would
benefit hugely from using administrative data that is linked to survey data, where this additional
information is usually included.
Another limitation of the SCS lies in the way in which the data are recorded. That is, the collec-
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tion of the data is carried out at the local authority level. This inevitably gives rise to differences in
recording practices which can ultimately lead to differences between local authorities. Specifically,
many of the entries for the SCS are not mandatory and some local authorities decide not to collect
the information at all. This was apparent in Chapter 3 where we found differences in the recording
of certain information between local authorities which meant that some variables, such as the
Indicator of Relative Need (IoRN) score variable, could not be used in the analysis. Linked to this,
although in theory the SCS is a longitudinal survey, differences in recording practices between
local authorities may also mean that it is not possible to rely on this longitudinal element. If
this were more reliable, future research would benefit greatly from understanding more about the
duration and evolution of peoples care packages as they age.
A further issue related to LTC data which has been identified in this research is the lack of data
which includes information on both carers and the cared for. One of the key limitations of the SCS
in Chapter 3 is that the data are on the cared for themselves and there is no information whatsoever
on the person who is providing unpaid care, other than their presence or non-presence. Whilst
survey data, like the FRS, capture information on the person being cared for and their carers, this
is only possible for those who are living with the person being cared for. Otherwise, there is very
limited information on the cared-for who live outside the household. At the same time, surveys
like the FRS can only capture care networks, that is unpaid carers working in collaboration with
other family members to provide care to the older adults in the family, if they live within the
same household as the person being cared for. If information were available on all unpaid carers
providing care to someone outside the household, this would help to build up a much more reliable
picture of unpaid care provision, and this in turn might help to understand older peoples use of
formal care services and how future changes to Scotland’s demography might influence the care
that older people get.
Overall, the findings from this PhD have contributed to the existing evidence by enhancing
our understanding of LTC provision to older adults in Scotland in both the formal and unpaid care
settings. We have identified avenues for future research in this area, which would certainly aid
future policy discussions and assist the Scottish Government in implementing its new powers over
disability and carers benefits, as well as in achieving its goal of ensuring that older people can
access quality services when they need them. The findings may also be of interest to England
and the rest of the UK where similar demographic changes, austerity measures and new policy
developments are being explored.
91
6 | Bibliography
Abasolo, I., Manning, R. & Jones, A. M. (2001), ‘Equity in utilization of and access to public-
sector gps in spain’, Applied Economics 33(3), 349–364.
Acock, A. C. et al. (2013), ‘Discovering structural equation modeling using stata’, Stata Press
books .
Age UK (2011), ‘Care in crisis: causes and solutions’. Written by Andrew Harrop, Director of
Policy and Puclic Affairs, Public Policy Department, Age UK.
Allin, S., Grignon, M. & Le Grand, J. (2010), ‘Subjective unmet need and utilization of health care
services in canada: what are the equity implications?’, Social science & medicine 70(3), 465–
472.
Alzheimer Scotland (2017), ‘Statistics: Estimated number of people with dementia in scotland
2017’.
URL: https://bit.ly/2HRzdoC
Arno, P. S., Levine, C. & Memmott, M. M. (1999), ‘The economic value of informal caregiving’,
Health Affairs 18(2), 182–188.
Arntz, M. & Thomsen, S. L. (2011), ‘Crowding out informal care? evidence from a field
experiment in germany’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 73(3), 398–427.
Arora, S., Goodall, S., Viney, R. & Einfeld, S. (2018), ‘Using discrete-choice experiment methods
to estimate the value of informal care: The case of children with intellectual disability’,
PharmacoEconomics pp. 1–11.
Audit Scotland (2008), A review of free personal and nursing care, Audit Scotland.
Audit Sotland (2008), A review of free personal and nursing care, Technical report, Audit
Scotland.
Banks, J., Blundell, R. & Lewbel, A. (1997), ‘Quadratic engel curves and consumer demand’,
Review of Economics and statistics 79(4), 527–539.
Barrow, S. & Harrison, R. A. (2005), ‘Unsung heroes who put their lives at risk? informal caring,
health and neighbourhood attachment’, Journal of Public Health 27(3), 292–297.
Bass, D. M. & Noelker, L. S. (1987), ‘The influence of family caregivers on elder’s use of in-
home services: An expanded conceptual framework’, Journal of Health and Social Behavior
pp. 184–196.
92
Beesley, L. (2006), ‘Informal care in england’, London: King’s Fund .
Bell, D. N., Bowes, A. & Heitmueller, A. (2007), ‘Did the introduction of free personal care in
scotland result in a reduction of informal care?’.
Belotti, F. (2015), ‘twopm: Two-part models’, Stata Journal 15(1), 3–20(18).
URL: http://www.stata-journal.com/article.html?article=st0368
Beltrán-Sánchez, H., Jiménez, M. P. & Subramanian, S. (2016), ‘Assessing morbidity compression
in two cohorts from the health and retirement study’, Journal of epidemiology and community
health 70(10), 1011–1016.
Berthoud, R. (2010), The take-up of carer’s allowance: a feasibility study, Technical report, ISER
Working Paper Series.
Boaz, R. F. & Muller, C. F. (1994), ‘Predicting the risk of "permanent" nursing home residence: the
role of community help as indicated by family helpers and prior living arrangements.’, Health
services research 29(4), 391.
Bolin, K., Lindgren, B. & Lundborg, P. (2008), ‘Informal and formal care among single-living
elderly in europe’, Health economics 17(3), 393–409.
Bom, J., Bakx, P., Schut, E. F. & van Doorslaer, E. E. (2018), ‘Informal caregiving, a healthy
decision? determinants and health-related consequences of providing informal care’.
Bonsang, E. (2009), ‘Does informal care from children to their elderly parents substitute for formal
care in europe?’, Journal of health economics 28(1), 143–154.
Brimblecombe, N., Pickard, L., King, D. & Knapp, M. (2018), ‘Barriers to receipt of social care
services for working carers and the people they care for in times of austerity’, Journal of Social
Policy 47(2), 215–233.
Buntin, M. B. & Zaslavsky, A. M. (2004), ‘Too much ado about two-part models and
transformation?: Comparing methods of modeling medicare expenditures’, Journal of Health
Economics 23(3), 525 – 542.
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629604000220
Campolina, A. G., Adami, F., Santos, J. L. F. & Lebrão, M. L. (2014), ‘Expansion of morbidity:
trends in healthy life expectancy of the elderly population’, Revista da Associação Médica
Brasileira 60(5), 434–441.
Carers UK (2014), Facts about carers, Technical report, Carers UK.
Carers UK (2015), Valuing carers 2015: the rising value of carers’ support, Technical report,
Carers UK.
Carmichael, F. & Charles, S. (2003), ‘The opportunity costs of informal care: does gender
matter?’, Journal of health economics 22(5), 781–803.
93
CDG (2001), Fair care for older people, Technical report, The Stationery Office, London.
Chappell, N. & Blandford, A. (1991), ‘Informal and formal care: exploring the complementarity’,
Ageing and society 11(03), 299–317.
Chari, A. V., Engberg, J., Ray, K. N. & Mehrotra, A. (2015), ‘The opportunity costs of informal
elder-care in the united states: New estimates from the american time use survey’, Health
services research 50(3), 871–882.
Charles, K. K. & Sevak, P. (2005), ‘Can family caregiving substitute for nursing home care?’,
Journal of health economics 24(6), 1174–1190.
Christianson, J. B. (1988), ‘The evaluation of the national long term care demonstration. 6. the
effect of channeling on informal caregiving.’, Health services research 23(1), 99.
Comas-Herrera, A., Wittenberg, R., Pickard, L. & Knapp, M. (2007), ‘Cognitive impairment in
older people: future demand for long-term care services and the associated costs’, International
Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry: A journal of the psychiatry of late life and allied sciences
22(10), 1037–1045.
Cookson, R., Laudicella, M. & Donni, P. L. (2012), ‘Measuring change in health care equity using
small-area administrative data–evidence from the english nhs 2001–2008’, Social Science &
Medicine 75(8), 1514–1522.
Coughlin, T. A., McBride, T. D., Perozek, M. & Liu, K. (1992), ‘Home care for the disabled
elderly: predictors and expected costs.’, Health Services Research 27(4), 453.
de Meijer, C., Brouwer, W., Koopmanschap, M., van den Berg, B. & van Exel, J. (2010),
‘The value of informal care–a further investigation of the feasibility of contingent valuation
in informal caregivers’, Health economics 19(7), 755–771.
Deb, P., E.C., N. & W.G., M. (2017), Health Econometrics Using Stata, Stata Press.
Deb, P. & Trivedi, P. K. (2002), ‘The structure of demand for health care: latent class versus
two-part models’, Journal of health economics 21(4), 601–625.
Deloitte Access Economics (2015), The economic value of informal care in Australia in 2015,
Carers Australia.
Dickinson, H., Glasby, J., Forder, J. & Beesley, L. (2007), ‘Free personal care in scotland: A
narrative review’, British Journal of Social Work 37(3), 459–474.
Doorslaer, E. v., Koolman, X. & Jones, A. M. (2004), ‘Explaining income-related inequalities in
doctor utilisation in europe’, Health economics 13(7), 629–647.
Duan, N., Manning, W. G., Morris, C. N. & Newhouse, J. P. (1984), ‘Choosing between the
sample-selection model and the multi-part model’, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics
2(3), 283–289.
94
Dunbar, S. B., Khavjou, O. A., Bakas, T., Hunt, G., Kirch, R. A., Leib, A. R., Morrison, R. S.,
Poehler, D. C., Roger, V. L. & Whitsel, L. P. (2018), ‘Projected costs of informal caregiving for
cardiovascular disease: 2015 to 2035: a policy statement from the american heart association’,
Circulation 137(19), e558–e577.
DWP (2017), ‘Carer’s allowance’. Department for Work and Pensions.
URL: https://www.gov.uk/carers-allowance
DWP (2018), ‘Carer’s allowance’. Department for Work and Pensions.
URL: https://www.gov.uk/carers-allowance
d’Uva, T. B. & Jones, A. M. (2009), ‘Health care utilisation in europe: new evidence from the
echp’, Journal of health economics 28(2), 265–279.
d’Uva, T. B., Jones, A. M. & Van Doorslaer, E. (2009), ‘Measurement of horizontal inequity in
health care utilisation using european panel data’, Journal of health economics 28(2), 280–289.
Escribano-Sotos, F. & Pardo-García, I. (2015), ‘Analyzing the costs of informal care for persons
with dementia in spain’, Journal of Promotion Management 21(4), 459–474.
European Commission (2018), The 2018 ageing report, economic and budgetary projections for
the 28 eu member states (2016-2070), Technical report, Institutional Paper 079.
Faria, R., Weatherly, H. & van den Berg, B. (2012), ‘A review of approaches to measure and
monetarily value informal care’, Unit Costs Health Soc Care 2012 pp. 22–31.
Farina, N., Page, T. E., Daley, S., Brown, A., Bowling, A., Basset, T., Livingston, G., Knapp, M.,
Murray, J. & Banerjee, S. (2017), ‘Factors associated with the quality of life of family carers of
people with dementia: A systematic review’, Alzheimer’s & Dementia 13(5), 572–581.
Fernandez, J.-L. & Forder, J. (2015), ‘Local variability in long-term care services: Local
autonomy, exogenous influences and policy spillovers’, Health economics 24, 146–157.
Foster, R. & Fender, V. (2013), Valuing informal adultcare in the uk, Technical report, Department
for Work and Pensions, Office for National Statistics.
Franca, A., Guilley, E. et al. (2008), ‘The interface between formal and informal support in
advanced old age: a ten-year study’, International Journal of Ageing and Later Life 3(1), 5–
19.
García-Gómez, P., Hernández-Quevedo, C., Jiménez-Rubio, D. & Oliva-Moreno, J. (2015),
‘Inequity in long-term care use and unmet need: two sides of the same coin’, Journal of health
economics 39, 147–158.
Geerlings, S. W., Pot, A. M., Twisk, J. W. & Deeg, D. J. (2005), ‘Predicting transitions in the use
of informal and professional care by older adults’, Ageing and Society 25(01), 111–130.
Geerts, J. & Van den Bosch, K. (2012), ‘Transitions in formal and informal care utilisation
amongst older europeans: the impact of national contexts’, European Journal of Ageing
9(1), 27–37.
95
Geyer, J., Haan, P. & Korfhage, T. (2017), ‘Indirect fiscal effects of long-term care insurance’,
Fiscal Studies 38(3), 393–415.
Goodrich, K., Kaambwa, B. & Al-Janabi, H. (2012), ‘The inclusion of informal care in applied
economic evaluation: a review’, Value in Health 15(6), 975–981.
GOV.UK (2018a), ‘Attendance allowance’.
URL: https://www.gov.uk/attendance-allowance
GOV.UK (2018b), ‘Personal independent payment’.
URL: https://www.gov.uk/pip
Greene, V. L. (1983), ‘Substitution between formally and informally provided care for the
impaired elderly in the community’, Medical care pp. 609–619.
Gustavsson, A., Jönsson, L., McShane, R., Boada, M., Wimo, A. & Zbrozek, A. S. (2010),
‘Willingness-to-pay for reductions in care need: estimating the value of informal care in
alzheimer’s disease’, International journal of geriatric psychiatry 25(6), 622–632.
Hausman, J. A. (1978), ‘Specification tests in econometrics’, Econometrica: Journal of the
econometric society pp. 1251–1271.
Health and Social Care Analysis Division (2018), ‘Health and social care: Self-directed support,
scotland, 2016-17’.
URL: https://www.gov.scot/publications/self-directed-support-scotland-2016-17/
Hoefman, R. J., van Exel, J. & Brouwer, W. (2013), ‘How to include informal care in economic
evaluations’, Pharmacoeconomics 31(12), 1105–1119.
Howard, M. (2002), ‘Redressing the balance: inclusion, competitiveness and choice’, London:
Carers UK p. 4.
Hsiao, C. (2007), ‘Panel data analysis—advantages and challenges’, Test 16(1), 1–22.
Hurd, M. D., Martorell, P., Delavande, A., Mullen, K. J. & Langa, K. M. (2013), ‘Monetary costs
of dementia in the united states’, N Engl J Med 2013(368), 1326–1334.
Information Services Division (2018), ‘Care home census for adults in scotland: Figures for 2007-
2017 (as at 31 march)’.
URL: https://bit.ly/2Wvz25U
Johansson, L., Sundström, G. & Hassing, L. B. (2003), ‘State provision down, offspring’s up: the
reverse substitution of old-age care in sweden’, Ageing and Society 23(03), 269–280.
Josefsson, K., Andersson, M. & Erikstedt, A. (2016), ‘Older adults’ self-rated health and
differences by age and gender: A quantitative study’, Healthy Aging Research 5, 1–10.
Karlsberg Schaffer, S. (2015), ‘The effect of free personal care for the elderly on informal
caregiving’, Health economics 24, 104–117.
96
Keene, J. & Li, X. (2005), ‘Age and gender differences in health service utilization’, Journal of
Public Health 27(1), 74–79.
Kehusmaa, S., Autti-Rämö, I., Helenius, H. & Rissanen, P. (2013), ‘Does informal care reduce
public care expenditure on elderly care? estimates based on finland’s age study’, BMC health
services research 13(1), 317.
Knapp, M., Prince, M., Albanese, E., Banerjee, S., Dhanasiri, S., Fernandez, J. et al. (2007),
‘Dementia uk: The full report’.
Koopmanschap, M. A., van Exel, N. J. A., van den Berg, B. & Brouwer, W. B. (2008), ‘An
overview of methods and applications to value informal care in economic evaluations of
healthcare’, Pharmacoeconomics 26(4), 269–280.
Krol, M., Papenburg, J. & van Exel, J. (2015), ‘Does including informal care in economic
evaluations matter? a systematic review of inclusion and impact of informal care in cost-
effectiveness studies’, Pharmacoeconomics 33(2), 123–135.
Landfeldt, E., Zethraeus, N. & Lindgren, P. (2018), ‘Standardized questionnaire for the
measurement, valuation, and estimation of costs of informal care based on the opportunity cost
and proxy good method’, Applied health economics and health policy pp. 1–10.
Langa, K. M., Chernew, M. E., Kabeto, M. U. & Katz, S. J. (2001), ‘The explosion in paid home
health care in the 1990s: who received the additional services?’, Medical care 39(2), 147–157.
Langa, K. M., Chernew, M. E., Kabeto, M. U., Regula Herzog, A., Beth Ofstedal, M., Willis, R. J.,
Wallace, R. B., Mucha, L. M., Straus, W. L. & Fendrick, A. M. (2001), ‘National estimates of
the quantity and cost of informal caregiving for the elderly with dementia’, Journal of general
internal medicine 16(11), 770–778.
Lang Buisson (2018), ‘Figures revel unequal care funding’.
URL: https://www.laingbuissonnews.com/care-markets-content/figures-reveal-unequal-care-
funding/
Legislation.gov.uk (2010), ‘Equality act 2010’.
URL: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/6
Li, L. W. (2005), ‘Longitudinal changes in the amount of informal care among publicly paid home
care recipients’, The Gerontologist 45(4), 465–473.
Lillie Wenzel, Laura Bennett, S. B. R. M. B. S. (2018), ‘Approaches to social care funding: Social
care funding options’, Health Foundation (2). Working Paper.
Litwin, H. & Attias-Donfut, C. (2009), ‘The inter-relationship between formal and informal care:
a study in france and israel’, Ageing and Society 29(01), 71–91.
Lo Sasso, A. T. & Johnson, R. W. (2002), ‘Does informal care from adult children reduce
nursing home admissions for the elderly?’, INQUIRY: The Journal of Health Care Organization,
Provision, and Financing 39(3), 279–297.
97
Maher, J. & Green, H. (2002), Carers 2000: Results from the carers module of the general
household survey 2000, Stationery Office.
Mangalore, R. & Knapp, M. (2006), ‘Equity in mental health’, Epidemiology and Psychiatric
Sciences 15(4), 260–266.
Manning, W. G. (1998), ‘The logged dependent variable, heteroscedasticity, and the
retransformation problem’, Journal of health economics 17(3), 283–295.
Marsh,S (2017), ‘Nhs straining at the seams year before 70th birthday, finds regulator’.
URL: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/oct/10/nhs-straining-at-seams-70th-birthday-
says-regulator-cqc
McDaid, D. (2001), ‘Estimating the costs of informal care for people with alzheimer’s
disease: methodological and practical challenges’, International journal of geriatric psychiatry
16(4), 400–405.
McKay, S. (2008), ‘Measuring material deprivation among older people’.
McMaughan Moudouni, D. K., Ohsfeldt, R. L., Miller, T. R. & Phillips, C. D. (2012), ‘The
relationship between formal and informal care among adult medicaid personal care services
recipients’, Health services research 47(4), 1642–1659.
McNamee, P. (2006), ‘Effects of free personal care policy in scotland. examination of trends in the
use of informal and formal care at home and in residential care’, Securing Good Care for Older
People: Taking a Long-term View. Kings Fund, London, Appendix .
Mentzakis, E., Ryan, M. & McNamee, P. (2011), ‘Using discrete choice experiments to value
informal care tasks: exploring preference heterogeneity’, Health economics 20(8), 930–944.
Mihaylova, B., Briggs, A., O’hagan, A. & Thompson, S. G. (2011), ‘Review of statistical methods
for analysing healthcare resources and costs’, Health economics 20(8), 897–916.
Moran, P. A. (1950), ‘Notes on continuous stochastic phenomena’, Biometrika 37(1/2), 17–23.
Morciano, M., Hancock, R. & Pudney, S. (2015), ‘Disability costs and equivalence scales in the
older population in great britain’, Review of Income and Wealth 61(3), 494–514.
Morris, S., Sutton, M. & Gravelle, H. (2005), ‘Inequity and inequality in the use of health care in
england: an empirical investigation’, Social science & medicine 60(6), 1251–1266.
Moscone, F. & Knapp, M. (2005), ‘Exploring the spatial pattern of mental health expenditure’,
Journal of mental health policy and economics 8(4), 205.
Moscone, F., Tosetti, E. & Knapp, M. (2007), ‘Sur model with spatial effects: an application to
mental health expenditure’, Health economics 16(12), 1403–1408.
Mullahy, J. (1998), ‘Much ado about two: reconsidering retransformation and the two-part model
in health econometrics’, Journal of health economics 17(3), 247–281.
98
National Records of Scotland (2016a), ‘Mid 2016 Population Estimates Scotland’.
National Records of Scotland (2016b), ‘Projected population of scotland (2016-2041)’.
National Records of Scotland (2016c), ‘Scotland’s population: The registrar general’s annual
review of demographic trends’. Annual Report of the Registrar General of Births, Deaths and
Marriages for Scotland 2016, 162nd Edition.
National Records of Scotland (2017), ‘Scotland’s population 2016: Infographic report’.
NICE (2013), The social care guidance manual, Technical report, National Institute for Clinical
Excellence.
OECD (2017), Health at a Glance 2017: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Osborne, J. W. & Costello, A. B. (2009), ‘Best practices in exploratory factor analysis: Four
recommendations for getting the most from your analysis’, Pan-Pacific Management Review
12(2), 131–146.
Otto, M., Armeni, P. & Jommi, C. (2018), ‘Variations in non-prescription drug consumption and
expenditure: Determinants and policy implications’, Health Policy .
Oxford (2017), ‘Definition of standard of living’. Oxford English Dictionaries.
URL: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/standardo fliving
Penning, M. J. (2002), ‘Hydra revisited substituting formal for self-and informal in-home care
among older adults with disabilities’, The Gerontologist 42(1), 4–16.
Pezzin, L. E., Kemper, P. & Reschovsky, J. (1996), ‘Does publicly provided home care substitute
for family care? experimental evidence with endogenous living arrangements’, Journal of
Human Resources pp. 650–676.
Pezzin, L. E., Pollak, R. A. & Schone, B. S. (2007), ‘Efficiency in family bargaining: Living
arrangements and caregiving decisions of adult children and disabled elderly parents’, CESifo
Economic Studies 53(1), 69–96.
Pickard, L. (2012), ‘Substitution between formal and informal care: a ’natural experiment’in social
policy in britain between 1985 and 2000’, Ageing and Society 32(07), 1147–1175.
Pickard, L. (2018), ‘Good value for money? public investment in ‘replacement care’for working
carers in england’, Social Policy and Society pp. 1–18.
Pickard, L., King, D., Brimblecombe, N. & Knapp, M. (2015), ‘The effectiveness of paid services
in supporting unpaid carers’ employment in england’, Journal of social policy 44(3), 567–590.
Pickard, L., King, D., Brimblecombe, N. & Knapp, M. (2018), ‘Public expenditure costs of
carers leaving employment in england, 2015/2016’, Health & social care in the community
26(1), e132–e142.
99
Pickard, L., King, D. & Knapp, M. (2016), ‘The ‘visibility’of unpaid care in england’, Journal of
Social Work 16(3), 263–282.
Pickard, L., Wittenberg, R., Comas-Herrera, A., Davies, B. & Darton, R. (2000), ‘Relying on
informal care in the new century? informal care for elderly people in england to 2031’, Ageing
& Society 20(6), 745–772.
Propper, C., Eachus, J., Chan, P., Pearson, N. & Smith, G. D. (2005), ‘Access to health care
resources in the uk: the case of care for arthritis’, Health Economics 14(4), 391–406.
Rattinger, G. B., Schwartz, S., Mullins, C. D., Corcoran, C., Zuckerman, I. H., Sanders, C.,
Norton, M. C., Fauth, E. B., Leoutsakos, J.-M. S., Lyketsos, C. G. et al. (2015), ‘Dementia
severity and the longitudinal costs of informal care in the cache county population’, Alzheimer’s
& Dementia 11(8), 946–954.
Regidor, E., Martínez, D., Calle, M. E., Astasio, P., Ortega, P. & Domínguez, V. (2008),
‘Socioeconomic patterns in the use of public and private health services and equity in health
care’, BMC health services research 8(1), 183.
Royal Commission on Long Term Care (1999), With respect to old age, Technical report, The
Stationery Office, London.
Rutherford, A. C. & Bu, F. (2017), ‘Issues with the measurement of informal care in social surveys:
evidence from the english longitudinal study of ageing’, Ageing & Society pp. 1–19.
Salisbury, C., Johnson, L., Purdy, S., Valderas, J. M. & Montgomery, A. A. (2011), ‘Epidemiology
and impact of multimorbidity in primary care: a retrospective cohort study’, Br J Gen Pract
61(582), e12–e21.
Savage, S. & Bailey, S. (2004), ‘The impact of caring on caregivers’ mental health: a review of
the literature’, Australian health review 27(1), 111.
Schneider, E. C. (2017), Mirror Mirror 2017: International Comparison Reflects Flaws and
Opportunities for Better US Health Care, Commonwealth Fund.
Schulz, R. & Beach, S. R. (1999), ‘Caregiving as a risk factor for mortality: the caregiver health
effects study’, Jama 282(23), 2215–2219.
Schulz, R. & Sherwood, P. R. (2008), ‘Physical and mental health effects of family caregiving’,
Journal of Social Work Education 44(sup3), 105–113.
Scotish Government (2016), ‘Integration of health and social care’. Scottish Government Website.
URL: http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Health/Policy/Adult-Health-SocialCare-Integration
Scottish Executive (2001a), ‘Regulation of care (scotland) act 2001’, The Stationery Office Ltd
www. opsi. gov. uk/legislation .
Scottish Executive (2001b), Single shared assessment of community care needs, Technical report,
Health Departement, Directorate of Health Policy. Circular No: CCD 8/2001.
100
Scottish Executive (2002), ‘Community care and health (scotland) act 2002’, Stationery Office,
Edinburgh .
Scottish Executive (2003), ‘Free personal and nursing care-consolidated guidance’.
Scottish Executive (2016), ‘Scotland act 2016’, The Stationery Office Ltd www. opsi. gov.
uk/legislation .
Scottish Government (2009), ‘National standard eligibility criteria and waiting times for the
personal and nursing care of older people- guidance’.
Scottish Government (2010), The healthcare quality strategy for nhsscotland, Technical report,
Scottish Government.
URL: https://www.gov.scot/publications/healthcare-quality-strategy-nhsscotland/
Scottish Government (2015), ‘Scotland’s carers’.
URL: https://www.gov.scot/Resource/0047/00473691.pdf
Scottish Government (2016a), Health and social care delivery plan, Technical report, Scottish
Government.
Scottish Government (2016b), ‘Scottish government urban-rural classification 2016’.
URL: https://www.gov.scot/Resource/0053/00533588.pdf
Scottish Government (2016c), ‘Scottish index of multiple deprivation 2016: Introduction to simd’.
URL: https://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/SIMD
Scottish Government (2016d), ‘Social care survey data specification 2016’.
URL: http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Health/SocialCareSurvey/SC16
Scottish Government (2017a), ‘Carers (scotland) act 2016’.
URL: http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Health/Support-Social-Care/Unpaid-
Carers/Implementation/Carers-scotland-act-2016
Scottish Government (2017b), ‘Unpaid carers’.
URL: http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Health/Support-Social-Care/Unpaid-Carers
Scottish Government (2018), ‘Health and care experience survey 2017/18 technical report’.
URL: https://bit.ly/2RYRZPD
Scottish Government (2019), ‘Implementation for free personal care for under 65s’.
URL: https://www2.gov.scot/Topics/Health/Support-Social-Care/Support/Adult-Social-
Care/Free-Personal-Nursing-Care/Implementation-free-personal-care-under65
Scottish Parliament (2013), ‘Social care (self-directed support)(scotland) act 2013’, Edinburgh
and Norwich: The Stationery Office .
Scottish Parliament (2016), Spice briefing integration of health and social care, Technical report,
Scottish Parliament.
101
Shelley, W.-M. I. & Rose, R. M. (2004), ‘Trade-offs between formal home health care and informal
caregiving’, Journal of Family and Economic Issues 25(3).
Stallard, E. (2016), ‘Compression of morbidity and mortality: new perspectives’, North American
Actuarial Journal 20(4), 341–354.
Sutherland, S. R. (2008), Independent review of free personal and nursing care in Scotland,
Scottish Government.
Terraneo, M. (2015), ‘Inequities in health care utilization by people aged 50+: evidence from 12
european countries’, Social Science & Medicine 126, 154–163.
The Scottish Government (2017-18), ‘Green book for grant aided expenditure’. Local Government
Finance Settlement 2017-2018.
URL: https://www.gov.scot/Resource/0051/00515060.pdf
The Scottish Office (1992), ‘The client group approach to estimating grant aided expenditure’.
Finance Circular, Local Government Finance Group.
URL: https://www.gov.scot/Resource/0040/00406069.pdf
Trydegård, G.-B. & Thorslund, M. (2001), ‘Inequality in the welfare state? local variation in care
of the elderly–the case of sweden’, International Journal of Social Welfare 10(3), 174–184.
UK Data Service (2013/14-2016/17a), ‘Family Resources Survey’.
URL: https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/series/?sn=200017
UK Data Service (2016/17b), ‘Family Resources Survey Questionnaire Instructions ’.
United Nations (2017), ‘World population ageing 2017’, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs .
Van de Poel, E., Van Doorslaer, E. & O’Donnell, O. (2012), ‘Measurement of inequity in health
care with heterogeneous response of use to need’, Journal of Health Economics 31(4), 676–689.
van den Berg, B., Al, M., Brouwer, W., van Exel, J. & Koopmanschap, M. (2005), ‘Economic
valuation of informal care: the conjoint measurement method applied to informal caregiving’,
Social science & medicine 61(6), 1342–1355.
van den Berg, B., Al, M., van Exel, J., Koopmanschap, M. & Brouwer, W. (2008), ‘Economic
valuation of informal care: conjoint analysis applied in a heterogeneous population of informal
caregivers’, Value in health 11(7), 1041–1050.
van den Berg, B., Bleichrodt, H. & Eeckhoudt, L. (2005), ‘The economic value of informal care:
a study of informal caregivers’ and patients’ willingness to pay and willingness to accept for
informal care’, Health economics 14(4), 363–376.
van den Berg, B., Brouwer, W. B. F. & Koopmanschap, M. A. (2004), ‘Economic valuation of
informal care’, The European Journal of Health Economics, formerly: HEPAC 5(1), 36–45.
102
van den Berg, B., Brouwer, W., Exel, J. v. & Koopmanschap, M. (2005), ‘Economic valuation
of informal care: the contingent valuation method applied to informal caregiving’, Health
economics 14(2), 169–183.
van den Berg, B., Brouwer, W., van Exel, J., Koopmanschap, M., van den Bos, G. A. & Rutten, F.
(2006), ‘Economic valuation of informal care: lessons from the application of the opportunity
costs and proxy good methods’, Social science & medicine 62(4), 835–845.
van den Berg, B. & Ferrer-i Carbonell, A. (2007), ‘Monetary valuation of informal care: the well-
being valuation method’, Health economics 16(11), 1227–1244.
van den Berg, B. & Spauwen, P. (2006), ‘Measurement of informal care: an empirical study into
the valid measurement of time spent on informal caregiving’, Health economics 15(5), 447–460.
Van Doorslaer, E., Wagstaff, A., Van der Burg, H., Christiansen, T., De Graeve, D., Duchesne, I.,
Gerdtham, U.-G., Gerfin, M., Geurts, J., Gross, L. et al. (2000), ‘Equity in the delivery of health
care in europe and the us’, Journal of health economics 19(5), 553–583.
Van Exel, J., Bobinac, A., Koopmanschap, M. & Brouwer, W. (2008), ‘The invisible hands made
visible: recognizing the value of informal care in healthcare decision-making’, Expert review of
pharmacoeconomics & outcomes research 8(6), 557–561.
van Exel, N., Brouwer, W. B., van den Berg, B. & Koopmanschap, M. A. (2006), ‘With a little
help from an anchor: discussion and evidence of anchoring effects in contingent valuation’, The
journal of socio-economics 35(5), 836–853.
Van Houtven, C. H. & Norton, E. C. (2004), ‘Informal care and health care use of older adults’,
Journal of health economics 23(6), 1159–1180.
Van Houtven, C. H. & Norton, E. C. (2008), ‘Informal care and medicare expenditures: testing for
heterogeneous treatment effects’, Journal of health economics 27(1), 134–156.
Van Wijngaarden, B., Koeter, M., Knapp, M., Tansella, M., Thornicroft, G., Vázquez-Barquero,
J.-L. & Schene, A. (2009), ‘Caring for people with depression or with schizophrenia: are the
consequences different?’, Psychiatry Research 169(1), 62–69.
Vlachantoni, A., Robards, J., Falkingham, J. & Evandrou, M. (2016), ‘Trajectories of informal
care and health’, SSM-Population Health 2, 495–501.
Wagstaff, A. & Van Doorslaer, E. (2000), ‘Measuring and testing for inequity in the delivery of
health care’, Journal of Human Resources pp. 716–733.
Walter, S., Beltrán-Sánchez, H., Regidor, E., Gomez-Martin, C., Del-Barrio, J. L., Gil-de Miguel,
A., Subramanian, S. & Gil-Prieto, R. (2016), ‘No evidence of morbidity compression in spain:
a time series study based on national hospitalization records’, International journal of public
health 61(7), 729–738.
Weaver, F. M. & Weaver, B. A. (2014), ‘Does availability of informal care within the household
impact hospitalisation?’, Health Economics, Policy and Law 9(1), 71.
103
WHO (2000), The world health report 2000: health systems: improving performance, World
Health Organization.
Wittenberg, R., Hu, B. & Hancock, R. (2018), ‘Projections of demand and expenditure on adult
social care 2015 to 2040’.
Wood, R., Sutton, M., Clark, D., McKeon, A. & Bain, M. (2006), ‘Measuring inequalities in
health: the case for healthy life expectancy’, Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health
60(12), 1089–1092.
Work and Pensions Committee (2008), ‘Fourth report, 2007-08’.
Yardim, M. S. & Uner, S. (2018), ‘Equity in access to care in the era of health system reforms in
turkey’, Health Policy 122(6), 645–651.
Yong, V., Saito, Y. & Chan, A. (2011), ‘Gender differences in health and health expectancies of
older adults in singapore: an examination of diseases, impairments, and functional disabilities’,
Journal of cross-cultural gerontology 26(2), 189–203.
Zhu, C. W., Torgan, R., Scarmeas, N., Albert, M., Brandt, J., Blacker, D., Sano, M. & Stern, Y.
(2008), ‘Home health and informal care utilization and costs over time in alzheimer’s disease’,
Home health care services quarterly 27(1), 1–20.
104
